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The production of the report was coordinated by Alfonso Arpaia.

The main contributors were Alfonso Arpaia, Daniel Alonso, Marco Cantalupi, Matteo Duiella, Anita Halász, with inputs from Lucas Buchhass, Duco Claringbould, Andra Dusu. Adam Kowalski provided statistical and editorial assistance. Emilie Meurs provided secretarial support.

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Comments on the report would be gratefully received at the following E-mail address:

EMPL-A3-UNIT@ec.europa.eu.

FOREWORD

In 2020, the world was hit by an unprecedented pandemic.The restrictions to mobility and the introduction of social distancing measures led to a sudden halt in activity for a large number of sectors. The EU experienced the deepest recession since World War II.

The sizeable decline of EU GDP has for the time being had only a relatively modest impact on the unemployment rate at the time of publication. This report shows that the increase in the unemployment rate has been mitigated by the considerable drop in the hours worked, mainly due to the widespread use of short-time work schemes and a drastic decline in the activity rate.

Social distancing has impacted different sectors in different ways. Many workers do jobs that require close physical interaction with clients and colleagues, or perform tasks that cannot be done remotely. Women, low-educated, low-paid and young workers have suffered the most in this crisis. The young are particularly at risk of unemployment as they are more likely to be on temporary contracts. Protecting vulnerable workers is crucial to mitigate the socio-economic consequences of the pandemic.

Protecting workers and preserving jobs has been the European Commission's main objective since the start of the crisis. Short-time work schemes have been the main tool to preserve jobs, protect workers' income and avoid mass lay-offs. By rapidly adopting the Commission's proposal for a European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE), Member States have received the financial support to establish or continue short time work schemes.

The pandemic has also accelerated the digital transformation as remote working has largely extended. The impact on the organisation of work will be considerable. Jobs will disappear or be transformed as new jobs will be created. This will affect the labour market and enhance the need for better job transitions. Reskilling and upskilling are in this context of high importance to respond to these changes. The Pact for Skills precisely brings together private and public stakeholders to promote this skills revolution. Active labour market policies should contribute to a job rich recovery. Upskilling and reskilling, job-search assistance and well-designed and temporary hiring subsidies on the top of adequate social protection for all workers independently of their contract status will be more important than ever to ease transitions and foster inclusive growth. The funds made available by the European Social Fund, the Recovery and Resilience Facility and REACT-EU are major tools to tackle these challenges related to jobs and social inclusion following this unprecedented time of upheaval.

Nicolas Schmit
European Commissioner for Jobs and Social Rights



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SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS

This edition focuses on the impact of the pandemic on the EU labour market until mid-2020

At the end of 2019, a new coronavirus, named COVID-19, emerged from the city of Wuhan (China) and rapidly spread all over the world. Against this background, and while Europe is hit by a second wave of the pandemic, this edition focusses on the impact of the pandemic on the labour market in the first half of 2020.

The EU economy was starting to slow down when COVID-19 struck

In 2019, the GDP growth rate dropped to 1.3%, from 1.9% one year earlier. The good labour market outcomes contributed to sustaining domestic demand, while the weakness of the external sector was a drag on economic growth. The EU unemployment rate kept falling throughout the year and, in December 2019, reached its lowest rate since 2000 (6.5%). Employment growth slowed down during the second half of the year, but remained solid. On an annual basis, it increased by 1% (1.2% for the euro area), close to the average of the period 2000-2018.

In a few weeks, the outlook for 2020 has taken a dramatic turn for the worse

By the end of November 2020, more than 51 million people were infected globally by the pandemic, and the EU had recorded almost 11.5 million of confirmed cases of infection and 264 thousand deaths. Wide-ranging containment measures were taken to avoid the spread of the virus and prevent health systems from becoming overwhelmed. By mid-March 2020, most countries had adopted social distancing measures and ordered the closure of non-essential services. In several countries, working was allowed only remotely with the exception of essential services. In spring, countries took steps to soften these restrictions. In summer, restrictions were lifted except for public gatherings and some international travels. In spite of its short duration, the lockdown was pervasive and large were its negative effects on the economy.

The pandemic represents the largest economic shock since World War II

Although the timing and stringency of lockdown measures differed across countries, a sizeable drop of consumption, investment, labour demand, labour supply and production was observed everywhere. In the first quarter of 2020, EU GDP fell by 3.3% quarter-over-quarter, the largest decline since the series is available. The contraction continued, and was even sharper in the second quarter (11.4% quarter-over-quarter). Over the same period, employment declined by 2.8% corresponding to 6 million less employed (2.7% for the euro area). Half of this drop of employment was concentrated in contact-intensive sectors, such as wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food services. In the third quarter, GDP rebounded by 11.6% in the EU (12.5% in the euro area). Over the same period, the number of employed increased by less than 1% in both the EU and the euro area.

The increase of the unemployment rate has been mitigated by the drop in the hours worked and the drastic decline in the labour force activity rate

In the first half of 2020, the sizeable decline of GDP in the EU had only a relatively small impact on the unemployment rate. Between the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020, the EU unemployment rate rose from about 6.6% to almost 6.7%. This increase is below the one experienced during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and smaller than what would have been expected on the basis of the drop of GDP. In October 2020, the unemployment rate reached 7.6%. Two reasons explain this unusual response of unemployment. The first is the pervasive decline in hours worked, which mainly reflects the extensive use of short-time work schemes. The dismissal restrictions introduced in some countries have also contributed to containing labour shedding. Second, the severity of the recession pushed many unemployed people – in particular young, low-skilled and women – into

inactivity as they gave up job search. Between the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020, there was a contraction in the activity rate in 21 Member States. For the EU, the activity rates dropped from 73.5% in the fourth quarter of 2019 to 71.8% in the second quarter of 2020. Activity rates declined for all level of education and in particular for the low skilled. Over the same period, the EU active population fell by 5.8 million, equally distributed between men and women. With few exceptions, the youth and female activity rate dropped in all countries, with drastic declines – between 5 and 6 percentage points – for both groups in Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Portugal.

Containment measures have influenced both labour demand and labour supply

The containment measures taken to curb contagion have significantly altered individuals' behaviour, with effects that persisted after their relaxation in spring. In the turn of a few weeks, mobility to non-residential locations fell by about 80%. The strict lockdown measures introduced during the first half of 2020 were accompanied by a worsening of the unemployment expectations. Households' concerns about their financial situations reached unprecedented levels. The analysis shows that half of the 3% employment losses observed between the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 was due to the response of unemployment expectations to the lockdown. Deteriorating labour market prospects translated into higher households' savings, lower consumption and lower demand for labour. On the supply side, constraints to physical mobility to many workplaces sharply reduced production. Starting from May 2020, several restrictions began to be lifted. Nonetheless, economic activity and confidence remained weak in the second quarter of 2020. In response to a second wave of infections, governments introduced more selective lockdown measures in October 2020. Preliminary evidence suggests that mobility dropped but not as strongly during the first wave. Despite the rebound of GDP in the third quarter, vacancies have remained at the lowest level since more than two decades.

In the short-term, individuals adopt social distancing also in the absence of strict confinement measures

In the context dominated by the uncertainty about the spread of the virus, individuals lower their risks of contagion by limiting voluntarily the consumption of contact-intensive goods. This is confirmed by indicators of mobility to workplaces – a proxy of the effect of the confinement measures on economic activity via a "demand channel" – which fell with the increase in the number of confirmed cases also in countries where lockdown measures were less strict. Moreover, although there is a large drop of mobility to workplaces around the date of implementation of the confinement measures, it is shown that this decline started already a week before the administrative measures were issued. These findings confirm that individuals have adjusted their consumption pattern before the restrictions were in place. In an uncertain outlook, firms also hold back their investments. Overall, lower consumption and investments imply that the demand for labour will remain "on hold" in several sectors, even without strict mandatory measures, which weakens the prospects of a quick economic recovery.

Social distancing has heterogeneous impacts across sectors and occupations

Many workers are in occupations that are vulnerable to social distancing, i.e. in jobs that require close physical interactions with clients or other workers or have tasks that cannot be completed remotely. Workers in *high contact* and *low tele-workability occupations* account for 45% of total employment. Most of them are women and low-educated and young. The latter are more at risk of unemployment as they are more likely to be in temporary employment.

Looking at earnings, about 73% of vulnerable occupations are low wage earners. The low educated are also at higher risk of unemployment, as only few of them are in tele-workable occupations. Protecting vulnerable workers is necessary to mitigate the distributional effects of the pandemic.

Remote working is an effective way to reduce vulnerability to social distancing

There is a significant difference across Member States in the share of work that can be done remotely. On average, at least 25% of workers can potentially perform their tasks from home. However, the distribution across countries is quite heterogeneous. While in Luxembourg and Slovenia more than 40% of employment is in activities that can be executed remotely, in Spain, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Greece this accounts for less than 30% of total employment. Countries with a disproportionate number of contact-intensive occupations that cannot be performed remotely (e.g. Greece and Spain) are more vulnerable to social distancing.

There is a potential of remote working that is not fully exploited

According to the last available data (2019), only 13% of total employed was working remotely either usually or sometimes. The gap between the potential and the effective number of people working remotely is the largest in Cyprus, Lithuania and Romania, (more than 30 percentage points), while in the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, the gap is less than 7 percentage points. Although the extent of teleworking during the COVID-19 outbreak has very much increased, there is a potential that can be further exploited.

The policy responses have mitigated the labour market and social impacts of COVID-19

The policy response at the EU and national level - including a temporary relaxation of fiscal and state aid rules, the full use of EU funding instruments and the use of short-time work schemes - have been decisive to preserve jobs and support households' incomes. Through the European instrument for temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE), Member States have expressed their concrete solidarity towards countries with tighter financing conditions in order to help workers to maintain their jobs. Social partners took actions to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on growth and jobs and ensure the health and safety of workers at risks.

Different measures have supported households' incomes

All Member States have implemented comprehensive policy packages aiming at preserving jobs and supporting incomes of workers directly or indirectly affected by the pandemic. Many Member States have adapted sickness benefits to protect incomes of workers in quarantine after being diagnosed with COVID-19 or exposed to the virus. In several of them, schools' closure or distance learning required an adaptation of care and parental leave measures to allow parents to take care of their children. To mitigate the distributional effects of the crisis, several countries adopted targeted measures in favour of vulnerable groups. Short-time work schemes have been the main tool to preserve jobs, protect workers' income and avoid mass lay-offs. Some countries complemented these schemes with restrictions to dismissals or allowing for more working time flexibility.

All countries have used short-time work to avoid a mass increase in unemployment

In countries with consolidated schemes, their scope has been extended and their access simplified by shortening notification periods and streamlining administrative procedures. Access was also extended to certain categories of workers, firms and certain sectors previously excluded, most notably workers with temporary contracts and SMEs. The criteria for acceding the schemes were also relaxed. New schemes have been introduced in countries that did

not have short-time schemes before the pandemic. Usually, these schemes set limits to the reduction of working hours or sales that a firm would experience to be eligible for the support, which makes them less flexible than schemes where there are no constraints to the drop in hours or economic activity.

The extensive use of short-time work schemes has mitigated the effect of the recession on unemployment

The widespread use of short-time work schemes contributed to curbing the massive job destruction that many countries would have otherwise experienced following the severe output losses of the first half of 2020. This is particularly the case for countries with well-established short-time work schemes. Conversely, the effect seems smaller in countries where new schemes have been introduced, following the pandemic outbreak, perhaps because of the design of their schemes or implementation delays. At the height of the first wave of the pandemic, about one fifth of employees across the EU has been in a short-time work scheme. Short-time work schemes are more prevalent in services. Differences across countries in the take-up are partly related to the length of the lockdown and to the prevalence of contact-intensive occupations. A high share of temporary contracts also leads to a lower share of workers in short-time work.

In the medium-term, COVID-19 entails a reallocation across industries and geographical locations

The pandemic accelerates the adoption of automation in all sectors of the economy and increases the demand for essential services. In the medium term, these changes can boost productivity growth and wages and accelerate the transition towards low-carbon and digital technologies. Changes in consumers' behaviour (e.g. use of online shopping) may persist after the health shock has receded. Businesses that invested in digital infrastructures and adopted new communication technologies during the lockdown may realise that remote working brings significant savings (e.g. maintenance of buildings). The demand for certain activities (such as leisure and hospitality) might contract, at least until Europe has become an area with very much reduced contagion risks. Displaced workers will be less employable if their job-specific skills are not transferrable to thriving sectors or occupations. As digital transformation accelerates, skills are likely to depreciate and become obsolete faster. There is a risk of rising mismatches and structural unemployment. Since access to technology differs between low- and high-income earners, this reallocation may intensify polarisation and income inequality. Protecting vulnerable workers is necessary to mitigate the distributional effects of the pandemic-induced structural changes. The employment and skills policies required in this context should speed up the recovery and accompany the reallocation of workers toward expanding sectors, including in the green, digital and other strategic sectors (e.g. health care).

Employment policies should focus on preserving employment in viable firms, supporting structural change and job opportunities in expanding sectors

The rise of infections since early October 2020 has led many EU governments to reinstate targeted shutdowns. While reducing the economic impact of the new restrictions and avoiding a massive job destruction requires that the current measures are only withdrawn in the light of the evolving health and economic situation, it will be important to gradually shift the focus from employment preservation to supporting structural change and new job creation by easing business restructuring and facilitating the redeployment of labour. Thus, when designing the employment policies that are appropriate in this particular context, it is necessary to go beyond the initial response to preserve jobs, by devising more targeted and selective policies that can support the green and digital transitions that will boost growth and job

creation. This will require a combination of upskilling and reskilling measures, job-search assistance and well-designed and temporary hiring subsidies on the top of adequate social protection for all workers independently of their contract status.

1. GENERAL LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN THE EURO AREA AND THE EU

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of 2019 has completely changed the life of millions of people and imposed an enormous human toll and large output and employment losses. This edition focusses on the impact of the pandemic on the labour market in the first half of the year and discusses the unprecedented challenges stemming from social distancing measures.

The EU economy was already slowing down when the COVID-19 pandemic struck. In 2019, the GDP growth rate declined to 1.3%, from 1.9% one year earlier. The good labour market performance up to end 2019 contributed to sustaining domestic demand, while the weakness of the external sector was a drag on economic growth. Unemployment kept falling throughout the year and in December 2019 reached its lowest rate (6.5%) since 2000.

In the first quarter of 2020, when the pandemic reached the EU, several Member States enacted extraordinary social distancing measures, aimed at curbing the diffusion of the virus and alleviating the burden on the health care systems. Although their timing and stringency differed across countries, a sizeable drop of output, domestic demand and labour supply was observed everywhere. In the first quarter of 2020, EU GDP fell by 3.3% quarter-over-quarter, the largest decline since the series is available. The contraction continued, and was even sharper, in the second quarter (11.4% quarter-over-quarter); this is when several restrictions have started to be gradually lifted.

Thanks to the exceptional stimulus measures and the gradual lifting of restrictions to mobility in spring, EU GDP increased in the third quarter by 11.6% compared to the previous quarter (12.6% in the euro area). Over the same period, employment increased by 0.9% in both the EU and the euro area.

The sizeable decline of GDP has so far had only a relatively small impact on the unemployment rate, which stood in October 2020 at 7.6%, about 1 pps above the level of the last quarter of 2019. By comparison, between February and May the US unemployment rate more than quadrupled - from 3.5% to 14.7% - while GDP dropped by 1.3% and 9% in the first and second quarter respectively. In September, the unemployment rate dropped to 6.9%, which is still more than twice the rate in February.

Two reasons explain this relatively mild response of unemployment in Europe. The first is the pervasive decline in hours worked, which mainly reflects the extensive use of short-time work schemes. In the first and second quarter, the hours worked per person employed in the EU dropped by 2.9% and 11.3% respectively. The chapter shows that if workers involved in workplace closures had lost their jobs, the employment rate would have dropped from 68.3% to 61.6%. Assuming no change in the activity rate, this would have implied an increase in the unemployment rate of about 10 pps. Second, the severity of the recession and the limitations to mobility have brought many unemployed people into inactivity. In the first quarter of 2020, there was a contraction in the activity rate in 18 Member States. In the second quarter, the activity rate further dropped in 17 countries. For the EU as a whole, the activity rate dropped from 73.5% in the fourth quarter of 2019 to 71.8% in the second quarter of 2020.

The containment measures that all Member States have taken to curb down contagion, and that have been gradually tightened until April, have significantly altered individuals' mobility behaviour. In the turn of a few weeks, people's mobility to non-residential locations fell by about 80% on average. By the end of April, about 45% of working age population was affected by school and workplace closures. All this was accompanied by a worsening of employers and consumers' unemployment expectations over the next twelve months. Households' concerns about their financial situations reached unprecedented levels.

Starting from May, several restrictions began to be lifted. Over the summer, people's mobility to non-residential locations - a real time indicator of economic activity - came back close to pre-corona normal. Nonetheless, economic activity in the second quarter remained weak. As a second wave of infections led to introduce selective lockdown

measures, mobility dropped but not as strongly as during the first wave.

In spite of the short-time work schemes and supportive policies, employment fell by almost 3% in the first half of the year compared to the same period of the previous year. Over the summer, unemployment expectations improved, but started to deteriorate again in October.

Social distancing has deeply hit sectors such as retail, accomodation, restaurants and transports that heavily rely on close physical interactions with other people. Jobs vulnerable to social distancing are those that require workers to be close to other people to complete their tasks or jobs that cannot be executed by remote working. About 45% of workers are in vulnerable occupations, most of them are women, low educated and young; the latter are more at risk as they are disproportionally in temporary contracts. As new labour market entrants, the young are also at higher risk of unemployment.

Remote working is an effective way to reduce the risks of contagion and the costs of social distancing. Overall, the report shows 30% of the occupations can potentially be performed remotely. Yet, not all this potential has been fully exploited. With the exception of the workers aged between 55 and 64 years of age, the share of workers actually teleworking is about 10 pps below potential. These findings suggest that policies promoting remote working may contribute to mitigating the economic costs of social distancing until a vaccine is deployed to a large mass of people.

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Until the end of 2019, the European economy was on a path of a gradual slowdown. After six consecutive years of growth, economic activity in the EU was expanding at a slower rate, amid less supportive global growth and rising geo-political and trade tensions. A weak demand of manufacturing goods restrained growth, while services continued to expand. The good labour market performance and the gradual acceleration of wages kept domestic demand high.

Within a few weeks, the outlook for 2020 took a dramatic turn for the worse. The outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (COVID-19) was reported at the end of December in Wuhan in China. It rapidly spread globally to all countries in the world. ([1]) By the end of November, the EU had recorded 11.5 million of confirmed cases of infection ([2]) and around 51 million people were infected in the rest of the world. At the same date, the pandemic has taken 264 thousand lives in the EU (and 1.2 million in the rest of the world).

Wide-ranging containment measures have been taken to avoid the spread of the virus. In the first quarter of 2020, all Member States took measures aimed at restraining social interactions. By mid-March, most countries had mandated social distancing measures and ordered the closure of non-essential services. In spring, countries took steps to soften these restrictions. In summer, most restrictions were lifted. As a second wave of contagion hit Europe, selective restrictions were restored since September.

The economic implications of the pandemic are broad and sweeping. Three elements characterise the labour market impact of COVID-19. First, the duration and stringency of the confinement measures have brought immediate large output losses, especially in activities that rely on social interactions (e.g. travel, hotels and restaurants, arts and recreational, retail trade and personal services). Through trade linkages, the lockdown disrupted global value chains, amplifying the impact of domestic physical restrictions on the economic activity. Second, the uncertainty about the duration of the health crisis made consumers and firms more cautious about their spending and hiring plans; in particular, consumers postponed larger expenditures. ([3]) Third, uncertainty looms around the labour demand shifts that may result from COVID-19 in the medium-term and on the characteristics of the occupations that are more vulnerable to social distancing. Uncertainty about

([1]) On 11 March, the World Health Organisation declared that the epidemic had become a pandemic.
([2]) Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.
([3]) UNCTAD (2020) shows that online shopping increased everywhere but average online monthly spending per shopper dropped. The employment impact is uncertain, as the size of online shopping differs between different goods; also online shopping entails a completely different production model than traditional retail (PWC, 2020).

the future labour demand may delay hiring. Depending on the scope of reallocation induced by COVID-19, matching job seekers with vacant jobs may require time, especially if people do not have the skills required for taking up new jobs in different occupations.

The Commission put forward several measures to help Member States respond to this challenge. In spring 2020, it tabled a set of measures, introducing full flexibility to use some EUR 54 billion under the European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds to assist health care systems, small and medium-sized enterprises and workers. The CRII+ (*Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative Plus)* mobilises all non-utilised support from the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. ([4]) The Commission proposed a modification of rules applicable to the use of ESI funds, supporting healthcare and cushioning the economic blow for citizens. ([5]) The Commission proposed a solidarity instrument (SURE) worth up to EUR 100 billion to support national short-time work schemes and similar measures for the self-employed. ([6])([7]). Temporary deviations from the normal requirements under the Stability and Growth Pact were authorised as the general escape clause activated. A temporary framework for state aid to support affected companies was introduced.

There is a need to get back on a path of sustainable growth and job creation. The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), proposed by the Commission in May, will provide large-scale financial support of EUR 672.5 billion in the form of grants and loans to support relevant reforms and investments by Member States. ([8]) The RRF will support EU common priorities, notably the green and digital transitions, social and economic resilience with a view to fostering a balanced recovery based on convergence, sustainable growth and jobs.

Monitoring the effect of the pandemic requires combining information that refers to different time horizons and frequencies. Containment measures were taken and subsequently relaxed between February and April, while GDP and employment data are available at quarterly frequency. Containment measures respond to the evolution of the contagion, which, in turn, depends on individual behaviour in dealing with the health emergency. This web of interactions makes it difficult to disentangle the labour market effects of social distancing from those stemming from their subsequent reversal. In this context, the surveys used to track labour market outcomes provide only belated information on the possible labour market impacts of the pandemic.

Against this background, this chapter analyses how labour markets are responding to the crisis that followed the outbreak of COVID-19. It compares the EU labour market performance with that of other industrialised economies and assesses the role played by relevant variables including employment, participation, working hours and wages. Section 1.2 describes the recent developments. Based on daily data obtained by the Google Maps smartphone applications, the Section first identifies how individual mobility behaviour evolved over time in response to social distancing measures. High frequency data combined with a measure of stringency of the lockdown are used to identify the effect of confinement measures on unemployment expectations and employment. This analysis is informative of the effects of the lockdown and of how the labour market has responded to the gradual softening of the limitations to individual mobility over the summer. To conclude, the Section provides a mapping of the occupations vulnerable to social distancing. Section 1.3 analyses the trends in employment, activity rates and hours worked. Section 1.4 reviews trends in wages and labour costs. Finally, Section 1.5 focuses on aggregate movements in and out of unemployment and indicators job matching. Section 1.6 concludes.

([4]) CRII+ provides support to the most deprived by changing the rules for the Fund for European Aid to the most deprived.
([5]) The ESF contributes to supporting short-time work schemes; allowances for parents who cannot work as they have to take care of their children whose schools were closed; and allowances for trainers whose trainings have been suspended. See Corona virus response.
([6]) See SURE.
([7]) See Overview of the Commission's response.
([8]) The European Union will raise the necessary funds by borrowing on the financial markets in the context of the NextGenerationEU initiative.

Table 1.1: **Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area and the EU**

					Quarter over same quarter of previous year, %							Quarter over previous quarter, %						
		2017	2018	2019	2019Q1	2019Q2	2019Q3	2019Q4	2020Q1	2020Q2	2020Q3	2019Q1	2019Q2	2019Q3	2019Q4	2020Q1	2020Q2	2020Q3
Unemployment rate	EA	9.0	8.1	7.5	-0.8	-0.7	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.2	1.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.1	1.0
	EU	7.6	6.8	6.3	-0.7	-0.6	-0.5	-0.5	-0.4	0.0	1.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.2	0.8
Unemployment growth	EA	-9.4	-9.4	-7.1	-8.4	-8.5	-6.0	-6.0	-7.0	-4.8	10.1	-1.0	-2.8	-1.0	-1.3	-2.0	-0.6	14.6
	EU	-10.3	-10.2	-7.2	-8.3	-8.7	-6.5	-6.2	-6.7	-1.9	13.3	-1.0	-3.3	-0.8	-1.2	-1.5	1.6	14.6
Growth of nominal compensation per employee	EA	1.7	2.2	1.9	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.7	0.6	-4.7	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.2	-0.8	-4.8	6.3
	EU	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.1	1.1	-3.8	0.8	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.3	-0.6	-4.3	5.6
GDP growth	EA	2.6	1.9	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.0	-3.2	-14.7	-4.3	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1	-3.7	-11.7	12.5
	EU	2.6	2.0	1.5	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.3	-2.6	-13.9	-4.2	0.6	0.3	0.3	0.2	-3.3	-11.3	11.5
Employment growth	EA	1.6	1.6	1.2	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.4	-3.0	-2.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.2	-0.3	-3.0	1.0
	EU	1.5	1.4	1.0	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.4	-2.8	-1.9	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.2	-0.2	-2.8	0.9

EU-27 from 2020Q1. Seasonally adjusted data. As for the unemployment rate, the table presents changes in percentage points, rather than percent. For 2020Q3, unemployment rate is monthly average.
Source: Eurostat.

1.2. SETTING THE SCENE: THE EU LABOUR MARKET IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

1.2.1. Recent EU-level developments

The slowdown that started at the beginning of 2018 continued at a more gradual pace in 2019. Driven by the weakness of the external sector, economic activity in 2019 expanded at a slower rate than in 2018 (Table 1.1). Economic growth was supported by the dynamism of services and stimulated by a resilient labour market and sustained wage growth. Employment growth slowed down during the second half of the year, but remained solid (Graph 1.1). On an annual basis, it increased by 1% (1.2% for the euro area) close to the average of the period 2000-2018.

Graph 1.1: **Employment, GDP and productivity growth in the EU, 1996Q1-2020Q3**



Source: Eurostat. EU 27 from 2020Q1

Throughout 2019, the unemployment rate continued to fall. Employment in the EU further increased by 2.1 million (1.9 million in the euro area). It was 3.6%, above the level observed before the 2008 crisis in the EU (4% in the euro area). Employment in 2019 continued to outpace the increase in the labour force, leading to a drop in unemployment by almost 1 million in the EU (960 thousands for the euro area) (Graph 1.2). The unemployment rate fell steadily from almost 11% in early 2013 (12% for the euro area) to 6.5% (7.3% for the euro area) in December 2019 - the lowest rate since the EU time series is available. At the onset of the 2013 recovery, the number of unemployed (15-74 years) had reached 24.8 million (19.1 million in the euro area), but by 2019 it had dropped to 14.2 million (12.3 million in the euro area). About 60% of this decline was due to the fall in the long-term unemployed.

Graph 1.2: **Employment and unemployment in the EU, million persons, 2001Q1-2020Q3**



(1) Employment is from National Accounts, domestic concept, ages 15 and over, seasonally adjusted. (2) Unemployment is from the Labour Force Survey, ages 15-74, seasonally adjusted. EU27.
Source: Eurostat.

The COVID-19 outbreak has drastically changed the economic outlook. In the second quarter of 2020, GDP was almost 15% lower than at the end of 2019 (15.5% for the euro area). Over

the same period, employment declined by 3% or by some 6 million people (3.2% for the euro area or about 5 million less employed) - (Table 1.1). These are the largest declines ever observed at the early stage of a recession. The swift and widespread use of short-time working schemes has contributed to mitigating the job losses implied by the sharp fall of output. The counterpart of this is the large drop in the hours worked per person employed, which fell over the same period for the EU and the euro area respectively by about 11.3% and 14.2%; this is the largest decline since 1995. ([9]) The drop of employment has been more accentuated for temporary contracts; ([10]) in the EU, almost 12% less in the first half of 2020 compared to the level of 2019.

Graph 1.3: **Actual unemployment rate and Okun's prediction**



(1) Weighted average of the predictions for different countries with weights their labour force in total EU in 2019. Sample period: 2000Q4-2019Q4.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat LFS and National Accounts.

Between the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020, the EU unemployment rate increased from 6.2% to 6.9%. This increase is below what was experienced during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and less than expected by the drop of GDP in the first half of the year (Graph 1.3). In October, the unemployment rate reached 7.6% of the labour force (8.5% for the euro area). The number of unemployed was almost 16.3 million in the EU and about 14 million in the euro area, respectively almost 2.1 million and 1.7 million above the level of December 2019.

In the third quarter, there was a partial recovery of output and employment. The figures for the third quarter show a strong increase of GDP in the EU, with a growth rate of 11.6% compared to the second quarter (12.6% for the euro area), accompanied only by a small pick up of employment (0.9% for both the EU and the euro area). Yet, EU GDP and employment remain, respectively 4.4% and 3% below the levels prior to the pandemic. Although the COVID-19 shock is a unique event, experience from past epidemics suggests that its effects can be persistent (Box 1.1).

The dispersion of unemployment rates increased slightly in the second quarter. The gap between the maximum and minimum unemployment rate dropped from 22.5 pps in the second quarter of 2013 to 14.6 pps in the fourth quarter of 2019. The dispersion continued to fall in the third quarter of 2020, mainly due to the increase of the unemployment rate in countries where this is low (Graph 1.4). In the second quarter, the effect of the pandemic started to be visible, in particular with an increase of the jobless rate in countries with high unemployment. The gap between the lowest and the highest unemployment rate increased to 14.7% pps.

Graph 1.4: **Unemployment rates by quartile, January 2000-October 2020**



(1) A quartile divides data into four representative points. The first quartile is the middle number that falls between the minimum and the median (the second quartile). The third quartile is the point that lies between the median and the maximum. The median is the point where half of the values are greater and half are less than the value. (2) Except for the EU, each point in time may represent a different country.
Source: Eurostat, LFS.

([9]) Since 1995, the hours worked per person employed have been falling at about 1% per year.
([10]) In the sectors most directly affected, non-standard workers represent around 40% of total EU employment (Causa and Cavalleri, 2020).

Box 1.1: Economic effects of COVID-19: evidence from the 1918 influenza

Studies of the economic effect of the 1918 influenza provide some insights into the economic consequences of pandemics. The measures taken at that time were similar to those adopted in response to COVID-19 (lower working hours, school closure, and ban of public events). Epidemiology literature has shown that these measures reduce disease transmission, that epidemics spread faster during economic booms as people travel more (Adda, 2017; Carillo and Jappelli, 2020). While clear differences exist in terms of the importance of services, trade linkages, technology and synchronisation of lockdowns, the 1918 influenza suggests that a pandemic has substantial economic effects.

With about 50 million of fatalities, the 1918 influenza was the costliest epidemic of modern times. On the labour supply side, the most important cost was the drop in the labour force (Fan et al., 2016). Cross-country estimates indicate that the 1918 flu led to a decline of GDP in the order of 6-8% in the typical country (Barro et al., 2020). The effects on output growth differed across firms and households (Garrett, 2008). Cohorts born during the pandemic had lower educational attainment, lower incomes (Almond, 2006), higher infant mortality (Guimbeau et al., 2020) and lower social trust (Le Moglie et al. 2020). More exposed areas experienced a sharper and more persistent decline in consumer durables, manufacturing output and employment. The impact also varied across countries. For Denmark, the recovery was V-shaped; the unemployment rate spiked during the pandemic, but declined a few months after it had regressed (Dahl et al., 2020). In Italy, regions with the highest mortality rate experienced a decline of GDP 6.5% larger than in the lowest mortality regions, with the effects on output vanishing after 4 years (Carillo and Jappelli, 2020). For the US, the decline of employment and output in exposed states was more persistent, lasting up to five years (Correia et al., 2020); the increase in mortality in 1919 relative to 1917 led to a fall of output by 18%, of employment by 23% and of the population by 1.8%.

All Member States adopted interventions to favour social distancing (Box 1.2). In spite of its short duration and different degree of restrictions imposed (Graph 1.5), the lockdown was pervasive. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the direct labour market impacts and the role of expectations.

Graph 1.5: **Stringency of containment measures, 1 January- 30 November**



Oxford COVID-19 Government response collects information on eight containment measures. The index measures the strictness of restrictions. It varies between zero and 100.
Source: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker

1.2.2. The direct effects of the March lockdown

Containment measures have a direct impact on social interactions and the economic activities that rely on them. Workplace, stay-at-home and public transport restrictions have a direct impact on workers' physical mobility. School closures reduce the travel of children and the mobility to work of parents that have to take care of them at home. Restrictions to mobility reduce labour supply of those who need travelling from home to their workplace for their regular activities. By favouring social distancing, confinement measures reduce the demand for goods and services that rely on personal interactions: they also leads to a decline of labour supply as people cannot travel to their workplaces. ([11]) They have direct effects on demand of contact-intensive sectors such as tourism, retail, recreation and culture (Graph 1.33).

The sectors more directly affected by the administrative restrictions accounted for about one third of job creation during the 2013-2019 recovery. Fana et al. (2020) have assessed the

([11]) See Gupta et al. (2020); Correia et al. (2020).

restriction decrees of three Member States (Germany, Italy and Spain) and come up with a classification based on whether industries were allowed to operate. The *fully closed* and the *mostly inactive* sectors account for about one third of total employment in the EU ([12]). During the 2013-2019 recovery, these sectors accounted for 35% of total employment growth (Graph 1.6). The *partly active* sectors, including, among others, trade and other market services, represented 17% of total employment and contributed for 13% to total employment growth. Finally, *teleworkable activities* absorbed only one quarter of total employment; yet, their contribution to total job creation was about 32%. ([13])

Graph 1.6: **Sectoral contribution to 2013-2019 employment growth (%)**



Industry: Nace B to F. Market services: Nace G to N; Others: Nace P to U.
Source: European Commission calculations on Fana et al. (2020) and Eurostat.

If workers involved in workplace closures had lost their jobs, the employment rate would have dropped from 68.3% to 61.6%. From 22 February to 2 April, up to 19 million of employed were gradually affected by workplace closures, i.e. 9.6% of EU total employment (Graph 1.7). If these would have been dismissed, the EU employment would have fallen from 199.4 million to 180.4 million. Assuming no change in the activity rate, this would have implied an increase in the unemployment rate of about 10 pps.

Graph 1.7: **Population involved in school closure and employment involved by workplace closures**



Sectors are classified in six categories: fully active, tele-workable, partly active, mostly inactive, strongly restricted; closed. The employment share was computed for each country and category. The chart is obtained applying the share of sectors that are fully closed. Closed sectors include all workers in accommodation, real estate, arts, entertainment and recreation; half of those in other services and one quarter of those in administrative and support service activities. Mostly inactive sectors are concentrated in the industry, including construction, manufacture of fabricated metal products, motor vehicles and machinery.
Source: European Commission calculations on Fana et al. (2020).

The containment measures have led to a drastic drop in people's mobility, which continued also after the restrictions were partly relaxed in spring. Since mid-March, there was a decline in the mobility towards non-residential locations and an increase in the presence in residential locations (see Graphs 1.8 and 1.31-1.32). ([14]) By country, the trajectory differs depending on the spread of the virus and the measures implemented (Graph 1.31). Yet, on average, mobility to non-residential locations fell by about 80%. In May, several restrictions began to be lifted up and mobility to various locations - except to workplaces, retail and recreation and transit stations - gradually came back to pre-lockdown levels.

([12]) See footnote to Graph 1.7.
([13]) Total employment growth in teleworkable sectors (the sum of the green bars) was 2.4%. This represents 32% of total employment growth, i.e. 7.5%.

([14]) Google Mobility reports provide information on how visits and length of stay at different locations change over time. Data have been collected for the following location: grocery and pharmacy; parks; residential; retail and recreation; transit stations; workplaces. The *Residential* category shows a change time spent at home - the other categories measure a change in total visitors.

Box 1.2: **Policy measures for social distancing**

Governments have taken a wide range of containment measures aimed at curbing the spread of the virus and alleviating the burden on the health systems. Countries implemented a combination of eight types of measures: 1) restrictions of international travels; 2) restrictions to domestic travel; 3) closures of public transports; 4) school closures; 5) workplace closures except for essential activities; 6) cancellation of public events; 7) restrictions on gathering size; 8) stay-at-home-requirements.

Within less than one month following the first confirmed cases, the majority of Member States had taken measures of social distancing that strongly reduced individual mobility (Graph 1**)**. By the end of February, seven countries had constrained international travels; in six of them, this was the first measure taken. In a few days, some measures were taken all together: by the first half of March, the large majority of countries had cancelled public events, restricted public gatherings and closed schools and workplaces. This coincidence of events makes it difficult to identify the consequences of single containment measures. In the second half of March, domestic travels were restricted and stay-at-home orders issued. Public transports were closed later, but not everywhere.

There is a large variation across countries in the timing of adoption of different containment measures. Restrictions to international travels occurred relatively early (Graph 2). In France and Italy, workplace restrictions were the second measure introduced to mitigate the spread of the virus, while for a large number of Member States it was the last one to be implemented, either alone or jointly with other measures. Bulgaria and Germany introduced school closure orders as a first measure, respectively before and after the reported first confirmed case. In the large majority of countries, school and workplace closures were introduced at a later stage. In a few countries, workplace restrictions were adopted quite late.

There is a significant variation across countries in the rate and timing of the increase in the degree of stringency. This heterogeneity reflects primarily the different circulation of the virus, in particular in February. Yet, it may also capture different containment strategies. Some governments immediately intensified certain measures to contain the spread of the virus, while for others the confinement measures lagged behind the growth of the new confirmed cases (Hale et al., 2020).

Graph 1. Number of Member States that took containment measures in different domains



Data for LT, LV and MT are not available.
Source: University of Oxford's COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

Graph 2. Policy timeline by Member States



Source: University of Oxford's COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

Graph 1.8: **Mobility to different locations, from 15 February to 20 November**



To smooth out weekend seasonality, the chart shows the 7-days moving average of the mean across countries of the original variables. A negative number implies a decline with respect to 15-2-2020.
Source: Google mobility reports.

Graph 1.9: **Google searches of cheap flights and stringency of containment measures (median values)**



Oxford COVID-19 Government response collects information on 8 containment measures and creates indices to measure their strictness. The stringency indicator aggregates the score for different containment measures. Google Trends provides access to anonymised data of actual search requests made to Google. Data are normalised between 0 and 100
Source: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response and Google trends.

Changes in mobility patterns have direct effects on attendance of restaurants, art and recreational events and on the demand for transport and tourist-related services. The contraction of domestic demand has a strong sectoral dimension, with severe losses in contact-intensive sectors. Graph 1.9 shows that after 2019 Christmas peak, a drastic drop occurred in the internet searches of *cheap flights* in parallel with the increase in stringency of the confinement measures. In parallel, between December 2019 and June 2020, there was a severe decline in the number of nights spent at tourism and accommodation establishments by about 70%. ([15]) This reduction in business activity is reflected in the dynamics of employment in the relevant sectors. In the second quarter of 2020, when there were 6 million less employed in the EU compared to the last quarter of 2019, about half of this was due to job destruction in wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food services. This is a large loss, as these sectors account for one quarter of total employment.

([15]) This refers to all Member States except France, Cyprus and Portugal for which data are not available.

1.2.3. The effect of the lockdown on unemployment expectations and employment

Sentiment indicators deteriorated rapidly in parallel with the tightening of the lockdown. Yet, confidence remained weak also after restrictions were partially relaxed. In April, unemployment expectations over the next twelve months increased drastically, suggesting a very weak labour demand all over the year (Graph 1.10). Households also appeared very concerned about their financial situation and, consequently, less inclined to spend money on major purchases. This followed the gradual tightening of confinement measures and occurred in parallel with the decline of mobility and the deterioration of firms' revenues (Graph 1.11). ([16]) In June, confidence rebounded compared with May amid a decline of COVID-19 cases and the gradual loosening of lockdown measures. Yet, pessimism remained high in August throughout October, in

([16]) Differences in the social distancing index across countries account for 26% of the difference in total consumption of households and for 40% of the difference in consumption of households on durable goods. For the US, Chudik et al. (2020) show that stay-at-home orders caused a reduction in spending in restaurants and retail stores respectively by 51% of baseline spending per restaurant and 69% of the daily average consumer spending.

particular as concerns labour market prospects, hinting at a persistent shift in expectations.

Graph 1.10: **Consumers' and employers' confidence indicators, January 2007-November 2020**



Source: European Commission, Business and Consumers surveys.

Graph 1.11: **Social distancing, unemployment expectations and stringency: January-September (normalised data)**



The Social distancing index is a weighted average of the six mobility series with weights chosen with a principal component analysis; the first principal component explains 80% of the overall variance of the six mobility indicators: the weights refer to this component (see Atkinson et al. (2020) for the US). An increase of SDI means lower mobility.
Source: DG EMPL calculations on Eurostat, EU business and consumer survey, Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker and Google mobility reports.

A pandemic creates a general upheaval of economic activity. In the absence of confinement measures, individuals may try to lower the risk of contagion, by voluntarily reducing their mobility to different locations. Graph 1.12 shows on the horizontal axis the confirmed COVID-19 cases and on the vertical axis the mobility to workplaces. Two groups of countries are shown: those with low- and high-stringency for four types of confinement measures - workplace closures, school closures, stay-at-home orders, and transport closure. The chart shows that mobility to workplaces falls when the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases rises, even in the absence of strict confinement measures. ([17]) Graphs 1.31-1.32 and the analysis in Box 1.3 suggest that people reduced their mobility to non-residential locations and increased their stay at home after the virus had started to spread and before confinement measures had been decided on. Yet, their response was stronger after the measures were implemented. ([18])

Graph 1.12: **Mobility to workplaces and COVID-19 confirmed cases, 26 February- 9 May**



The Graph shows in the horizontal axis the confirmed cases and on the vertical the mobility to workplaces. Each dot represents a combination of countries and days.
Source: DG EMPL calculations on Google mobility report and Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

Voluntary social distancing has labour market implications. On the demand side, risk averse

([17]) For the EU, there are no data on individual mobility by socio-economic characteristics. For the US, Couture et al. (2020) show that educated people have reduced the most their mobility, while people with less resources continued to use transportation networks.

([18]) A model that take accounts the individual response to perceived contagion risks explains about two thirds of the effective decline in median mobility to workplaces (Box 1.3). Brzezinski et al. (2020) show for the US that lockdown policies increases the time people spend at home up to 39%; and that individuals decrease their social interactions to a limited extent in the absence of such policies. Gupta et al. (2020) find large declines in mobility even in states without major mitigation measures. Maloney et al. (2020) find that case incidence accounts for much of the fall in mobility in the US. For the EU, Kahanec et al. (2020) show that people responded to the pandemic by reducing mobility beyond the effect of formal government imposed social distancing policies. Correia et al. (2020) show that in the aftermath of the 1918 flu, employment and output growth were higher in cities that implemented more aggressive containment measures.

individuals cut consumption of goods and services that require interpersonal contacts; on the supply side, it implies a reduction in the number of workers (or hours worked). ([19]) Increased uncertainty about future employment prospects leads workers to postpone purchases of durable goods and services, even in the absence of strict confinement measures. The fear of being infected also makes people less prone to consume goods and services that require interpersonal contacts. ([20]) The rest of this Section assesses the impact on employment of shifts in unemployment expectations caused by the containment measures. ([21]) This is done in two steps. In a first step, it is estimated how much of the change in unemployment expectations observed between February and June is due to the lockdown. In a second step, this estimated change is introduced in the relation linking employment growth to unemployment expectations.

The lockdown has led to an increase of consumers' unemployment expectations. Regression analysis suggests that an increase in the stringency index leads to higher unemployment expectations; the estimated coefficient suggests that the increase is only partly translated into worse unemployment expectations. ([22])

([19]) Koren and Pető (2020) find that 49 million of US workers have occupations that require close physical proximity to other workers. Barrot et al. (2020) show for the EU countries that six weeks of social distancing brings GDP down on average by 6.6%; the effect is sizable also for sectors most distant from final demand. Differences across countries are partly due to sectoral composition and partly to the propensity to telework.

([20]) The fear factor was a key feature of the 1918 flu. "Absenteeism reached extraordinary levels. In the shipyards, it ranged from 45% to 58%. Absenteeism crippled the railroad system, which transported nearly all freight, bringing it to the point of collapse. It shut down telephone exchanges, closing off communication. Grocers refused to open. Coal sellers closed." (Barry, 2009).

([21]) The expectation channel is an important element of the transmission of the health crisis to economic conditions.

([22]) About 84% of the change in the stringency index feeds through into a change of unemployment expectations in the same month. The increase in the (average) stringency index observed up to the second quarter of 2020 (about 66 pps) predicts an increase in unemployment expectations by 55.4 pps. This is close to the deterioration in expectations effectively observed (50.5 pps). The predicted value is not statistically different from the observed one. The impact of stringency on unemployment expectations is obtained from a panel estimate over the period 2020Q1-2020Q3 and 25 Member States.

About half of the employment losses observed in the first half of 2020 is accounted by the deterioration of unemployment expectations that followed the lockdown. The unemployment expectations predicted by the increase in the stringency index of the first half of 2020 are used to evaluate the response of employment to changes in the expected labour market prospects that followed the introduction of the confinement measures. Table 1.2 reports the response of total and sectoral employment growth to one percentage point change in the unemployment expectations over the next 12 months.([23]) An increase in the unemployment expectations by 10 pps is associated with a fall in employment growth between 0.2% and 0.6%, depending on the sector. Graph 1.13 reports the estimation and suggests the following:

- **The lockdown brought about a fall of total employment by 1.4%, with an effect differentiated across sectors.** It is the strongest for construction and industry, with a drop of employment of 2.3% and 4.4% respectively. These sectors account for about one fifth of total employment in the EU. For trade and accommodation, information, communication and real estate, the decline of employment is only about 1.4%. Each of these sectors represents a different share of total employment, so that the same growth rate may imply different job losses. For trade and accommodation, accounting for about one quarter of total employment, the loss is of about 3 million less employed people. Conversely, information and communication accounts for only 3% of total employment and the employment losses are consequently smaller (about 22 thousands). ([24])

- **About half of the drop in total employment growth is due to effects unrelated to unemployment expectations**. This effect varies across sectors. In industry, the pessimism about the labour market induced by the lockdown accounts for almost all of the employment losses observed in the first half of the year. Conversely, it explains only a small

([23]) This is based on a panel estimate over the period 2000Q1-2019Q4 for 25 Member States.

([24]) This result appears consistent with a positive effect of the pandemic on the demand of digital services and IT workers.

percentage of the fall of employment in trade accommodation and professional services. Thus, actual employment losses were more in line with unemployment expectations in industry, and less in line with unemployment expectations in trade, accommodation and professional services.

Table 1.2: **Effect of unemployment expectations on employment growth**

	Total	Indu-stry	Construc-tion	Trade and Accomo-dation	Information and Communica-tion	Finance	Real estate	Professional
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Unemployment expectations	-0.02***	-0.03***	-0.06***	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.02***	-0.02***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Constant	0.60***	0.50***	1.44***	0.65***	0.30***	1.03***	1.01***	1.28***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.2)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.05)
Observations	2151	2151	2151	2151	2151	2151	2151	2151
R-squared	0.20	0.12	0.11	0.06	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02

Second stage regression. Panel estimate on 25 countries over the period 2000Q1-2019Q4. Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance respectively at 1, 5 and 10 per cent.
Source: Own calculations based on National accounts and Business Survey.

Graph 1.13: **The (indirect) impact of the lockdown on employment growth: cumulated changes 2019Q4-2020Q2**



Estimates based on table 1.2.
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on National accounts

The analysis above suggests that confidence can play a key role in shaping the recovery. The uncertainty about the evolution of the pandemic and the deployment of a vaccine may lead people to adopt social distancing. ([25]) Faced with the fear of infection, people may delay their consumption putting the recovery on hold. ([26]) ([27]) In the third quarter, the EU economy has been hit by a second wave of contagion and selective restrictive measures have been implemented to curb the diffusion of the virus. As suggested by confidence indicators, this has fuelled expectations of a weak demand. Lower expected incomes rises risk aversion and strengthens the negative feedback loops between supply and demand of labour. ([28]) Overall, lower consumption implies that the labour demand in several sectors will remain "on hold", even without strict mandatory measures.

([25]) Stay-at-home orders do not explain the entire change in the consumer spending observed between March and May in the US. Spending was also falling in high-income areas before these orders went into effect. (Chudik et al. 2020).

([26]) During the lockdown, the composition of spending shifted towards online shopping and housing-related expenses, while spending on retail and tourism dropped. This change persisted after the removal of the restriction.

([27]) During the first wave, the propensity of households to save reached unprecedented levels. Dossche and Zlanatos, (2020) show that the unemployment rate expectations explain a large share of the historical variation in the saving rate. During downturns, households' savings increase mainly because of precautionary reasons.

([28]) For the US, Coibon et al. (2020) find a drop of 31% in overall spending and more pessimistic unemployment expectations. Lockdown accounts for about 60% of the decline in the employment/population ratio.

Box 1.3: Effects of restrictions on mobility to different places

The strictness of the measures limiting inter-personal contacts and social interactions differs across countries. Table 1 reports the scores of different social distancing measures. Zero means that no measure was in force. For school closures, workplace closures and stay-at-home-requirements, the maximum of three corresponds to complete school closures, workplace closures (except for essential occupations) or not leaving the house. For public events, restriction of internal movements and public transports, the maximum of two corresponds to the case where all events are cancelled, internal movements are restricted or the use of public transports is prohibited for most of the citizens. Finally, for international travel controls and restrictions on gatherings, a maximum of four corresponds to the case of closed borders or when there are restrictions on gatherings of 10 people or less. All Member States have taken some type of measure; yet only a few had prohibited most of the citizens from using public transports (i.e. Cyprus, Croatia, Italy, Romania and Slovenia). About half of the countries restricted domestic travels, while only eight recommended not to leave the house (i.e. the others required to stay at home with minimal exceptions).

Not only has the timing of the outbreak of the virus differed across countries, but also the implementation of confinement measures. For example, Italy was the first country to enforce school closures on 23 February, Sweden the last to do so on 18 March. The median lag between the first and the last adopter was 37 days. For public events, the gap was just 25 days, for the restrictions on international travel 74 days (France and Italy on 23 January, Ireland on 6 April).

Table 1. Maximum degree of restriction by type of measure: 1/01/2020-25/04/2020

	Cancel public events	Close public transports	Domestic travels	International travels	Restrictions of gatherings	School closing	Stay-at-home	Workplace closing
AT	2	0	1	2	4	3	1	2
BE	2	0	2	4	4	2	2	3
BG	2	0	2	3	4	3	2	1
CY	2	2	2	4	4	3	2	3
CZ	2	0	0	2	3	3	1	2
DE	2	1	2	4	4	3	2	1
DK	2	1	1	4	4	2	1	2
EE	2	0	2	3	4	3	2	3
EL	2	1	2	3	4	3	2	2
ES	2	1	1	4	4	3	2	3
FI	2	1	1	4	2	2	1	2
FR	2	1	2	4	2	3	2	3
HR	2	2	2	4	4	3	2	3
HU	2	1	2	4	1	3	2	2
IE	2	1	2	2	4	3	2	3
IT	2	2	2	3	4	3	2	3
LU	2	1	1	0	4	3	1	3
NL	2	1	1	3	3	3	1	3
PL	2	1	2	4	4	3	1	2
PT	2	1	1	3	4	3	2	3
RO	2	2	2	4	4	3	2	2
SE	0	0	1	3	3	1	0	1
SI	2	2	2	3	4	3	1	2
SK	2	1	1	4	3	3	1	2

Source: Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

The variation across countries in the timing and stringency of lockdown measures can be used to estimate their impact on mobility to different locations. The main question to be addressed is what are the implications for mobility of people to different locations of lockdown measures and to what extent people voluntarily have reduced their presence in specific locations. In Google Maps, anonymized data are used to compute how busy certain types of places are. Google Mobility Reports shows how visits to (or time spent in) certain locations change compared to a baseline day (the median value from the five week period from 3 January to 6 February 2020). ([1]) Google provides this data for 6 categories of places: retail and recreation,

([1]) https://support.google.com/covid19-mobility/answer/9824897?hl=en&ref_topic=9822927

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

grocery and pharmacy, parks, transit stations, workplace and residential. These data have been extensively used by economists and epidemiologists to study mobility behaviour since the outbreak of the virus.

This Box analyses the effects of four types of containment measures on mobility to workplaces. Within a "event-study" framework, each mobility measure is regressed on a variable that captures the day at which the policy was implemented with twenty days leads and twenty days lags. ([2]) The analysis also explores whether individuals changes their mobility behaviour around the date of the first death.

Graph 1 shows how mobility to workplaces has evolved twenty days before and twenty days after the implementation date of the containment measure (time zero). A decline in the mobility to workplaces is observed, concentrated around the date of implementation of the confinement measure. However, already a week before the issuance of the administrative orders, there is less mobility towards workplaces. Twenty days after the implementation of measures restricting access to workplaces or the introduction of stay-at-home orders, mobility to workplaces is reduced on average by 20%. Restrictions to public transports have the strongest impact on mobility to workplaces. Similar analysis has been conducted for retail and recreation and the time spent at home. Movements to retail and recreational locations dropped after the implementation of restrictive measures, in particular those that limit access to public transports and impose confinement at home. Twenty days after the enactment of stay-at-home orders and restrained access to public transports, mobility to retail and recreational places drop respectively by 34% and by 48%. Similarly, the time spent at home gradually increases before the implementation of the lockdown measures, except for the effect of the restrictions to public transports, which is correctly signed but statistically not significant. After implementation of confinement measures, the time spent at home increases, in particular in the case of restrictions to public transports. The plots for the first deaths suggest a gradual change in mobility to different locations ten days before the event.

Graph 1. Effects of social distancing measures on mobility to workplaces



Note. The figure shows event studies estimates of the effect of specific restrictive measures on workplace mobility. Vertical axis shows how mobility to workplaces changes for specific numbers of days before (-) and after (+) the introduction of the restrictive measures. Dotted lines are 95% confidence intervals.

([2]) The variable equals one when a measure is taken and zero otherwise.

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

The perceived risk of contagion leads to reduced mobility to workplaces, independently of the confinement measures. For the US, Engle et al. (2020) study the response of daily changes in distance travelled to the perceived risks of contracting the disease and to the restrictions orders; in their model, an increase in the perceived risk induces individuals to travel less. The same analysis has been here replicated for the EU on data on mobility to workplaces, measuring the perceived risk of infection by country with the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases as percentage of total population.

The results suggest that an increase in this risk reduces mobility to workplaces, which is consistent with the US findings. Similarly to Engle et al. (2020), mobility drops when a restriction is announced; however, an increase in the perceived risk does not further reduce mobility to workplace. This finding differs from what was found for the US, namely that an increase in perceived risk decreases mobility when restrictions are announced. With less stringent government imposed confinement measures, individuals have adopted more voluntary social distancing. Graph 2 reports for different restriction orders the effect on mobility to workplaces of confirmed cases, when these are set at median value; the dark blue line is the median change in mobility to workplaces. As suggested by the graph; up to 50% of total mobility decisions are determined by perceived risks of contagion, i.e. by self-distancing.

Graph 2. Effects on workplace mobility of different restrictions orders



Note. The chart shows the change in mobility when the perceived risks is at the median value and a restriction order is in place. Results show estimate of a non-linear fixed effect model.

1.2.4. Which sectors and occupations are more vulnerable to the lockdown?

Social distancing has a heterogeneous impact across sectors and occupations. While social distancing is necessary to reduce the spread of the virus, the exposure to it varies across occupations. Some occupations require a high degree of face-to-face and close physical interactions with clients or other employees, but are not necessarily at risk of contagion if these contacts can be kept remotely. For others, working from home is unfeasible and close contacts with other workers or clients may be required. These jobs are more exposed to a negative demand shock due to social distancing.

Occupations in services are particularly exposed to physical proximity. Voluntary social distancing driven by the perceived risks of contagion might continue to affect labour market performance. This concerns, in particular, non–essential contact intensive occupations. ([29]) To understand which occupations bear the burden of social distancing, whether compulsory or

([29]) For the US, while non-contact-intensive and essential contact-intensive industries contracted by about 10%, employment in non-essential contact-intensive dropped by 35% relative to February. Employment has been recovering in all industries since April, but levels stay below the pre-pandemic ones (Famiglietti et al. 2020).

Table 1.3: **Physical proximity index and Working from remote index: sectoral breakdown**

Sector	Physical proximity index	% workers > 66th pct	Working from remote index	% workers > 66th pct	% women	% tertiary	% youth employment
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles	75.0	68	24.2	23	49%	22%	11%
Accommodation and Food Service Activities	70.8	58	23.5	9	54%	16%	18%
Financial and Insurance Activities	70.5	55	33.3	79	52%	57%	5%
Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security	69.2	47	27.7	54	48%	45%	4%
Human Health and Social Work Activities	69.0	57	18.0	21	78%	43%	6%
Real Estate Activities	69.0	59	30.2	70	51%	43%	5%
Transportation and Storage	67.3	51	24.7	21	22%	18%	6%
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation	66.4	34	27.2	42	48%	44%	13%
Activities of Extraterritorial Organisations and Bodies	66.2	37	32.5	78	51%	73%	1%
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities	65.6	34	33.2	79	48%	68%	6%
Other Service Activities	65.1	27	25.3	34	66%	29%	8%
Education	64.3	34	26.8	33	72%	71%	5%
Administrative and Support Service Activities	60.3	38	26.1	30	49%	23%	8%
Water Supply; Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation Activities	60.0	28	25.7	26	21%	20%	4%
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply	59.8	20	28.8	46	24%	45%	5%
Information and Communication	57.2	19	35.7	84	30%	65%	7%
Construction	55.1	9	24.5	21	10%	17%	7%
Manufacturing	50.6	15	27.6	36	30%	23%	8%
Mining and Quarrying	49.7	13	26.8	28	13%	21%	4%
Activities of Households as Employers; Undifferentiate Goods and Services Producing Activities of Households for Own Use	47.7	4	22.5	1	90%	11%	4%
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	43.5	5	26.4	31	34%	10%	7%

Source: O*NET and EU-LFS (2018) data)

voluntary, an index of physical proximity is built for different occupations. ([30])

Graph 1.14: **High- and low-contact intensive occupations: proximity index 0-100**



(1) For the metholodogy, see Box1.4.
Source: O*NET and EU-LFS (2018 data)

Graph 1.14 shows the occupations at the top and at the bottom of the ranking of this index. ([31]) High-contact occupations include domestic cleaners, street vendors, clerks and nurses; low-contact intensive occupations are assemblers, machine operators or farmers. About 38% and 26% of total employment in the EU is in high contact-intensive and low-contact occupations, respectively.

There are significant differences across and within sectors in terms of their risk to physical proximity. While in some sectors less than 5% of employment is in occupations requiring high physical contact (e.g. agriculture), in others half of total employed have jobs that require close interactions with other workers. These include *Wholesale and retail trade*, *real estate*, *accommodation and food services* (Table 1.3). ([32]) Moreover, there is a large dispersion in the physical proximity index within industries, particularly in public administration, manufacturing and activities of private households

([30]) Individual-level data from the 2018 Labour Force Survey are combined with the information on job tasks requirements of each occupation from the US Occupational Information network (O*NET) to construct an indicator of occupational contact-intensity (see Box 1.4). This classification is based on how jobs were carried out before the pandemic.

([31]) High contact-intensive occupations are those with a proximity index above the 66th percentile of the distribution of all occupations. Low contact-intensive occupations are those below the 33th percentile. There are 40 occupation groups using the two-digit classification; 13 are high-contact and 13 low-contact intensive.

([32]) Chapter 2 shows that the heterogeneity in occupations translates into different vulnerability across Member States.

(Graph 1.15); this reflects the diversity of the various occupations within each industry.

Graph 1.15: **Distribution of Physical proximity index across industries**



Physical proximity index distribution for occupation categories falling within each broad 1-digit NACE category. The broad industry categories are ordered by the median values of each underpinning distribution.
Source: O*NET and EU-LFS (2018 data)

Occupations adaptable to remote working are less vulnerable to social distancing. Some occupations are less location-dependent. These jobs use more often ICT and can be performed remotely. This makes workers less vulnerable to the effects of physical interruption of interpersonal contacts at the workplace, even when occupations are highly contact intensive. Hence, remote working softens the trade-off between the economic losses and the risks of contagion.

About 35% of total employment in the EU is in occupations that do not necessarily require presence at the workplace. To identify those occupations, a composite index (ranging from 0 to 100) is built ranking occupations from the least to the most tele-workable. ([33]) Graph 1.16 shows that only *ICT*, *Science and engineering professionals* have tasks that are not dependent on a specific location of the workplace and can be executed remotely. These are flexible occupations as concerns the location from where their tasks can be performed. *Health professionals and personal service workers* are in occupations that require tasks to be performed in close physical proximity to others and are not tele-workable. ([34])

Graph 1.16: **High and low tele-workable occupations: index 0-100**



The index is computed taking the average of the seven questions: (i) importance of performing general physical activities; (ii) importance of working with computers; (iii) importance of manoeuvring vehicles, mechanical vehicles or equipment; (iv) requirement of face-to-face interactions; (v) dealing with external customers or with the public; (vi) physical proximity; (vii) time spent standing. Following the most recent literature (e.g. Barbieri et al. 2020), high and low tele-workable occupations" are respectively those above the 66th and below the 33th percentile of the distribution of the work remotely index by occupations.
Source: O*NET and EU-LFS (2018 data)

Physical proximity and tele-workability allow for the identification of occupations at risk of earning losses due to social distancing. Occupations can be ranked with respect to two features that make them more vulnerable to social distancing, namely the physical proximity and the tele-workability (Graph 1.17). ([35]) Several facts emerge from the inspection of the graph:

- There is a negative relation between the location flexibility (i.e. the ability to work from different locations) and the requirement of being in close contact with others. Workers in *high contact* and *low tele-workability occupations* (first quadrant) are more vulnerable to wage losses due to social

([33]) The figure is obtained as follows. Following the 2020 literature (e.g. Barbieri et al. 2020), high and low *tele-workable* occupations are respectively those above the 66th and below the 33th percentile of the distribution of the work remotely index by occupations. The employment share of occupations above the 66th percentile of the distribution is 35%. See Box 1.4 for the methodology on the construction of the index. Out of the 40 occupational groups using the two-digit classification, 13 are high tele-workable and 13 low tele-workable intensive. The index does not measure the actual degree of ICT-enabled occupations but only the potential one.

([34]) For the US this figure is 32% (Dingel and Neiman, 2020).
([35]) A similar classification has been applied by Sostero et al. (2020).

Graph 1.17: **Classification of occupations by their physical proximity, ability to telework and pay**



(1) The size of the bubbles represents the share in total employment of each occupation
(2) Three groups according to Goos et al., 2014. A value 60 for the proximity index and of 30 for the work remotely index correspond to the median of the index over the different occupations.
Source: O*NET and EU-LFS (2018 data)

distancing. These occupations account for 45% of total employment.

- Occupations that do not need physical interactions with others and can be performed from home will be less affected by social distancing measures (third quadrant); these occupations account for 11% of total employment. Moreover, there are occupations (e.g. business professionals) that require close personal contacts, but with tasks that can be executed remotely (second quadrant); these occupations account for 19% of total employment.

- The *low contact-low tele-workable* occupations account for 25% of total employment. These are less at risk of social distancing and less vulnerable to wage losses.

- Low wage occupations are more vulnerable to wage losses. While personal service workers might experience lower demand due to either selective lockdown or consumers' *self-imposed social distancing*, teachers, business professionals and managers, can execute their tasks remotely, mitigating the impact of the health shock on their earnings. Low wage occupations account for one third of total employment. Without policy support in favour of low-wage occupations, a lockdown or social distancing might worsen wage inequality.

- Within the medium- and the high-pay occupations there are workers with different risks of income losses (e.g. electrical trade workers *vs* ICT professionals). Those in jobs that require high-physical proximity or that cannot be conducted remotely are relatively more vulnerable to wage losses due to lockdown or targeted return to work.

- Consistent with research on US data (Mongey et al., 2020), these findings suggest that the major burden of social distancing is likely to fall on those who were already vulnerable before the pandemic, highlighting the risk that the pandemic will exacerbate existing income inequalities.

Box 1.4: Which occupations can be done from home and which are contact-intensive?

This box provides a classification of occupations based on whether they can be technically performed remotely and/or whether they require close physical interaction. Subsequently, an index of technical teleworkability and of physical proximity is developed. This approach is comparable to that one developed to measure the potential to offshore different occupations (Blinder, 2009) or to automate them (Frey and Osborne, 2017). It follows the methodology by Dingel and Neiman (2020) to measure the share of US jobs that can be performed from home. A similar approach has been adopted by Boeri et al. (2020) to analyse several dimensions of workers' safety relevant in the context of the epidemic; by Barbieri et al. (2020) to assess the characteristics of Italian workers at risks of contagion and by Sostero et al.(2020) to evaluate the occupations with tasks that can be performed remotely.

To construct the teleworkability and the physical proximity indexes, the chapter relies on the O*NET survey that measures the task content of specific occupations with some level of detail. Individuals across a very large number of occupations covering the US economy are asked by Occupational Information Network (O*NET) run by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to answer questions on the work context that best describe their occupations. ([1]) One of these questions asks rating the extent to which the job requires the worker to perform his/her tasks in close physical proximity to other people. The survey directly asks about physical proximity for every profession, based on the following question: "During your work are you physically close to other people?" The answers are given scores, which are aggregated to compute a contact-intensity index between 0 ("I don't work near other people") and 100 ("Very close"). These questions are particularly relevant to shed light on the potential exposures of workers to social distancing. A score ranging from a 0 to 100 scale (from less to more intense) is then calculated for each 5-digit occupation. ([2]) Moreover, we built a composite index (also ranging from 0 to 100) that proxies for the feasibility of a remote working arrangement. The index is computed by taking the average of the following seven questions: (i) importance of performing general physical activities (reverse sign); (ii) importance of working with computers; (iii) importance of manoeuvring vehicles, mechanical vehicles or equipment (reversely signed); (iv) requirement of face-to-face interactions (reverse sign); (v) dealing with external customers or with the public (reversely); (vi) physical proximity (reverse sign); (vii) time spent standing (reverse sign). Note that this index is similar to the offshorability index by Autor and Dorn (2013), the "face-to-face" and "on-site job" indexes by Firpo et al. (2011) and the measures of safe jobs recently developed by Boeri et al. (2020).

To match the information derived from O*NET to the EU-LFS, O*NET-SOC occupations codes were recoded into ISCO 3-digit codes that identify occupations in the EU-LFS through weighted averages. For each ISCO 3-digit code, a score, ranging from 0 to 100, was obtained. The methodology relies on the *technological* characteristics of US jobs. This exercise entails some measurement error as technology differs across countries. Thus, results need to be interpreted as if the US occupational technology were in place for each labour market analysed. In the spirit of Autor and Dorn's, the chapter provides the percentage of sectoral employment in the top third of the employment-weighted distribution of each index (physical proximity and working from remote) at the 3-digit occupation level. For the physical proximity index, for instance, such percentage is calculated for each j-th sector as follows:

$$Top\ Proximity_j = 100 \cdot \left(\sum L_{kj} \cdot 1[\,Proximity\ Index_{\,k} > Proximity\ Index^{P66}]\right)\left(\sum L_{kj}\right)^{-1}$$

where L_{kj} is the employment in k-th occupation and j-th sector. The indicator function, 1, takes the value of one if the occupation's physical proximity is above the 66th percentile of the employment-weighted index.

([1]) For the EU a survey similar to the O*NET does not exist.
([2]) The standardization formula is 100*(Y-min)/(max-min); Y is the original answer (from 1 to 5), min and max are the minimum and maximum value reported for that occupation. Each value for each occupation is standardized over about 20 answers received from workers in that occupation. The index has no cardinal interpretation.

Women, young and low-educated workers are more likely to be in jobs vulnerable to social distancing. While on average women are slightly more likely to be in tele-workable jobs than men, they are also more exposed, as they tend to work in vulnerable sectors like *Accommodation and food* services (Graph 1.18). The low educated are also at risk mainly due to the lack of opportunities to telework. Young workers are overrepresented in sectors that are vulnerable to social distancing (i.e *Retail and accommodation and food services*). They are more likely to be in vulnerable jobs also because almost half of these jobs are temporary (Graph 1.19). Workers in small firms are also more likely to be in vulnerable jobs as these firms are in sectors requiring physical contacts with fewer possibilities to perform their tasks remotely. ([36])

Graph 1.18: **Characteristics of workers in vulnerable, high proximity and tele-workable jobs**



The graph shows the coefficients of a logistic regression controlling for age, gender, nationality, firm size, university studies, poor household and working part-time. The circle markers give point estimates; 95% confidence intervals are shown by the lines through each marker. The coefficients represent the marginal effect (i.e. the average change in probability). For example, women are approximately 12 pps more likely to be in a vulnerable job than men.
Source: O*NET and EU-LFS (2018 data)

There is a large potential of work that can be performed remotely. The teleworkability index describes the characteristics of the occupations based on their technological content. A comparison with the actual proportion of people teleworking provides an estimate of the potential share. In 2019, about 3% of employees usually worked from home. The lowest percentage of workers that report working from home, both *sometimes and usually*, is the 15-24 age group (Graph 1.20). With the exception of the older workers, there is a large difference between the share of workers that are effectively teleworking and the potential shares. Survey conducted during the pandemic, show an increase in the incidence of remote working. Eurofound (2020) reports that about 40% of employees started to work from home following the pandemic, i.e. almost the double of those that replied having worked remotely "at least several times a month" before COVID-19. A smaller share of job losses or working hour reductions is reported during the lockdown in countries with a higher incidence of homeworking during the pandemic. Working from home represented a buffer against employment losses during the pandemic (Sostero et al. 2020).

Graph 1.19: **Share of vulnerable workers by age group**



Shaded bars represent the share of temporary employment.
Source: O*NET and EU-LFS

Graph 1.20: **Share of persons who telework in the EU as percentage of total of same age group, 2019**



Effective teleworkers are those that replied to the LFS that they usually work from home.
Source: O*NET and EU-LFS

([36]) SMEs are also financially constrained, which makes them more vulnerable to prolonged shortfall of sales.

1.3. RECENT LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN MAJOR WORLD REGIONS

Before the outbreak of COVID-19, unemployment was on a declining path in all industrialised countries. At the end of 2019, in most industrialised countries the unemployment rates were back to pre-2008 crisis levels. The gap between the EU and the G7 unemployment rates was on a declining path (Graph 1.21 and Table 1.4). ([37])

Graph 1.21: **Unemployment rates in the EU, the US and the 'Group of seven' advanced economies, January 2007-October 2020**



EU27 from 2020.
Source: OECD.

In April 2020, the US unemployment rate reached levels second only to those seen in the years that followed the Great Crash of 1929. The stock of jobless claimants in the US reached in May the staggering level of 19 million for the standard unemployment insurance, with an additional 10 million for the temporary pandemic related programmes. In April, the unemployment rate reached 14.7%: this not only was the highest rate since the Great Depression of the 1930s, but also the largest increase ever observed in a few months. In May, the unemployment rate fell to 13.3%, but this decline was largely driven by a sharp drop in the activity rate (Graph 1.22). By the beginning of May, 22 million of non-farm jobs were destroyed. Despite uninterrupted increases over the summer, in October employment was still 10 million below the level of February. The unemployment rate dropped to 6.9%, reflecting job growth in sectors hit hard, such as leisure and hospitality, retail and construction. However, compared to the previous year, long-term unemployed almost tripled. In the first two quarters of 2020, wages grew respectively by 3% and 6.5%, most likely reflecting a composition effect following temporary layoffs. Compared to October 2019, real average hourly earnings increased by 3.2%, a significant deceleration from 6.5% recorded in May 2020.

Table 1.4: **GDP growth and unemployment in selected economies**

	GDP growth %					Unemployment rate %				
	2000 -2007	2018	2019	2020 Q1	2020 Q2	2000 -2007	2018	2019	2020 Q1	2020 Q2
EA	2.2	1.9	1.3	-3.7	-11.8	8.6	8.2	7.6	7.3	7.6
EU	2.5	2.0	1.5	-3.3	-11.4	8.7	6.8	6.3	6.5	6.9
CAN	2.8	1.8	1.6	-2.1	-11.5	7.0	5.8	5.7	6.3	13.0
JPN	1.5	0.3	0.7	-0.6	-7.9	4.7	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.8
USA	2.7	2.9	2.3	-1.3	-9.1	5.0	3.9	3.7	3.8	13.0
OECD	2.5	2.2	1.7	-1.9	-9.8	6.8	5.5	5.4	5.4	8.6
BRIC:	8.1	5.7	5.1			:	:	:		
BRA	*3.6*	*1.1*	*1.1*	*-2.5*	*-9.7*	*9.3*	*12.3*	*12.1*		
RUS	*7.2*	*2.3*	*1.3*	*-0.9*	*-3.2*	*7.9*	*4.9*	*4.6*		
IND	*7.2*	*7.4*	*5.3*	*0.7*	*-25.2*	*5.6*	*5.3*	*5.4*		
CHN	*10.6*	*6.6*	*6.1*	*-10.0*	*11.5*	*3.9*	*3.8*	*3.6*		

Source: Eurostat and OECD.

Graph 1.22: **The activity rate in the EU and selected advanced economies, 1996-2020**



(1) The activity rate is the ratio of active to total population. Active population includes those employed and unemployed, but excludes those inactive (e.g. not seeking work). (2) Age group: 15-64 years old.
Source: OECD.

The unemployment rate in Canada is the highest since four decades. In March, measures to contain the spread of the virus caused a sudden interruption in business operations. By early April, employment fell by 11%, while the number of unemployed had gone up to 2.5 million. In May, the unemployment rate peaked to 13.7%, exceeding the previous historical high (13.1%) reached in December 1982. Improvements over

([37]) However, the drop in the US unemployment rate after the 2008 crisis mainly reflects the drop in its activity rate. Had the activity rate remained constant, the gap between the EU and the US unemployment rates would have disappeared (European Commission, 2018).

summer were significant, mainly in the accommodation and food sectors. However, employment remains almost 4% lower than the pre-COVID-19 levels. In the third quarter 2020, the employment rate dropped to 59.1% (-3 pps on a yearly basis) and the unemployment rate went down to 9.0%. In the first two quarters, wage growth rose respectively by 3.6% and 7%.

In Japan, the low unemployment rate conceals a deeper labour market impact. Well before the nationwide declaration of emergency (16 April), household consumption dropped by about 3%. The extension of labour market measures preserved employment levels. By October 2020, the employment rate, at 77.3%, was less than 1 percentage point below the previous year with total employment losses (y-o-y) hovering at 930 thousands, mainly temporary employees (-350 thousands) and self-employed (-170 thousands). With gradual recovery since May, the unemployment rate mildly increased from the historically low 2.3% of 2019 to 3.1% in October.

Despite being severely hit by COVID-19, China's economic growth in 2020 will remain positive. In the first two months of 2020, China recorded a severe decline in industrial production, retail sales, and investment leading to a contraction of GDP by 8% in the first quarter 2020 with respect to the same quarter of 2019. Yet, a sharper than expected recovery led to a significant upward revision of growth for 2020. Boosted by a recovery in manufacturing and investment along with strong exports of machinery and textiles, China's GDP rebounded by 3.2% and 4.9% in the second and third quarter, respectively. During the slowdown, the official unemployment rate - which had reached a low of 3.6% in 2019 - increased to 4.3% but in the second quarter already declined to 3.8%. The official measure, however, does not take into account the large pool of migrant workers. Slightly higher are the values provided by the Urban Surveyed Unemployment rate. In September, it stood at 5.6%, after peaking at 6.2% in January.

1.4. EMPLOYMENT, ACTIVITY RATES AND HOURS WORKED

In 2019, the EU employment rate continued to rise in line with the trend that had started in 2013. From 2018 to 2019, it increased by 0.7 pps to 69.3%, as a result of an increase in the number of people employed by around 1%, only slightly offset by an increase in the working age population. The employment rate for women increased by 0.7 pps to 64% in 2019, and by 0.5 pps for men (to 74.3% in 2019). The gender gap in employment rates can be largely attributed to the lower activity of women in the labour market relative to men. In 2019, the activity rate of women stood at 68.6%, compared to 79.3% for men. The overall activity rate in the EU increased by 0.3 pps to 74% in 2019 compared to 2018, the highest activity rate measured in the past 18 years. In the second quarter of 2020, the activity rate dropped by about 1.5 pps with no major differences between men and women. This decline in the total activity rate matches the drop in the employment rate by about -1.4 pps, which explains the small increase in unemployment (Graph 1.23).

Graph 1.23: **Employment, unemployment and activity rates, EU27, 2000Q1-2020Q2**



Age group: 15-64 years old.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.

1.5. WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS

In the first half of 2020, compensation per employee experienced a substantial decline. In 2019, wages expanded at about the same rate as the previous year, 2.7% and 2% for the EU and the euro area, respectively. This was the highest growth since 2008. On a quarterly basis, wages expanded in 2019 at a stable rate, but resulted in a slightly negative growth on a yearly basis in the first quarter of 2020. In the second quarter, wage dropped further (Table 1.1), being about 5% below the level reached at the end of 2019 (about 5.5% for the euro area). This is the largest decline since EU aggregate data are available. In spite of this decline, the nominal unit labour costs (wages adjusted for productivity) increased at an average

rate of almost 6% in the first two quarters, due to labour hoarding (i.e. a drop of GDP higher than the drop of employment) (Graph 1.24).

On an hourly basis, wages increased both in the first and the second quarter of 2020. At first sight, the decline of compensation per employee without a substantial increase of unemployment is puzzling (Graph 1.25). Two explanations can be given to this unusual pattern. First, the widespread use of short-time work schemes implies that a large number of workers receive lower wages. ([38]) Indeed, workers in a short-time working scheme keep their job, while working fewer or no hours and receive only a partial replacement for the wage lost for not working. Second, the drop in both the hours worked and the activity rate make the unemployment rate less informative of the true labour market slack. Due to the drastic adjustment in hours worked, the quarter-over-quarter growth of hourly compensation was in the first two quarters of 2020, respectively, 2.5% and 5.7%, up from 0.3% in the last quarter of 2019. ([39])

Graph 1.24: **Compensation per employee and unit labour costs in the euro area, annualised growth rates, 2005Q1-2020Q3**



Source: Commission Services.

([38]) In addition, the drop in wages may also be explained by a reduction of variable components of wages (i.e. overtime and wage premia). The Policy developments chapter discusses at length the role of short-time work schemes.

([39]) This is the compensation per hour worked. In the first and second quarter of 2020, wages in the EU increased respectively by 1.9% and 3.8% quarter over quarter.

Graph 1.25: **Phillips curve for the euro area, 2000-2020Q3**



For 2020, the growth rate is year-over-year.
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database and Eurostat, LFS.

1.6. LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR MARKET MATCHING

In 2019, the long-term unemployment in the EU continued to decline. Between 2018 and 2019, it fell from 6.9 million to less than 6 million. This decline accounts for approximately 80% of the total reduction in the number of unemployed. The long-term unemployment rate dropped from the peak of 5.3% in the first quarter of 2014 (6.4% for the euro area) to 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2019 - 3.2% for the euro area – (Graph1.26). This drop mirrors the rising job finding rates, while the job destruction rates had stopped falling since early 2019 (Graph 1.27). ([40]) In 2019, the probability of finding a job declined for all unemployment durations, while the job destruction rate increased slightly (Graph 1.28).

Graph 1.26: **Long-term unemployed (for 1 year or more) in the EU, the euro area and the US (% of total labour force), 2005Q1-2020Q2**



Source: Eurostat and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

([40]) European Commission (2019).

Graph 1.27: **Job finding and separation rates in the euro area, 2005Q1-2020Q2**



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat data.

In the second quarter of 2020, the long-term unemployment rate dropped below 2%. At the early stage of a recession, the job separation rate usually spikes, while the job-finding rate declines only gradually as firms revise their hiring plans on the basis of the expected path of the recovery. The increase in the job destruction rate rises the share of unemployed for less than 12 months (the short-term unemployed). However, this is not what was observed in the first half of 2020, as the share of the long-term unemployment in total EU unemployment dropped by almost 10 pps, from 42% in the last quarter of 2019 to 32% in the second of 2020 (Graph 1.28). Consequently, the share of the short-term-unemployed increased from 58% to 68%. As suggested by data, this increase is mainly due to the exit from the labour force of those who lost a job before the pandemic and gave up search during the lockdown. Due to the effectiveness of the government sponsored short-time work schemes, the increase in the job separation rate was relatively limited. (Graph 1.27). ([41]) However, in the second quarter of 2020, there was also a drop in the probability of finding a job in particular for those with short durations of less than six months (Graph 1.29). This suggests that with the prospects of economic recovery being hampered by the persistence of the COVID-19 shock, the long-term unemployment rate is also likely to increase gradually over time.

([41]) In few countries (Greece, Spain and Italy), dismissals were legally prohibited or the fiscal incentives to retain workers were conditional to not make dismissals.

Graph 1.28: **Unemployment by duration (share in total unemployment), 2007Q1-2020Q2**



3 quarters moving averages
Source: Eurostat

In 2019, the proportion of firms reporting labour shortages dropped sharply, while the unemployment rate continued to fall. Graph 1.30 displays the Beveridge curve, i.e. the negative relationship between the unemployment rate and vacancies. A right (left) shift of the curve means that employers are more (less) reluctant to fill their job openings, because of a mismatch between the skills they require and the one available to them. This shift is interpreted as a change in the efficiency of the process matching unemployed people with vacant posts. In 2019, the vacancies dropped together with the fall in the unemployment rate, which is consistent with a more efficient matching process, and a lower structural unemployment rate. ([42])

([42]) The increase in the matching efficiency parallels a decline in the structural unemployment rate; see European Commission (2018) and Consolo and da Silva (2019).

Graph 1.29: **Job finding rate by duration of unemployment, euro area, 2005Q1-2020Q2**



Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat data.

In the first half of 2020, job vacancies kept falling in response to the drastic drop of economic activity, while unemployment changed only marginally. Data from April 2020 mirror the initial effects of the lockdown. Following a typical pattern of the early stages of a recession, vacancies responded more swiftly to the decline in economic activity than unemployment. ([43]) Yet, COVID-19 has brought considerable disruptions to the job matching process both in the short and long term. In the short term, the physical constraint imposed by social distancing measures has made it difficult to match employers' needs with the available workforce. ([44]) The medium-term effects will depend on the extent to which firms will modify the structure of labour demand. In the medium term, firms may want to mitigate the risks of virus transmission by reorganising their working arrangements. Their demand for digital skills will rapidly go up while it might take time for workers to be trained or to find a new good job match. This would increase the mismatch between labour supply and demand and, potentially, lead to higher structural unemployment. The possibility of bankruptcies is an additional downside risk. ([45])

([43]) Because of recruiting costs, firms may prefer to retain workers during a recession rather than fire them when sales fall and rehire them during the recovery; firms may also adjust labour costs to lower demand by either reducing hours worked and/or the flexible components of wages (wage drift) rather than simply firing workers. As mentioned earlier, the increase in unemployment has been limited by the use of short-time work schemes.

([44]) For example, during the early months of 2020 physical labour shortages have been reported in many sectors, in particular agriculture.

([45]) Banerjee et al. (2020) show that unemployment typically increases three times more if a fall in GDP is accompanied by a similar-sized increase in bankruptcies.

On the upside, the restrictions imposed to deal with the second wave are more selective and their impact likely more limited.

Graph 1.30: **Beveridge curve for the euro area, 1997Q1-2020Q4**



The survey-based indicator of labour shortages in industry approximates job vacancies (factors limiting production: labour). For 2020Q4 data refers to the average of October and November figures.
Source: European Commission, based on Labour Force Survey and the Business and Consumer Survey.

1.7. CONCLUSIONS

In 2020, the EU has experienced the deepest recession since World War II. The restrictions to mobility and social distancing measures, enacted by the governments or voluntarily adopted by people have led to a sudden stop in the activity of a large number of sectors. Given the size of the shock, the increase in the unemployment rate so far has been relatively small. As discussed in the chapter, if, at the onset of the first lockdown, all workers affected by the job closures had all lost their job, the employment rate would have dropped by almost 7 pps. This is primarily due to the effectiveness of the policy response, in particular short-time work schemes and employment protection legislation. The drop in the activity rate has also contributed to mitigate the effect on unemployment. In summer, all Member States have removed or relaxed the restrictions to individual mobility. Yet, economic activity and consumers' confidence remained low.

Via its impact on future incomes, the lockdown has exerted a negative effect on employment. Between the last quarter of 2019 and the second of 2020, employment declined by about 3%. Half of these losses are due to the uncertainty created by

the lockdown. While data do not allow to explain what drives the remaining half, it can be assumed that it is related largely to the direct effect of the lockdown; indeed, the component of employment growth that is unexplained by the response of expectations to the lockdown is larger in trade and accommodations.

Via their impact on consumption, voluntary social distancing measures may have also contributed to lower employment. As indicated by the drop of people's mobility to different locations, individuals have adopted a cautious behaviour before the restrictions to mobility were in place. The analysis in the chapter suggests that 50% of the collapse in the mobility is determined by the perceived risks of contagion. As people's mobility is a proxy of economic activity this change may have influenced consumption and employment, in particular in contact-intensive sectors.

In spite of the modest employment growth of the third quarter, uncertainty on the path of the recovery remains. After the temporary relief of summer, in the fourth quarter the EU economy has been hit by a second wave of contagion. Selective restrictive measures have been reintroduced to curb the diffusion of the virus. As suggested by consumers' confidence indicators, this fuels expectations of a weak demand, in particular in contact intensive sectors.

The time needed to deploy a vaccine to a large number of people will affect the path of the economic recovery. The announcements of effective vaccines have raised optimism about the possibility of controlling the pandemic. There are important worldwide challenges for the logistic of mass production and transportation of a vaccine. The longer the deployment of a vaccine, the higher the uncertainty about labour market prospects. People might delay consumption and accumulate savings, putting the economic recovery on hold even without further waves of contagion. On the upside, the Commission commitment to ensure *a coordinated approach to the distribution of vaccines across Member States* is likely to sustain expectations and, together with the NextGenerationEU, provide a strong boost to the EU economic recovery.

COVID-19 entails a reallocation across industries and geographical locations. For some firms, the pandemic represents a transitory shock; for several others, it might lead to lower demand compared to pre-crisis levels due to profound changes in consumption behaviour (e.g. use of online shopping) and firms' work organisation. In the next phase of the crisis, reallocation challenges may emerge. This is not necessarily a negative evolution, as it would imply efficiency gains, boosting productivity and wages. At the same time, some services (such as retail and transportation) developed around office districts might be under pressure as firms realise that savings can be made with remote working and large cities may become less relevant for economic growth. Since access to technology differs between low- and high-income earners, this reallocation may intensify polarisation and income inequality. As shown in the chapter, workers in a weak position before the pandemic (low-paid, women, low-educated and young) hold occupations that are vulnerable to social distancing – i.e. with tasks that require workers to be close to other people and that cannot be executed remotely. Unemployment risks for this group may increase.

As the crisis is concentrated in specific sectors, it risks leaving deep scars in the labour market, along with large skill mismatches. Data for the third quarter and the first two months of the fourth do not signal a rising mismatch. Yet, the large use of short-time work schemes, which have mitigated the increase in unemployment, may conceal the challenges that the EU labour market may face from 2021 onwards. While labour supply factors may induce labour reallocation away from risky jobs, there might be a rising demand for essential jobs, with most of them being at higher risk of infection. ([46]) Displaced workers will be less employable if their job-specific skills are not necessarily transferrable to other sectors or occupations. This gap may lead to rising skill mismatches and higher structural unemployment. This will require a combination of upskilling and reskilling measures, job-search assistance and well-designed and temporary hiring subsidies on top of adequate social protection for all workers, independently of their contract status.

([46]) Boeri et al. (2020).

Graph 1.31: **Mobility to different locations: daily data from 15 February to 11 September 2020**



The horizontal lines identify the day of implementation of different confinement measures. Straight line: School closure; dotted line: Work place closure; dashed line: Close public transports; dashed-dotted line: Stay at home requirements. The colour identifies the stringency of the confinement measures. Red: all activities forbidden; black: few activities forbidden; grey: recommended not be engaged in activity.
Source: Google mobility reports and Oxford COVID-19 Government response tracker.

Graph 1.32: **Mobility to different locations: daily data from 15 February to 11 September 2020, cont.**



The horizontal lines identify the day of implementation of different confinement measures. Straight line: School closing; dotted line: Work place closing; dashed line: Close public transports; dashed-dotted line: Stay at home requirements. The colour identifies the stringency of the confinement measures. Red: all activities forbidden; black: few activities forbidden; grey: recommended not be engaged in activity;
Source: Google mobility reports and Oxford COVID-19 Government response tracker.

Graph 1.33: **Employment growth in the EU by sector; 2013Q1-2020Q3**



Source: Eurostat, National Accounts

2. LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN MEMBER STATES

The outbreak of the pandemic has marked the end of a long expansionary cycle. By the end of 2019, in a majority of the Member States, employment was above the levels reached before the 2008-2009 crisis; most of the job creation occurred in services. Almost all countries entered 2020 with the lowest unemployment rates since 2013. The process of economic convergence kept its momentum. At the same time, after a long period of economic expansion growth was on a declining path in several countries.

With significant differences across countries, in April the outlook turned increasingly negative. Average hours worked dropped everywhere and at unprecedented rates. Unemployment developments were decisively shaped by the extensive use of short-time work schemes and a simultaneous decline in the activity rate. Nonetheless, labour market is well below capacity as suggested by indicators of labour market utilisation. Job destruction affected most of the countries, but with uneven sectoral profiles, badly hitting contact-intensive occupations and those that could not be performed remotely.

Wages continued to grow in 2019, even outpacing rates observed in the previous year. Real wages increased in almost all Member States, and particularly in the catching-up countries, therefore further contributing to convergence. By the first half of 2020, with several Member States entering into recession, the growth of compensation per employees started to slow down and decline, especially where the fall in hours was more intense.

2.1. INTRODUCTION

How and to what extent has the pandemic disrupted the national labour markets? This chapter looks into developments at the Member States level, by identifying common trends and the differences across countries in the labour market responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. starts with an analysis of developments in unemployment and of occupational vulnerabilities (Section 2.2). Section 2.3 reviews the evolution of employment, activity, and hours worked. Fluctuations in job creation and job destruction behind unemployment developments are reviewed in Section 2.4. Wage and productivity developments are analysed in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 focuses on external competitiveness and examines how labour market outcomes relate to external balances and adjustment needs. Section 2.7 concludes.

2.2. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES

In 2019, unemployment fell in all Member States. With the exception of Sweden, where the unemployment rate increased by 0.4 pps, and Luxembourg and Lithuania, where it hovered around the same level of 2018, all other countries entered 2020 with the lowest unemployment rates since 2013 (Graph 2.2). Similarly to 2018, countries with high unemployment, such as Greece and Croatia (-2 pps), Cyprus (-1.3 pps) and Spain (-1.2 pps) recorded a stronger decline. Among countries with low rates, unemployment dropped by about one percentage point in Bulgaria, Estonia and Ireland. Hence, cross-country differences in unemployment rates have markedly declined, mirroring the fall in the dispersion of the rates of economic growth (Graph 2.1).

Graph 2.1: **Dispersion of GDP growth and unemployment rates in the EU: 2008-2020Q3**



(1) Dispersion is measured by standard deviation (2) For 2015, Ireland is excluded due to a revision in the measurement of GDP.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts.

In the first quarter of 2020, unemployment increased only marginally. At the beginning of 2020, the jobless rate was only slightly affected by the sudden output losses that hit all countries. Compared to the last quarter of 2019, the unemployment rate increased in fifteen countries; yet, it was about half a percentage point higher only in Luxembourg and Estonia and close to one percentage point in Latvia. In eight Member

Graph 2.2: **Unemployment rate: 2007-2020 (October)**



(1) Countries are ranked by ascending order of unemployment rate 15-74 in 2019. EU27 from 2020.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.

States, the jobless rate even fell in the first quarter, quite substantially in Greece and Italy (by 1 and 0.7 pps respectively), and to a lesser extent in Cyprus, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia.

Starting from April 2020, the labour market situation became more difficult. In April 2020, the unemployment rate increased in nineteen Member States (Graph 2.2) – in eight of them by more than one percentage point compared to March. The increase was large in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, and Lithuania (by more than 1.5 pps). The rise was more moderate in Luxembourg (0.9 pps), Slovenia (0.8 pps), Spain (0.6 pps) and the Netherlands (0.5 pps). In October, the unemployment rate increased further; in 13 Member States, it was 1 percentage point higher than in 2019. Conversely, the unemployment rate dropped in Greece (-1.2), Belgium (-0.3) and Italy (-0.2). This decline does not reflect a favourable labour market situation, but rather a decrease of the active population. A measure of underutilised labour resources that includes those looking for a job, the discouraged workers and the involuntary part-timers shows that in all Member States the labour market is working below its capacity. This extended measure (LS4) increased faster than the unemployment rate and more in low than in high unemployment countries (Graph 2.3), showing underlying unemployment pressure. ([47])

Graph 2.3: **Measure of labour market utilisation**



LS1=Labour market slack (narrow definition); LS4=Labour market slack (broad definition)
Boxes represent the middle half of the distribution; the mark inside the box is the median. Dots are outliers. The upper and lower whiskers around the boxes show the minimum and maximum values excluding outliers.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat LFS.

Unemployment has not increased as expected based on the drop of GDP. The Okun's law is the standard relation linking changes in the unemployment rate to changes in GDP growth. Panel estimates suggest that a 1% shock to GDP growth leads to a change in unemployment by 0.2% on average for the EU countries. Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Ball et al., 2019 and OECD, 2020a), there is a considerable variation in the average response (Okun's coefficients) across countries. ([48]) Estimates coefficients are negative

([47]) This is visible in Graph 2.3 by the increase of the lower whisker and the median, while the higher whisker increase by less.

([48]) OECD (2020a).

ranging from 0.03 in Romania to 0.65 in Spain (Graph 2.4). ([49])

In twenty Member States, the increase in the unemployment rate in the first two quarters of 2020 was lower than predicted. Countries with the most moderate increase in unemployment compared to the expected one were Spain, Portugal, Italy, France, Cyprus, Poland, Greece, and Germany. The estimated relation over-predicts the response of unemployment also for Austria, Hungary, Slovakia Denmark, the Netherlands, Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovenia, Bulgaria, Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg; in this case, however, the gap between the expected and the current unemployment rate is lower than for the first group of countries. For a few Member States (Lithuania, Malta, Sweden, Latvia, Romania and Estonia), the increase in unemployment is above what is predicted by Okun's relationship. ([50]).

Graph 2.4: **Actual unemployment rate and Okun's law predictions for the first two quarters of 2020**



The graph shows the actual unemployment rate and the unemployment rate predicted on the basis of the Okun's law in first differences with two lags for the period 2000Q3-20019Q4 on a panel of EU countries, with country specific fixed-effects and country specific responses of unemployment changes to GDP growth, except for Romania where the estimation period is 2004Q1-2019Q4. See footnote (48).
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

The extensive use of short-time work schemes and the drop in the activity rate have mitigated the impact of the recession on unemployment. In some Member States, the unemployment rate did increase, marking a clear break with the developments in previous years. However, the

([49]) Estimates refer to the period 2000Q3-2019Q4, except for Romania where the estimation period is 2004Q1-2019Q4. Estimates are based on the following Okun's equation: $\Delta U = \alpha + \beta g_t + \gamma g_{t-1} + \delta g_{t-2} + \varepsilon_t$, where g_t is the growth rate at time t, ΔU is the change in the unemployment rate, α is the change in unemployment with zero growth. The Okun's coefficient is the sum of β, γ and δ. The ratio between α and the Okun's coefficient is the employment content of growth, i.e. the minimum GDP growth necessary to have no change in unemployment. To have unemployment falling, GDP growth should be higher than α divided by the sum of β, γ and δ. See OECD (2020a).

([50]) This result is explained by the lower Okun's coefficient for these countries. The relation between unemployment and GDP growth is non-linear, meaning that large GDP shocks lead to more rapid and larger increases in unemployment than for moderate GDP shocks. This non-linearity makes the estimate less precise (i.e. a larger gap between the actual and the predicted values) in case of large shocks. For the countries mentioned, the cumulated drop of GDP was smaller than for countries for which there is a larger under-prediction of the increase in the unemployment rate.

increase was relatively small in most countries. Several factors explain the moderate increase of the unemployment rate compared to what could be expected on the basis of GDP growth. The widespread use of short-time work schemes contributed to containing the massive job destruction that otherwise many countries would have experienced following the severe output losses of the first and second quarters of 2020. ([51]) These schemes prevent job destruction but do not explain the drop in the unemployment rate observed in some Member States. This decline is rather due to a significant number of people that have left the labour force. ([52]) In the first quarter of 2020, the activity rate dropped in 15 Member States and by the second quarter, in most of the Member States, with the exception of Romania, Sweden, Latvia and Finland. Significant declines – higher than 3 pps – were recorded in Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland (Graph 2.5). ([53])

Graph 2.5: **Unemployment rate, activity rate and employment rate: cumulated changes over the period 2019Q4-2020Q2**



The relation between unemployment rate and activity rate is non-linear: therefore, the difference between the change in the activity and the change in the employment rate does not equal the change in the unemployment rate.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat LFS.

In all countries, a sharp deterioration in consumers' unemployment expectations took place. In the first months of 2020, households' unemployment expectations one year ahead deteriorated in parallel with the tightening of the containment measures (Graph 2.6). This relation is strong for all countries, independently of the degree of restriction. ([54])

The response of unemployment expectations to the loosening of the containment measures varied across countries. In several countries, individuals' perceptions on labour market prospects one year ahead improved with the relaxation of the lockdown. Unemployment expectations improved considerably in Austria and Germany, as governments started to loosen the lockdown measures (Graph 2.6). In Italy, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, people remained pessimistic about job prospects despite the relaxation of government measures.

Graph 2.6: **Stringency of containment measures and consumers' unemployment expectations one year ahead: January-November 2020**



The stringency indicator aggregates the score for different containment measures. Missing data for MT.
Source: DG EMPL computations on European Business and consumers Survey and Oxford Tracker data.

Two factors have influenced the evolution of consumers' sentiment as lockdown restrictions started to be loosened. First, the perceived risk of

([51]) The dismissal restrictions imposed in several countries (e.g. Greece and Italy) also contributed to contain labour shedding.

([52]) For example in Italy, the decline in the unemployment rate by about 2 pps between January and April reflected a drop in the activity rate by 3.5 pps higher than the one in the employment rate (-1.7 pps)

([53]) In absolute numbers, against an increase of EU unemployment of 124 thousands, the reduction in the active population is 5.6 million, with the largest declines in Belgium, Greece, Portugal, France and Italy.

([54]) The correlation is 0.8 for Sweden and 0.7 for Italy, two countries at the extreme of the distribution of the stringency index.

contagion may have induced people to adopt voluntary social distancing and prolong the economic effects of the lockdown. The role of perceived risk of contagion is confirmed by a regression of unemployment expectations on the stringency index and the confirmed cases. ([55]) Second, certain occupations at risk (such as those related to hotels and hospitality) are disproportionately concentrated in some countries, which may have further contributed to the perceptions of weak labour market prospects.

2.2.1. An analysis of vulnerable occupations in the EU Member States

The share of vulnerable occupations is quite heterogeneous across countries. As discussed in Chapter 1, countries with a relatively higher proportion of contact-intensive occupations that cannot be performed remotely are more vulnerable to social distancing. ([56]) For example, Greek employment accounts for 2% of total employment but more than 55% of its employment is vulnerable. In six Member States, the share of vulnerable workers ([57]) is above 50% (Graph 2.7). The prevalence of temporary contracts makes certain countries more vulnerable to social distancing even when a large share of employment is in non-vulnerable occupations (e.g., Sweden, Finland and France). This is particularly evident for the young that are overrepresented in vulnerable occupations (Graph 2.8). Patterns are also quite differentiated across regions (Graph 2.A1.3 in the Annex).

Graph 2.7: **Country exposure to vulnerable occupations: share in total employment, 2018.**



Source: European Commission based on LFS and O*NET

Changes in the structure of occupations before 2020 have modified countries' exposure to social distancing. The 2013-2019 employment growth was not uniformly distributed across occupations. A shift-share analysis helps to quantify the importance of these structural changes for total employment growth. It decomposes total employment growth in two components. A "within" component represents the growth of contact-intensive employment within each industry. The "between" component represents the growth of contact-intensive employment due to the rising importance of contact-intensive industries. In all countries where the share of employment in high-contact occupations declined, this was mostly attributable to the decline of contact-intensive jobs within sectors (Graph 2.9). Luxembourg and Hungary are the exception to this pattern, as a shift of employment towards less-contact intensive sectors contributed also to the decline of contact-intensive occupations. In contrast, countries, such as Portugal, recording a rise in contact-intensive employment experienced a structural shift towards more contact-intensive

([55]) These two variables explain about 71% of total variability of unemployment expectations within countries. Chapter 1 shows that consumers have reacted to both government imposed social distancing and to the risks of contagion.
([56]) Chapter 1 classifies occupations on the basis of whether tasks can technically be carried out remotely via telework or whether they require face-to-face interactions.
([57]) i.e. those occupations whose tasks require to be closed to other people and cannot be performed remotely.

sectors. This implies that the overall exposure to physical proximity increased because the share of employment in contact-intensive sectors has risen and not because the growth of these jobs has on average increased within sectors. This change in the sectoral distribution offsets the decline of contact-intensive employment within sectors in Cyprus, Croatia, Estonia and Romania, while it pushed high-contact employment further up in Greece, Latvia and Portugal. In these countries, there was also an increase of employment in high-contact occupations within industries.

Graph 2.8: **Country exposure to vulnerable occupations: young workers (share in total employment), 2018.**



Source: European Commission based on LFS and O*NET

Graph 2.9: **Growth of high-contact occupations between 2012 and 2018: the contribution of change in the occupational composition**



Source: European Commission based on LFS and O*NET

There is a significant difference across Member States in the share of work that can be done remotely. On average, at least 25% of workers could potentially perform their tasks remotely. However, the distribution across countries is quite heterogeneous. While in Luxembourg and Slovenia more than 40% of employment is in activities that can be executed remotely, in Spain, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Greece this accounts for less than 30% of total employment (Graph 2.10). Differences in industrial structures are a decisive factor to explain the varying prevalence of teleworking across EU countries. Other factors include differences within sectors, the distribution of employment by company size, the share of self-employed and workers' skills. ([58])

Regional differences in potential remote working are stark. Capital regions have, in most cases, the highest potential for remote working (Graph 2.A1.4). On average, there is a 17 pps difference between the regions with the highest and lowest levels in a given country. This difference reaches more than 25 pps in Belgium, Czech Republic, Poland and Romania, driven by comparatively high levels of potential remote working in their capitals.

([58]) The possibility of remote working correlates strongly with the skills requirements of the occupation, firm size and sectoral composition (OECD, 2020f); some sectors, such as business services, have a higher potential of remote working than hotel and restaurants.

Graph 2.10: **Potential and effective employment in tele-workable occupations, year 2018.**



Source: European Commission based on LFS and O*NET

In all Member States, there is an untapped potential for teleworking. According to the last available data (2019), 13% of the employed was working either usually or sometime remotely. The gap between the potential and the effective number of people working remotely is the largest in Cyprus, Lithuania and Romania, (more than 30 pps), while in the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Denmark, the gap is less than 7 pps (Graph 2.10). Beyond differences among countries in the occupational structure, there are also differences in the access to an efficient internet connection that explain the actual numbers of workers that *can* work from home. ([59]) Thus, for regions that have lower levels of digital infrastructure, especially for many rural areas, the potential of remote working represents the most optimistic scenario. Until rural broadband infrastructure is sufficiently upgraded, the rural-urban divide in *actual* remote working may be even higher than the already large gap in *potential* remote working.

Higher income countries have a higher share of activities that can be done remotely. Graph 2.11 plots the share of effective tele-workable employment in each country against its per capita income. The graph depicts a clear positive relationship between income levels and the share of jobs done from home, suggesting that economic development explains largely the opportunities that workers have to work effectively from home.

Graph 2.11: **Share of effective tele-workable employment, by GDP (PPP) per capita**



(1) The regression line fits all countries, except Luxembourg and Ireland.
Source: European Commission based on National Accounts, LFS and O*NET

2.3. EMPLOYMENT, ACTIVITY RATES AND HOURS WORKED

2.3.1. Employment and activity rates

In 2019, Member States' employment rates kept rising despite the slowdown of the economy. In 2019, the employment rate increased in all Member States, except Denmark and Sweden, where it dropped by 0.4 pps. Bulgaria experienced the largest increase (2.4 pps), followed by Cyprus (1.9 pps), Greece (1.6 pps) and Malta (1.5 pps). In Bulgaria and Cyprus, the increase in the employment rate coincided with a relatively large increase in the activity rate (1.5 pps and 0.9 pps respectively).

After seven years of continuous growth, in the second quarter of 2020 the employment rate fell in almost all Member States. In about fifteen Member States, the employment rate was between 0.7 pps and 1.7 pps lower than the rate of the last quarter of 2019. Only in Malta and Lithuania, the employment rate was higher than in the last quarter of 2019 (0.1 pp and 0.4 pps respectively). By the second quarter, the EU-27 average was 1 pp less

([59]) Graphs 2.A1.4 and 2.A1.5 in the Annex provides information for the European regions.

than its 2019 yearly average, with large declines in Portugal and Ireland (-1.6 pps), Estonia and Austria (-1.8), Bulgaria and Spain (-2.2) (Table 2.A1.1). The employment rate increased only in Malta (+0.8). In almost all countries, the lower employment rate coincided with a lower activity rate.

Activity rates were quite resilient to the slowdown of 2018-2019. In 2019, the activity rate declined only in Slovenia (-0.6 pps), France (-0.4 pps) Latvia (-0.2 pps) and Estonia (-0.2 pps). The gap between the lowest and the highest activity rate remained mainly unchanged at about 16 pps. The resilience in the participation rate benefitted from the rise in the female activity rates, which in almost all countries increased between 2018 and 2019 more than the male rates. Only in Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Romania the male activity rates outpaced the growth of the female ones. A noticeable increase in the activity rate of women could be observed in Malta and Bulgaria, respectively from 63.8% to 66% and from 67% to 68.7%.

In the first half of 2020, the activity rate was lower than in 2019 in almost all Member States. In the first quarter of 2020, the activity rate was lower than one year earlier in fifteen Member States. By the second quarter, it had dropped in almost all countries except Poland, Croatia, Malta and the Baltics. Significant declines – higher than 2 pps – were recorded in Italy and Spain. In all countries, there is an increase in the number of marginally attached workers, revealing the high pessimism prevalent among the job seekers in the last months. ([60]) This increase is particularly significant in Austria, Luxembourg, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Hungary and Portugal (all with increases above 1 percentage point).

2.3.2. The adjustment of hours worked

In the first half of 2020, there was a steep decline in the hours worked per employee in several Member States. Average hours worked have been falling for a long time by now. ([61]). During the 2008-2009 and the 2011-2012 recessions, this decline accelerated, but hours did not pick up in the subsequent recovery. At the end of 2019, the average hours worked per employee were well below the level reached at the onset of the 2009 recession, while employment was higher in almost all Member States (Graph 2.12). In the first half of 2020, the average number of hours worked per employee dropped in a majority of the Member States. This decline was particularly steep in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, France, Malta and Spain, whereas it was relatively minor (less than 5%) in Finland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Czech Republic, Belgium, Poland, Finland, and Sweden.

In the first half of 2020, employment growth turned negative in all Member States. In the first quarter of 2020, employment growth started to decelerate in all countries from a level above the trough reached during the 2011-2012 recession, except in Greece, Latvia and Bulgaria that had not yet recovered the losses that followed the 2008-2009 financial crisis. In fifteen Member States, employment growth was negative already in the first quarter, most notably in Sweden, Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary, Belgium, and Italy. In the second quarter, employment growth turned negative in all countries, with the exception of Romania and Malta where it came to a standstill. The largest employment losses were registered in Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain, and Austria.

2.3.3. Employment developments at sectoral level

Until 2019, job creation mainly occurred in market services, in particular in wholesale and retail trade and professional, scientific and administrative services. Most of job creation after the 2011-2012 recession took place in trade and accommodation and in sectors that require specialised knowledge or provide support to general business operations (professional and administrative services) (see Graph 2.13 and Table 2.A1.2 in the Annex). In eleven Member States,

([60]) The marginally attached workers are people in the labour force who are searching without fulfilling the statistical criteria for being classified as unemployed: they have been looking for a job but not searched as intensively as those conducting any search activity in the past four weeks.

([61]) This downward trend reflects the rise of employment in the service sector, where part-time work is more prevalent, the growing importance of flexible working arrangements and non-standard working increasing preference for time off work.

Graph 2.12: **Change in number of employees and hours worked per employee, cumulative % change since the first quarter of 2009:2009Q1-2020Q3**



(1) Countries are ranked by ascending order of % change in the number of employees between 2009q1 and 2019q4. Values for number of employees for Luxembourg and Malta are out of scale (+30 and +51%). Due to break in the series of hours worked data from HU are shown relative to 2010Q1.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts.

these two sectors alone accounted for more than half of total employment growth, and for more than 80% in France, Italy, Greece and Romania. By contrast, industry contributed by more than one quarter to total employment growth in Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland and Romania. An important contribution came also from the sector of Information and Communication in the case of Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia. Public sector accounted for more than one third of the total employment growth in Belgium, the Scandinavian countries, Croatia, Germany and Romania.

In the first half of 2020, job destruction occurred in all countries and sectors. Employment dropped in all Member States except Malta (Graph 2.14). In these countries, job losses were sizeable in retail and professional activities. These sectors contributed the most to the growth of employment during the 2013-2019 recovery, (Table 2.A1.2). Heavier employment losses were recorded in Spain, Hungary, Ireland and Austria. In a few countries, employment growth in some sectors counteracted the job destruction in retail and professional services. For example, in Ireland employment growth in information and communication, finance and insurance, real estate and industry reduced by 2.5 pps the drop of total employment.

Employment growth remains overall positive in non-market services. Employment in non-market services, which are largely dominated by the public sector, continued to support total employment growth in almost all countries as it did during the recovery that followed the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Consequently, in the period 2013-2019, the share of public employment in total employment increased in twelve countries, especially Croatia (2.1 pps), Germany (1.1 pps)

Graph 2.13: **Sectoral contribution to total annual employment growth: 2013-2019**



(1) The chart shows the contribution of employment growth in each sector to total employment growth. Sectoral employment growth rates are shown in the Annex.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts

Graph 2.14: **Sectoral contribution to total employment growth: 2019Q4-2020Q2 (cumulated growth rates)**



(1) The chart shows the contribution of employment growth in each sector to total employment growth. Sectoral employment growth rates are reported in the Annex.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts.

and Romania (1 pp). It contracted, instead by more than 2 pps in Hungary, Cyprus and Malta.

The lockdown has led to an increase in spending on food and to a decline in the purchase of non-food goods and services. In the early months of the lockdown, the demand for food and related wholesale activities went up whereas, the demand for non-food dropped (Graphs 2.15 and 2.16). This is consistent with the evidence that a pandemic leads to a reallocation of spending from durables to non-durable goods (Correia et al. 2020; Chen et al. 2020). After two consecutive months of contractions, consumption in durable goods picked up again as to relax their lockdown measures. In June, turnover (a measure of the value of sales) had recovered almost all the losses of the first two months of the year. Yet, in July sales remained flat in all Member States. The stagnation of domestic demand had an impact on employment in all countries, in particular in sectors more strongly affected by the lockdown (Graph 2.17).

Graph 2.15: **Changes of turnover in the food sector and stringency**



Source: DG EMPL calculations on Eurostat and Oxford Tracker.

Graph 2.16: **Changes of turnover in the non-food sector and stringency**



Source: DG EMPL calculations on Eurostat and Oxford Tracker.

Graph 2.17: **Employment growth: total and wholesale and retail trade, transport, accommodation and food service activities, cumulated growth 2019Q4-2020Q3**

For Luxembourg 2020Q2
Source: Eurostat.

The impact of the lockdown on employment is differentiated across countries and sectors. The growth of employment between the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020 can be decomposed into a component that represents the uncertainty about job prospects created by the lockdown and a residual that is unrelated to this indirect effect of the confinement measures. ([62]) The unexplained component may represent the direct impact on the demand for labour (mainly, with confinement orders leading to a melting of demand), the effect of lower earnings on consumption and the impact of voluntary social distancing amidst high contagious risks.

Graph 2.18 shows how the shift in consumers' unemployment expectations following the lockdown has contributed to the change in employment growth. ([63]) It suggests the following considerations:

- A worsening in unemployment expectations induced by the lockdown is negatively related to observed decline in employment. Yet, there is a large heterogeneity across countries and sectors;

- In about nine countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Croatia, Italy and Slovakia), the lockdown-

([62]) See chapter 1 for the methodology.
([63]) Chapter 1 discusses at length the mechanisms through which the lockdown has affected employment growth. It may influence employment growth via its effect on confidence and on consumers' behaviour.

induced change in confidence predicts most of the employment losses experienced since the last quarter of 2019. In the others, the fall in employment is mainly due to factors unrelated to the link between the lockdown stringency and unemployment expectations;

- By sector, in seven countries (Austria, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Sweden, Slovenia and Slovakia) the deterioration of consumers' expectations due to the lockdown explains most of the employment losses in construction; a similar effect is observed for industry in almost all countries. Conversely, the negative impact on trade and accommodation stems mainly from factors other than those determined by the effect of the lockdown on consumers' expectations. Finally, in several countries, the unexplained component accounts for most of the employment losses in retail, which is consistent with the lockdown leading in many cases to temporary workplace closures.

2.3.4. Employment developments by contract type

In 2019, permanent contracts increased in a majority of the Member States. Countries such as Poland, Slovenia and Croatia with a lower share of permanent contracts experienced in 2019 a higher increase than countries where this share is high. (Table 2.1). Conversely, the share of temporary contracts increased in Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia and Malta, due to the growth of the retail trade, food and accommodation sector. The share of self-employed in total employment dropped in the majority of Member States in 2019, in particular in Greece, Bulgaria, Portugal and Ireland. In the second quarter of 2020, the share of permanent employment increased in all countries, except Bulgaria, Denmark and Latvia.

Graph 2.18: **The (indirect) impact of the lockdown on employment growth: cumulated change since 2019Q4**



(1) Estimates based on Tab. 1.2. in Chapter 1. (2) Second stage regression. Panel estimate on 25 countries over the period 2000Q1-2019Q4.
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on National accounts data.

In most Member States, temporary employment sharply declined in the second quarter of 2020. Compared to the first half of 2019, the EU average stock of temporary employees fell by almost 2.8 million (2.1 million in the euro area); more than 60% of this decline is concentrated in Spain, Poland, Italy and France. The share of temporary contracts fell in all countries except Denmark, in particular in Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Croatia (Table 2.1 and Graph 2.20). In the first three quarters of 2020, temporary employment declined

Graph 2.20: **Employment growth by contract type, 2008-2020Q3, cumulative changes since 2008Q1**



Age group: 15-64 years old. (2) 2020Q2 for EL, HR, MT, PL, RO. Missing 2020 data for DE.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data, Labour Force Survey.

strongly, and by more than 15% in Luxembourg, Latvia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Portugal and Poland.

Graph 2.19: **Employment growth by contract type, EU 28, 2005-2019**



Source: Eurostat, LFS. Last available year for the EU is 2019

Table 2.1: **Distribution of contract types among the employed, 2019 and 2020q2, % and pps.**

	Open-ended contracts				Temporary contracts				Self employed			
	2019	chg	2020q2	chg	2019	chg	2020q2	chg	2019	chg	2020q2	chg
LU	88.9	0.5	90.0	1.0	5.1	-0.4	3.9	-1.2	6.0	-0.1	6.1	0.1
LT	87.2	0.1	87.6	0.7	1.2	-0.1	0.9	-0.5	11.6	0.0	11.5	-0.2
HU	86.7	0.3	87.1	0.5	5.5	-0.6	4.7	-0.9	7.8	0.4	8.3	0.6
EE	86.4	0.3	86.8	1.0	2.7	-0.3	2.1	-0.8	10.9	0.1	10.8	-0.2
LV	85.5	-0.5	84.0	-1.9	2.7	0.4	1.7	-1.0	11.7	0.1	14.5	2.9
DK	84.7	0.0	84.4	-0.5	9.2	0.1	9.5	0.5	6.1	-0.1	6.1	0.0
SE	82.4	0.4	83.3	1.1	13.8	-0.2	12.8	-1.2	3.8	-0.1	3.9	0.0
DE	80.9	0.7	:	:	9.9	-0.4	:	:	9.2	-0.2	9.0	-0.2
AT	80.8	0.6	81.2	0.2	7.3	-0.4	6.4	-0.7	11.9	-0.2	12.4	0.5
UK	80.3	-0.1	81.0	0.6	4.1	-0.3	4.2	0.1	15.5	0.4	14.8	-0.8
CZ	79.9	0.7	80.6	0.9	6.2	-0.5	5.4	-1.0	13.9	-0.2	14.1	0.1
MT	79.7	-1.3	81.6	1.2	7.8	1.0	5.9	-1.3	12.5	0.3	12.6	0.1
SK	79.6	0.1	81.2	1.2	6.9	-0.3	5.6	-1.1	13.5	0.2	13.2	-0.1
CY	77.8	0.1	77.1	0.3	11.0	-0.1	11.4	-0.4	11.2	0.0	11.5	0.1
IE	77.0	0.8	77.9	0.6	8.3	-0.2	7.1	-0.9	14.7	-0.6	14.9	0.3
FI	76.0	0.7	76.3	1.5	12.7	-0.7	12.5	-1.5	11.3	0.0	11.2	0.0
RO	76.0	0.8	78.4	1.9	1.1	0.2	1.0	-0.1	23.0	-1.1	20.6	-1.8
FR	76.0	0.3	77.2	1.5	13.5	-0.5	12.0	-1.8	10.5	0.1	10.8	0.3
EU28	74.4	0.6	75.8	1.5	10.9	-0.4	9.4	-1.6	14.7	-0.1	14.8	0.1
BE	74.1	-0.2	75.0	0.7	9.1	0.1	8.0	-1.0	16.7	0.1	17.0	0.3
EU27	73.5	0.7	75.0	1.7	12.0	-0.5	10.4	-1.7	14.5	-0.2	14.6	0.0
EA19	73.4	0.5	75.0	1.7	12.6	-0.3	10.8	-1.8	14.0	-0.2	14.1	0.1
HR	71.7	1.9	75.6	3.9	15.5	-1.9	12.1	-3.4	12.8	0.1	12.5	-0.5
BG	71.5	0.6	69.9	-1.2	3.4	0.3	2.6	-1.1	25.1	-0.9	26.8	-0.3
SI	70.5	2.2	73.3	2.9	10.6	-2.1	7.6	-2.9	18.9	-0.2	19.0	0.1
PT	69.1	1.3	72.5	3.4	16.9	-1.0	13.9	-3.2	14.0	-0.3	13.8	-0.2
NL	68.2	1.1	69.4	1.5	15.3	-0.9	13.5	-2.2	16.5	-0.2	17.1	0.7
ES	64.7	0.7	67.3	2.8	21.5	-0.4	18.5	-3.2	13.7	-0.3	14.2	0.3
IT	64.5	0.2	66.6	2.3	11.9	0.0	9.8	-2.3	23.6	-0.2	23.6	0.0
EL	64.4	-0.3	62.4	2.0	7.3	0.9	6.2	-2.1	28.3	-0.7	31.4	0.1
PL	62.9	2.3	65.0	2.7	17.2	-2.0	14.6	-3.0	19.9	-0.3	20.4	0.4

(1) Countries are ranked by descending share of open-ended contracts in 2019. (2) "chg" refers to the change (in pps) in the share compared with the previous year (for 2019) or corresponding quarter (for 2020).
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat LFS data.

2.4. JOB MARKET FLOWS

2.4.1. Job finding and separation rates

In 2019, the dynamics of job-finding rates changed in line with the economic slowdown. For 19 Member States, job-finding rates – a measure of the probability that an unemployed person finds a job within the next month – have started to decrease from the peak reached at the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019, in line with the moderate economic slowdown (Graph 2.21). For several countries (including Czech Republic, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands) where finding rates were comparatively high, decreases in 2019 were steeper. Austria, Cyprus, Spain and Greece saw no change in the finding rates, which remained at the levels attained in 2018, while for Estonia and Slovenia only a slight increase was recorded.

The job-separation rate increased mainly in countries where it had reached very low levels before the pandemic. The separation rate – a measure of the probability that an employed person becomes unemployed in the next month – continued to decline in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Ireland, Italy and Poland, while it increased in Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Portugal, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia mostly from very low levels. In another group of countries (including Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia) their rates remained at about the same levels as in 2018.

In the first half of 2020, the job-finding rates dropped in almost all countries. The probability of finding a job dropped in all Member States except Italy, France and Portugal. In a number of countries – notably Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Croatia, Germany and Hungary –, the decline was substantial. In the former two, it was comparable to the one observed between the first quarter of 2008 and the last quarter of 2009. Conversely, in Croatia, Hungary and Germany, the decline was much larger than during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. For Italy, France and Portugal, the increase in the job finding rates does not imply better employment prospects, as it is mainly linked to the drop in the activity rate. Due to this decline, only the most employable workers remain in the pool of unemployed, which inflates the job finding rate. ([64])

The job-destruction rate – i.e. the probability of losing a job - increased in all countries except Italy, France and to a lesser extent in Belgium and Portugal. Between the last quarter of 2019 and the second quarter of 2020, the largest increase in the job destruction rates was recorded in countries with relatively more flexible labour markets, such as the Baltics or in countries where the economic structure or the prevalence of temporary contracts made workers more exposed to a contraction in domestic demand – e.g. Greece or Spain, Netherlands and Sweden.

2.4.2. The Beveridge curve and labour market matching

While already on a decreasing path in 2019, in 2020 the number of vacancies dropped abruptly. ([65]) After reaching a peak in 2018, where the labour markets were particularly tight (i.e. very high number of vacancies and lowest unemployment levels), job vacancies drastically fell in the second quarter of 2020. In Cyprus, Italy and France, the shape of the Beveridge curve remained flat for a long time (i.e. the unemployment rate was falling while vacancies were stagnating), which is consistent with favourable developments in the job matching efficiency in the context of a very weak labour demand. All other countries experienced a downward movement along the curve in 2019 and the beginning of 2020, indicating a decrease in the number of vacancies, while unemployment remained more or less stable. This pattern is usually associated with a negative demand shock, as unemployment responds with a lag of one or two quarters. The decline of vacancies was sharp for some countries (Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Hungary, Finland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Ireland and Sweden).

([64]) In these countries, the drop in the job finding rate in the second quarter of 2020 matches the decline in the long-term unemployment (Graph I.2.22).

([65]) The Beveridge curve is the relationship between unemployment and an indicator of labour market tightness (i.e. the abundance of job vacancies). Graph A1.1 in the Annex relies on a proxy for the vacancy rates, namely an indicator of labour market tightness, as calculated from the EU Business and Consumer Survey. It is the share of manufacturing firms reporting that labour is a "factor limiting production".

Graph 2.21: **Job finding and job separation rates, 2008Q1-2020Q1, quarterly data**



(1) For Germany, the last available figure is 2019Q4. (2) The job-finding rate is a measure of the probability that an unemployed person finds a job within the next month. The expected duration of unemployment equals the reciprocal of the job-finding rate. The job separation rate is a measure of the probability that an employed person becomes unemployed in the next month. They differ from inflows into unemployment and outflows out of unemployment, as these depends also on the stocks of employed and unemployed people. When inflows equal to outflows, the unemployment rate does not change. Thus, job finding and separation rates determine the level of unemployment (so-called frictional unemployment) which depends on the time spent between jobs when an unemployed is searching for a job.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

In 2019, long-term unemployment continued to fall markedly. The number of long-term unemployed – those who are looking for a job for at least a year – continued to fall by another 1 million from the previous year, reaching 6.3 million, with notable improvements in Spain, France, Italy, followed by Germany and Greece. These countries make up for more than half of the overall reduction in 2019. As a share on total unemployment, improvements were recorded even in the third quarter of 2020, notably in Slovakia, Portugal and Slovenia (Graph 2.22).

Graph 2.22: **Long-term unemployment (12 months or more) as percentage of total unemployment, 2005-2020Q3**

(1) 2020Q3 refers to 2020 three quarter averages, except for BG, EL, HR, IT, MT, PL, RO. (2) Missing 2020 data for DE.
Source: Eurostat, LFS

With frozen hiring, jobless people may end up in long-term unemployment. With the unemployment rate increasing only slightly, in the first half of 2020, due to reactive policy measures, a sharp increase in long-term unemployment would have been expected, in particular in countries where the job destruction did not spike up. However, in the second quarter of 2020, the long-term unemployment rate and the average duration of unemployment have continued to fall. The outbreak of the crisis in 2020 did not have negative repercussions on the unemployment spells: on the contrary, improvements continued along the previous trend, with a median decrease from the 2013-2019 average of around 2 months, and particularly significant (higher than 4 months) in Portugal, Croatia and Ireland (Graph 2.22). However, these developments need to be assessed against the fall in the labour force activity rate and of many young people joining the pool of unemployed after having lost a job. Indeed, in a large number of countries many job seekers, especially those with long unemployment spells, have given up job-search (Table 2.A1.1).

Graph 2.23: **Average length of unemployment spells, 2005-2020Q2, quarterly data, (in months).**

(1) Data for Malta are not available.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

2.5. TRENDS IN WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS

2.5.1. Nominal wage developments

In 2019, wages expanded at a higher rate than in 2018. Wage growth was above 4% in the Baltics, the Central and Eastern Europe countries and Ireland (Graph 2.24). For Hungary, Lithuania and Ireland, the changes in 2019 substantially outpaced those of the previous year. For Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia and Czech Republic, wage growth dropped from high rates. Wages decelerated also in Sweden, Italy and France. Wages adjusted for productivity (i.e. nominal unit labour costs) growth increased in all countries (Table 2.2), in particular in those countries with current account surplus, thereby supporting rebalancing within the EU. For instance, NULC grew by 3.5 and 3% in Germany and the Netherlands respectively.

Wages have reacted quite fast to the decline in economic activity of the first half of 2020. With all Member States entering into recession, growth

Graph 2.24: **Nominal compensation per employee, 2018, 2019 and 2020Q3, annual % change**



(1) Wages are measured by the indicator "Nominal compensation per employee", which is calculated as total compensation of employees divided by the total number of employees. The total compensation is defined as the total remuneration, in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an employee in return for work done by the latter during the accounting period and it has two components: i) Wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind; and ii) Social contributions payable by employers. (2) National accounts data. The indicators are based on national currency values. Aggregates are weighted averages. (3) Countries are ranked in descending order of nominal compensation growth in 2019.
Source: European Commission, AMECO database

of compensation per employee started to slow in most of them.

Table 2.2: **Decomposition of the annual percentage change of nominal and real unit labour costs (NULC and RULC), 2019**

	Compensation per employee	Labour productivity	NULC	GDP deflator	RULC
LV	8.8	2.3	6.4	2.6	3.6
SK	7.1	1.1	5.9	2.6	3.2
LT	9.8	3.5	6.1	3.0	3.1
CY	2.9	0.1	2.8	0.6	2.2
EE	9.3	3.7	5.4	3.2	2.1
SI	4.5	0.1	4.5	2.4	2.0
EL	1.1	-0.1	1.3	-0.4	1.7
UK	3.9	0.4	3.5	1.9	1.6
MT	2.8	-0.8	3.7	2.2	1.5
HU	9.4	3.2	6.0	4.5	1.5
DE	3.2	-0.3	3.5	2.2	1.3
ES	2.1	-0.3	2.4	1.4	1.0
AT	2.9	0.5	2.4	1.7	0.7
IT	1.5	0.1	1.4	0.7	0.7
BE	2.0	-0.2	2.1	1.5	0.6
HR	3.4	1.5	1.9	1.5	0.4
CZ	6.3	2.1	4.1	3.9	0.3
FI	1.4	-0.5	1.9	1.8	0.1
NL	2.9	-0.2	3.0	3.0	0.1
PL	7.3	4.4	2.8	2.9	-0.1
SE	3.2	0.7	2.5	2.7	-0.2
PT	2.8	1.4	1.4	1.7	-0.3
LU	1.7	-1.3	3.0	3.4	-0.4
DK	1.5	1.2	0.3	0.7	-0.4
BG	6.1	3.0	3.0	4.7	-1.6
FR	-0.2	0.3	-0.5	1.2	-1.7
IE	3.5	2.6	0.9	3.1	-2.2
RO	8.9	4.1	4.5	6.9	-2.2

(1) Countries are ranked in descending order of real unit labour costs (RULC). (2) The growth of nominal unit labour costs (NULC) is the difference between the growth of nominal compensation per employee and the growth of labour productivity. (3) The growth of RULC is the difference between the growth of NULC and of GDP deflator.
Source: European Commission, AMECO database.

This response mainly reflects the shortfall of hours worked associated with the widespread use of short-time work schemes. ([66])

Graph 2.25: **Wage growth and growth of hours worked per employee: 2019Q1-2020Q2**



Wage is nominal compensation per employee.
Source: European Commission.

Graph 2.27 shows that countries with a larger drop in hours worked experienced a larger drop in wages. In addition, firms may save on labour costs by freezing the variable components of pay or postponing the negotiation of expired contracts in firms that reduced the hours worked. Compared to one year earlier, in the second quarter 2020 almost

([66]) The effect on wages depends on the design of national schemes. In countries where benefits are paid directly to the employees and recorded as social transfers, the short-time working leads to a drop of wages, which is larger than in countries where benefits are paid as a subsidy to employers that continue paying full salary to for the reduced number of hours (da Silva et al. 2020).

Graph 2.26: **Nominal compensation per employee in public and private sector, 2019 and average 2015-2018, % change**



(1) The public sector is defined as public administration and defence, education, health and social work, personal service activities. (2) Countries are ranked by ascending order of growth of compensation per employee in the public sector in the period 2015-2018.
Source: Eurostat.

all Member States – notably Malta, Italy, France Spain and Belgium – recorded a drop of compensation per employee (Table 2.3). Wages increased only in Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia and The Netherlands. The partial rebound in economic activity in the third quarter of 2020 brought about a drop in the number of workers in short-time working and an increase in compensation per employee. Because of these wide fluctuations, in the third quarter of 2020 compensation per employee was 0.8% above the level of the third quarter of 2019.

The counterpart of the reduction of hours worked is the increase in hourly wages. In the first half of 2020, hourly wages increased in almost all countries, notably in Portugal, Greece and Hungary, Spain and Sweden (Table 2.3). Hourly wages dropped in few countries, namely in Romania, Croatia and Poland: in light of the limited adjustment in hours worked in these countries (Graph 2.25), this decline can be explained only by their relatively higher wage flexibility.

2.5.2. Real wage developments

In 2019, real wages increased in almost all Member States. Real wages are defined here as gross wages and salaries, deflated with consumer price inflation. These exclude the contributions paid by the employers, making them a more relevant measure of wages from the workers' prospective. Real wage growth was higher in countries with GDP per capita catching up to the EU average. This led to a decline in the dispersion of real wages within the EU. Wage growth above 4% was recorded in the Baltics, Romania, Poland and Poland (see Graph 2.28). Milder increases were observed in Slovenia, Czech Republic and

Graph 2.27: **Nominal compensation per employee by sector, 2019, annual % change**



(1) Countries are ranked by ascending order of changes in average compensation per employee (total economy) in 2019.
Source: Eurostat

Table 2.3: **Compensation per employee and per hour worked: growth rates.**

	Compensation per employee				Compensation per hours			
	2019q4-2020q3	2019q4-2020q1	2020q1-2020q2	2020q2-2020q3	2019q4-2020q3	2019q4-2020q1	2020q1-2020q2	2020q2-2020q3
AT	-0.8	0.1	-2.9	2.2	3.3	4.2	7.7	-7.9
BE	-0.7	-2.0	-5.8	7.6	:	0.7	5.6	:
BG	4.1	0.7	3.1	0.4	3.4	0.2	10.5	-6.6
CY	-1.1	0.6	-6.1	4.8	2.1	1.8	-2.1	2.4
CZ	0.6	0.7	-3.2	3.2	-1.8	3.3	2.5	-7.2
DE	0.3	0.3	-3.7	3.8	2.1	2.0	1.6	-1.4
DK	1.0	0.1	1.2	-0.3	2.0	1.3	5.1	-4.2
EE	5.8	0.1	0.8	4.9	4.0	2.5	2.0	-0.5
EL	0.7	-0.6	-1.6	2.9	3.9	4.9	22.4	-19.1
ES	0.7	-0.5	-6.5	8.3	1.6	3.3	6.8	-7.9
FI	1.2	0.7	-1.6	2.1	0.1	0.8	-0.3	-0.3
FR	0.1	-2.4	-7.5	10.9	2.6	1.6	8.2	-6.7
HR	1.9	0.4	-2.6	4.1	1.5	1.1	-2.9	3.3
HU	2.1	2.5	-0.5	0.1	4.4	3.8	8.7	-7.5
IE	-1.6	1.2	-5.0	2.3	-0.7	-1.1	1.4	-0.9
IT	-1.7	-3.1	-8.2	10.5	1.3	2.7	2.8	-4.1
LT	8.2	0.3	-0.1	8.0	8.4	1.8	4.2	2.2
LU		-0.6	-5.8		:	3.4	1.8	
LV	4.7	2.7	-2.3	4.3	3.8	1.8	3.9	-1.8
MT	-3.6	-0.4	-8.8	6.1	8.5	4.8	-2.3	6.0
NL		1.2	1.7		:	3.3	3.9	
PL	1.2	0.1	-1.4	2.6	-0.2	0.4	-1.1	0.5
PT	2.7	0.7	-1.5	3.5	6.6	4.5	22.1	-16.5
RO	2.5	1.1	-1.3	2.7	2.4	1.1	-1.3	2.5
SE	2.0	1.9	-0.3	0.4	4.3	1.4	4.1	-1.2
SI	3.0	0.2	-3.7	6.7	10.7	0.9	9.1	0.5
SK	0.7	1.6	-7.4	7.1	4.7	6.1	3.4	-4.6

Source: Eurostat, National Accounts

Slovakia and Portugal. Wage growth contributed to supporting workers' incomes but remained very low in Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and turned negative in Cyprus and Luxembourg.

By the third quarter of 2020, a large heterogeneity across countries is observed in the dynamics of real wages. In several Member States, real wages are either flat or even dropping. Negative real wage growth was recorded in Luxembourg, Italy, Austria, Czech Republic, Belgium and Poland.. Positive developments continued along the most recent trend in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia.

2.5.3. Wages, productivity, unit labour costs

In 2019, real compensation growth outpaced

Graph 2.28: **Real wages per employee, 2018, 2019 and 2020Q3, annual % change**



Real gross wages and salaries per employee, deflator private consumption. (2) Countries are ranked by descending order of real wage growth in 2019.
Source: European Commission, AMECO database.

Graph 2.29: **Real compensation per employee and productivity, 2019 (left panel) and 2020Q2 (right)**



(1) Real compensation is nominal compensation per employee deflated with the GDP deflator. (2) On the 45 degree line, real wage growth equals productivity growth. Points above (below) the line represent countries where productivity growth is above (below) real wage growth.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

productivity growth. For the majority of the Member States, real compensation grew at a faster rate than productivity. Higher gaps were recorded for some Central and Eastern European countries such as Estonia (2.4 pps), Latvia (3.7 pps), Lithuania and Slovakia (both at 3.2 pps) (Graph 2.29, left panel, countries furthest below the diagonal line). For Italy and Belgium, negative productivity growth was associated with almost stagnant real wages. In Finland and Luxembourg, wages declined at about the same rate as productivity. For France the modest productivity growth was coupled with a decrease in real wages. Since the 2013 recovery, the developments of real wages and productivity follow country specific patterns, with catching up countries usually experiencing higher real wage growth since 2013 (in Romania since 2016).

In 2019, the convergence of the wage share within the EU continued. Compared to countries with a high wage share, real wages grew much faster than productivity in countries with a low wage share (Graph 2.30). This is the case for a number of Central and Eastern European countries, where the wage share is particularly low (e.g. Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). In contrast, the wage share dropped in countries were wages grew less than productivity (e.g. Belgium, the Netherlands, and France).

In the second quarter of 2020, productivity growth turned significantly negative everywhere. The productivity decline reflects the effect of labour hoarding, (i.e. the retention of workers during recessions) spurred by measures aiming at preventing job destruction. In all countries, the decline of productivity was much larger than the decline of real wages (i.e. they are below the diagonal line, Graph 2.30, right panel). The largest gap was observed for Bulgaria, Malta Croatia and Portugal; the smallest for Finland, Estonia and Italy. The growth of real wages was higher than productivity in catching-up countries, which contributed to the convergence of the wage share within the EU. However, for Italy and Estonia the wage share increased less than the EU average.

Graph 2.30: **Wage share: 2014-2019 (changes in pps)**



(1) The wage share is defined as compensation per employee as percentage of GDP at current prices per person employed.
Source: AMECO database.

2.5.4. Wage developments by sector

In 2019, in the majority of Member States, public sector wages grew at a faster rate than in the private sector. Public wages fell only in Croatia (Graph 2.26); private sector wages

Table 2.4: **Decomposition of tax wedge at the average wage**

	Total Tax Wedge 2019	Of which			Difference 2018 - 2019				Difference 2008 - 2019			
		Personal Income Tax	Social Contributions Employee	Social Contribution Employer	Total Tax Wedge	Personal Income Tax	Social Contribution Employee	Social Contribution Employer	Total Tax Wedge	Personal Income Tax	Social Contribution Employee	Social Contribution Employer
MT	30.6	12.7	9.0	9.0	0.3	0.6	-0.1	-0.1	4.1	4.1	0.0	0.0
UK	30.9	12.5	8.5	9.8	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	-1.9	-2.3	0.2	0.1
IE	33.3	19.8	3.6	9.9	0.4	0.3	0.0	0.1	5.1	4.4	0.6	0.2
BG	34.9	7.2	11.6	16.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.0	0.8	-1.0
DK	35.5	35.5	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	-3.1	-3.1	0.0	0.0
PL	35.8	6.4	15.3	14.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.1	-0.2	1.2
EE	36.9	10.4	1.2	25.3	0.7	0.7	0.0	0.0	-1.5	-2.5	0.7	0.3
LT	37.2	16.3	19.2	1.8	-3.4	6.3	12.3	-22.0	-4.4	0.8	16.9	-22.0
NL	37.3	14.9	11.7	10.7	-0.5	-1.0	0.1	0.3	-1.9	0.9	-4.0	1.3
RO	38.3	6.9	29.2	2.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-4.1	-2.6	16.9	-18.4
LU	38.7	15.7	10.8	12.1	0.4	0.6	0.0	-0.2	4.0	1.9	0.0	2.1
ES	39.4	11.5	4.9	23.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.6	0.0	-0.1
HR	39.9	8.5	17.2	14.2	0.0	0.4	0.1	-0.5	:	:	:	:
EL	41.0	8.4	12.7	19.9	0.0	0.3	-0.1	-0.1	-0.5	1.3	0.2	-2.0
PT	41.0	12.9	8.9	19.2	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	4.1	4.1	0.0	0.0
SK	41.8	8.2	10.3	23.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	-0.1	3.0	0.7	-0.3	2.6
FI	42.1	17.0	8.1	17.0	-0.4	0.1	0.1	-0.6	-1.7	-2.5	3.1	-2.4
LV	42.4	14.1	8.9	19.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.1	-0.5	1.6	0.0
SE	42.7	13.4	5.3	23.9	-0.3	-0.4	0.0	0.0	-2.2	-1.6	0.0	-0.6
SI	43.5	10.6	19.0	13.9	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.3	0.2	-0.8
CZ	43.9	10.4	8.2	25.3	0.2	0.3	0.0	-0.1	0.5	2.2	-1.0	-0.7
HU	44.6	12.5	15.4	16.7	-0.5	0.1	0.1	-0.7	-9.5	-3.3	2.8	-9.0
FR	47.2	12.3	8.3	26.6	-0.4	0.0	-0.5	0.1	-2.6	2.5	-1.2	-3.8
AT	47.9	11.9	14.0	22.0	0.3	0.4	0.0	-0.1	-1.1	-0.6	0.0	-0.5
IT	47.9	16.7	7.2	24.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.5	0.0	-0.3
DE	49.3	16.0	16.8	16.5	-0.2	0.0	-0.5	0.3	-2.0	-1.7	-0.5	0.2
BE	52.3	20.0	11.0	21.3	-0.4	-0.4	0.0	0.0	-3.6	-1.9	0.3	-1.9

(1) The tax wedge data refer to a single person, without children, earning the average wage.
(2) Countries are ranked by ascending order of the tax wedge in 2019.
(3) Data for Cyprus not available; data for Croatia not available before 2013.
Source: European Commission based on OECD tax-benefit models.

declined by less than 1% in France and Malta. In eleven Member States, private sector wages grew at a faster rate than public wages, and most notably in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Croatia and Estonia. Public sector wage growth was significantly higher than private sector wages, and even accelerated with respect to the average of the previous three years, in Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus. Finally, in Malta, public wages increased substantially, both over previous average and the private sector. Within the private sector, the growth of compensation per employee was high in the market services and building sector (Graph 2.27). Boosted by labour shortages, record growth rates were registered in the building sector (Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia) and in the market services (Estonia and Latvia). Falling wages were recorded especially in the industry for France and Croatia.

By mid-2020, sectoral wage developments were generally negative and quite heterogeneous across countries. Declines were generally more intense in market services with a median growth of -6.4% (Graph 2.33). In construction, the dispersion was much higher, with severe wage declines in Ireland (-27.8%) and Italy (-22.5%), and positive growth rates (above 6%) in Malta, Hungary and Romania. With few exceptions (including Cyprus, Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Hungary), the fall of wages in market services outpaced the drop in industry. The heterogeneous response of wages across countries and sectors is not easy to interpret; they reflect not only differences in wage flexibility across countries, but also differences in the design of national short-time working schemes and their distribution across different sectors.

2.5.5. The tax wedge

In 2019, the total tax wedge at the average wage ranged from 30.6% in Malta to 52.3% in Belgium. The tax wedge is defined as the ratio of all the taxes and benefits paid on wages to total labour cost. It drives a wedge between the net wages (relevant for workers) and total labour cost (relevant for firms). Table 2.4 shows this indicator of the total tax burden on labour, estimated at the average wage in 2019, as well as its breakdown into various components and the changes of these components over one year and the last ten years.

Nine countries reduced their tax wedge from 2018 to 2019. Most significant changes occurred in Lithuania (-3.4 pps), Hungary and the Netherlands (-0.5 pps both). In the first two countries, the reduction was the result of a large shift from employers' to employees' social contributions, while in the latter it was a direct consequence of a reduction in the personal income tax. Lower reductions in the tax wedge were recorded in France and Finland (-0.4 pps both), Sweden (-0.3 pps) and Germany (-0.2 pps). The average increase in the tax wedge for the remaining countries was moderate (around 0.2 pp), with Estonia recording the largest increase (0.7 pp), yet starting from lower levels.

2.6. COST COMPETITIVENESS AND EXTERNAL ADJUSTMENT

2.6.1. Real effective exchange rate developments

Competitive developments continue to reflect the catching-up process in low-wage countries. Since 2016, Central and Eastern European Member States with rapid wage growth experienced an appreciation of their real effective exchange rates, an indicator of cost competitiveness based on the developments of real unit labour costs as compared to main trading partners (Graph 2.31). The magnitude of real appreciation depends on which deflator is used. In the case of Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltics, real appreciation is much milder when using the deflator based on export prices instead of the deflator based on unit labour costs. This suggests that firms in these countries are not able to pass labour cost increases on to their export prices, which may compress profit margins. However, this drop in profit margins is typical of the catching up processes and is possibly related to developing labour shortages.

2.6.2. Competitiveness and adjustment in the euro area

In 2019, labour cost developments were supportive of rebalancing needs in the euro area. Since 2011, nominal unit labour costs (NULC) have continued to grow faster in countries characterised by a current account surplus before the crisis ('surplus countries') than in countries with previous current account deficits ('deficit countries'). This divergence increased in 2019 and reached almost 2 pps (it was 1 percentage point in 2018) while NULC gained pace in both groups of countries (Graph 2.32), thanks to the positive wage developments. In particular, in 2019, NULC growth increased to 3.2% in 'surplus countries' (from 2.7% in 2018), while it dropped to 1% in 'deficit countries' (from 1.2% in 2018).

At the same time, changes in external competitiveness were not systematically linked to current account imbalances in the euro area in 2018. The real effective exchange rate appreciated more in catching-up countries than in most other euro area members. The former countries tended to have a current account in deficit (Latvia, Slovakia), in marginal (Lithuania) or moderate surplus (Estonia, Slovenia). With the exception of Ireland, other Member States with large current account surpluses in 2018 did

Graph 2.31: **REERs based on various deflators, cumulative % change over the period 2017-2019**



(1) Countries are ranked by ascending order of the variation in the ULC-based REER in 2017-2019.

Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

however not see a strong appreciation (Graph 2.34).

Graph 2.32: **NULC in deficit and surplus countries within the euro area, weighted average, 1999-2019, annual % change**



(1) Surplus countries are Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. Deficit countries are all other euro area Member States. This classification is based on the current account situation around 2008.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

Wage growth in the tradable and non-tradable sectors slowed down more in 'deficit' than in 'surplus' countries in 2019. In the surplus countries, growth of nominal compensation per employee picked up in the non-tradable sector, while it slowed down in the tradable sector, in line with the weaker external demand. In contrast, in *deficit countries,* wage growth declined markedly but to a similar extent in both sectors (Graph 2.35). Nonetheless, wages in 'surplus countries' are growing faster in the non-tradeable than in the tradeable sectors, which is contributing to rebalancing within the euro area. In turn, in 'deficit countries' wage growth in the tradeable sectors was closer to that in the non-tradeable sectors.

Graph 2.33: **Real appreciation in 2019 and current account balance in 2018, euro area countries**



Source: AMECO.

Graph 2.34: **Compensation per employee, tradable and non-tradable sectors, in 'deficit' and 'surplus' countries: 1999-2019, annual % change**



(1) Surplus countries are Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. Deficit countries are all other euro area Member States. This classification is based on the current account situation around 2008.
(2) Data for some deficit countries (Greece, Italy) for 2016 are not available.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

Graph 2.35: **Wages and salaries by sector, 2020q2-2019q2 growth rate**



(1) Countries are ranked by ascending order of changes in wages and salaries (total economy). (2) Wage and Salaries include social security contributions paid by the employees but exclude the contributions paid by the employers.
Source: Eurostat

2.7. CONCLUSIONS

In 2019, improvements in the EU labour markets continued although the European economy was already on a path of a gradual slowdown. Employment was above pre-crisis levels in a majority of Member States. In December 2019, all Member States had an unemployment rate below the peak of 2013. Unemployment kept declining at a faster rate than expected on the basis of GDP growth. The drop was particularly intense in those countries with high levels of unemployment. Hence, cross-country differences in unemployment rates markedly declined.

The pandemic has drastically changed the economic outlook. Triggered by the adoption of the containment measures and the sharp deterioration in consumers' unemployment expectations, GDP dropped in all Member States. Average hours worked – still already below the pre-2008 levels in almost all countries – fell almost everywhere and at unprecedented rates. Compared to the first half of 2019, the stock of temporary employees dropped by more than 2.7 million, heavily concentrated in few countries. Non-market services, largely dominated by the public sector, proved to be an important employment stabiliser in a large majority of countries. Although the unemployment rate did increase in all Member States in the second half of 2020, this was of a relatively small magnitude when compared to the sharp decline of GDP. In some Member States, the impact of the economic shock was accompanied more by a decline in the labour market participation rate than in rising unemployment rates.

Changes in the structure of employment observed before the outbreak of the pandemic have made some countries more vulnerable to epidemiological risks. Before the outbreak of the health crisis, the growth of employment was unevenly distributed across sectors. Countries where job creation shifted towards more contact-intense occupations (e.g. Latvia, Greece, Romania, Cyprus and Croatia) and/or countries with large shares of employment in contact-intense occupations (such as Italy and Spain), proved more vulnerable to social distancing than countries where job creation predominantly took place in sectors where tasks can be completed remotely.

In the first half of 2020, compensation per employee declined drastically. This is mainly explained by the widespread use of short-time work schemes, as workers in these schemes usually receive a compensation for the hours not worked up to a certain percentage of their previous wage. In the first half of 2020, the largest drop of wages was observed in Italy, France and Belgium, which are also the countries with the largest drop in the hours worked per employee.

APPENDIX 1
Annex to the chapter 2

Table 2.A1.1: **Employment and activity rates and shares of marginally attached and discouraged workers over all inactive workers, various time periods**

	2018	2019	2019Q4	2020Q1	2020Q2	2018	2019	2019Q4	2020Q1	2020Q2	2019	2019Q4	2020Q1	2020Q2	2019	2019Q4	2020Q1	2020Q2
NL	67.8	68.8	69.0	68.9	67.9	70.5	71.2	71.4	71.3	70.5	11.6	11.9	11.7	13.2	5.7	5.6	5.9	7.4
EE	68.3	68.7	69.4	68.3	65.6	72.1	71.9	72.4	71.8	70.6	17.7	17.5	17.1	19.2	10.4	9.7	9.0	11.0
SE	68.3	68.3	68.2	67.1	67.0	73.0	73.4	72.8	72.6	73.7	10.3	11.0	11.6	13.4	6.5	7.2	7.2	8.8
DE	67.3	68.2	68.7	:	:	69.7	70.4	70.9	:	:	8.8	8.8	:	:	2.5	2.6	:	:
UK	66.7	67.2	67.6	67.6	67.3	69.5	69.8	70.1	70.3	69.8	11.4	11.5	11.7	13.4	3.6	3.7	3.7	5.1
DK	65.0	66.0	66.3	65.8	64.9	68.6	69.5	69.8	69.4	68.5	17.0	17.6	17.4	17.7	4.1	4.3	5.1	5.6
LT	65.0	65.6	65.7	65.8	64.1	69.3	70.0	70.2	70.9	70.2	4.4	4.1	4.2	4.7	1.4	1.2	1.2	2.0
AT	64.9	65.3	65.6	64.1	63.0	68.2	68.4	68.4	67.3	66.8	18.9	17.9	20.9	23.3	5.6	4.7	7.2	10.0
CZ	64.9	65.0	65.1	64.7	64.0	66.4	66.4	66.4	66.0	65.6	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.8	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.6
LV	64.5	65.0	65.4	64.7	64.1	69.6	69.4	69.5	69.9	70.1	15.0	15.1	16.0	14.2	6.8	6.7	7.0	7.4
MT	62.4	64.0	64.9	65.5	64.1	64.8	66.3	67.3	67.9	67.1	9.2	8.1	8.3	9.2	2.0	2.0	2.7	2.9
IE	62.9	63.7	64.5	64.0	60.2	66.8	67.1	67.5	67.1	63.4	21.8	20.8	21.7	31.7	8.3	7.5	7.9	19.4
CY	61.8	63.4	63.9	62.9	62.9	67.4	68.3	68.2	67.9	67.6	5.1	4.9	4.3	4.3	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.2
FI	61.9	62.4	62.2	61.5	61.1	66.8	66.9	66.2	66.2	67.0	12.0	11.9	12.7	17.4	8.2	8.5	8.7	12.7
PT	61.8	62.4	62.4	61.7	60.0	66.5	66.8	67.0	66.2	63.6	10.9	9.7	10.8	16.5	6.5	5.7	6.3	11.0
SI	62.3	62.2	61.9	61.8	60.6	65.7	65.1	64.5	64.7	63.9	7.4	5.3	6.4	6.8	1.7	1.5	1.5	2.7
LU	61.0	61.7	61.7	60.6	60.8	64.6	65.4	65.5	64.6	64.9	15.7	15.5	17.2	16.7	6.0	6.1	6.0	6.8
EU28	60.4	60.9	61.2	60.5	59.6	64.8	65.0	65.2	64.5	63.5	10.6	10.4	12.1	14.6	5.5	5.2	6.0	8.1
HU	60.1	60.8	61.0	60.3	59.5	62.5	63.0	63.0	62.6	62.4	9.1	8.7	10.0	11.9	3.9	3.7	4.5	6.3
SK	60.1	60.6	60.8	60.0	58.9	64.3	64.3	64.4	63.8	63.1	4.7	4.7	4.8	6.1	2.5	2.3	2.2	3.2
BG	58.3	60.4	60.2	58.5	58.0	61.5	63.0	62.8	61.3	61.6	5.6	5.8	6.3	6.2	4.9	4.9	5.5	5.6
EU27_2020	59.5	60.0	60.2	59.5	58.6	64.1	64.3	64.5	63.8	62.8	10.5	10.3	12.0	14.4	5.7	5.4	6.2	8.4
EA19	59.1	59.7	60.0	59.2	58.1	64.4	64.6	64.8	64.1	62.7	11.2	11.0	13.1	16.0	6.4	6.2	7.1	9.7
PL	59.1	59.4	59.5	59.3	58.6	61.5	61.4	61.2	61.2	60.5	11.4	10.9	11.1	11.5	3.0	2.7	2.8	3.3
RO	58.2	58.6	58.6	57.7	57.6	60.7	60.9	61.0	60.3	60.9	3.3	2.4	2.5	2.9	2.0	1.3	1.3	1.6
BE	56.4	57.0	57.0	56.8	56.0	60.0	60.3	60.1	59.8	58.9	8.9	8.6	8.7	10.6	3.1	2.9	3.1	4.8
FR	56.5	56.5	56.8	56.5	55.6	62.1	61.7	61.9	61.5	59.6	7.0	7.3	7.1	11.0	3.9	3.8	3.9	6.8
ES	54.9	55.7	56.0	55.1	51.9	64.8	64.8	65.0	64.3	61.3	9.7	9.6	10.6	17.3	5.8	5.7	6.2	11.8
HR	52.5	53.6	53.5	52.7	53.3	57.4	57.4	57.7	56.7	57.0	8.4	7.6	8.5	9.9	8.3	7.6	8.5	9.8
IT	51.2	51.6	51.7	51.0	50.2	57.3	57.3	57.4	56.3	54.4	19.0	18.2	19.7	22.4	14.7	14.0	14.3	16.8
EL	47.9	49.2	49.2	48.7	48.6	59.4	59.6	59.2	58.1	58.3	4.8	4.8	5.0	6.4	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.9

(1) Marginally attached workers are the inactive persons (aged 15-74) who are available to work but are not actively searching for a job, expressed as a share of the total inactive population. (2) Discouraged workers are marginally attached workers who are not seeking employment because they think no work is available. Employment is based on the resident concept. Employment and activity rates refer to age group 15-64. (3) Countries are ranked by descending order of the employment rate in 2019.
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey.

Graph 2.A1.1:**The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2001q1-2020q3, quarterly data**



(1) Share of manufacturing firms indicating that labour is a "factor limiting production", EU-Business and Economic survey.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

Graph 2.A1.2:**The Beveridge curve in EU Member States, 2001q1-2020q3, quarterly data, cont.**



(1) Share of manufacturing firms indicating that labour is a "factor limiting production", EU-Business and Economic survey.
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data.

Graph 2.A1.3: **Vulnerable occupations in EU regions (as % of total employment in the region), 2018.**



Source: O*NET and LFS; regional data are at NUTS 2 level

Graph 2.A1.4: **Employment in occupations that can be performed remotely (as % of total employment in the region), 2018.**



Source: O*NETand LFS; regional data are at NUTS 2 level

Graph 2.A1.5: **Employment in occupations that are effectively performed remotely (as % of total employment in the region), 2018.**



Source: O*NET and LFS regional data are at NUTS 2 level

Table 2.A1.2: **Employment growth in different sectors, cumulative % change over the years 2013-2019 and first semester 2020**

	Industry		Construction		Wholesale and retail trade		Information, communication		Financial, insurance act.		Real estate activities		Prof., scientific and tech. act.		Public admin, health, edu.	
	2013-2019	2020 Q2	2013-2019	2020 Q2	2013-2019	2020 Q2	2013-2019	2020 Q2	2013-2019	2020 Q2	2013-2019	2020 Q2	2013-2019	2020 Q2	2013-2019	2020 Q2
MT	0.2	0.5	5.6	5.5	6.0	0.6	8.5	-2.3	4.4	0.3	13.7	0.5	19.6	4.0	4.1	1.6
IE	2.6	1.9	11.9	-14.0	2.9	-14.5	4.6	7.7	1.8	9.1	2.5	1.9	5.0	32.7	3.5	0.8
LU	0.7	-0.3	3.1	1.2	2.5	-1.8	5.6	0.5	3.2	0.2	6.0	-0.3	6.3	0.8	3.7	3.1
CY	2.8	0.2	6.0	1.6	3.6	-3.6	6.6	0.1	0.4	-0.3	12.7	0.2	8.1	-0.3	1.3	0.9
HU	2.2	-5.0	6.5	0.1	2.0	-8.8	6.2	-0.4	-0.8	-0.6	2.8	-5.0	8.2	-2.2	1.1	-4.0
ES	1.9	-7.3	4.0	-5.8	2.2	-13.8	4.8	0.3	-0.6	-5.7	6.3	-7.3	4.0	-3.7	2.0	-3.7
SI	2.5	-2.2	2.9	-3.5	2.5	-3.1	3.8	0.6	-1.6	-1.5	4.6	-2.2	3.0	0.7	1.7	0.9
SK	2.2	-2.7	1.6	-2.0	1.3	-2.1	4.7	1.5	1.8	-3.2	4.1	-2.7	3.6	19.6	1.4	-1.0
PT	2.4	-3.1	1.3	-1.4	3.5	-6.4	7.8	-0.2	-1.0	-1.3	10.0	-3.1	5.4	-5.9	1.2	0.0
HR	2.4	-2.3	3.4	3.8	2.6	-4.3	9.6	1.3	0.2	5.2	6.7	-2.3	4.7	-15.1	4.1	1.2
SE	-0.1	-1.3	3.3	-1.7	1.3	-5.5	2.5	1.6	-0.3	0.6	2.8	-1.3	3.2	0.6	1.8	-0.7
EE	0.5	-0.9	1.1	6.1	2.0	-8.7	10.7	0.3	3.1	-6.0	0.1	-0.9	2.6	-11.9	1.1	-1.3
NL	0.8	-1.1	1.1	-0.4	1.9	-4.0	3.8	0.9	-2.4	0.5	0.5	-1.1	3.5	0.0	0.7	0.2
UK	0.6	-1.2	2.5	-2.0	1.4	0.6	2.7	1.2	-0.3	0.0	2.3	-1.2	3.1	9.2	0.6	1.4
DK	1.3	-2.3	3.1	0.2	1.8	-7.0	2.1	0.3	0.5	1.0	1.2	-2.3	3.3	-3.2	0.5	-0.6
AT	1.0	-2.0	1.8	-4.8	1.1	-9.8	3.4	-1.1	-0.9	0.1	0.2	-2.0	2.6	1.5	1.7	-0.3
EL	0.6	-2.0	-0.9	-5.7	2.6	-7.0	0.7	2.2	-2.4	0.7	6.1	-2.0	0.2	3.5	1.2	2.5
EU28	0.9	-2.2	1.4	-0.9	1.5	-5.8	3.1	-0.4	-0.6	-1.8	1.8	-2.2	2.9	-2.7	1.2	-0.3
EA19	0.6	-1.9	0.9	-1.8	1.4	-6.2	2.8	-0.8	-0.8	-1.8	1.6	-1.9	2.8	-1.5	1.3	-0.5
CZ	1.4	-1.1	-0.8	-1.8	0.5	-2.2	4.5	-2.7	-0.8	-0.5	0.3	-1.1	2.6	-0.5	2.0	0.5
BE	-0.4	-0.2	0.7	0.0	0.5	-2.1	2.8	-0.5	-1.5	-0.8	3.5	-0.2	3.3	0.6	1.4	0.2
LT	1.3	-3.1	1.3	-4.4	0.8	-3.3	8.3	4.7	2.5	14.4	-2.1	-3.1	3.6	-1.6	1.6	-0.9
DE	0.7	-1.5	0.9	-0.1	0.9	-2.9	2.1	0.0	-1.4	-0.6	0.6	-1.5	1.8	-0.8	1.9	0.2
PL	1.9	-1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	-1.9	4.8	3.3	0.9	-3.5	2.3	-1.6	1.7	-16.7	0.6	0.5
IT	0.1	-0.6	-1.1	-1.8	1.4	-6.0	1.5	-3.1	-0.9	-1.7	1.2	-0.6	2.6	-5.2	0.6	-0.4
FR	-0.4	-0.9	-0.3	-0.6	1.0	-4.7	2.3	-4.5	0.0	-5.0	0.5	-0.9	2.9	-2.7	0.5	-0.5
FI	-0.5	0.6	2.0	-0.1	0.1	-9.6	2.4	6.8	-0.6	1.1	1.7	0.6	3.5	6.9	1.1	-0.6
BG	0.6	-2.1	1.5	-1.4	1.1	-8.3	6.4	2.1	1.1	0.2	0.0	-2.1	0.7	3.7	0.4	0.3
LV	-0.8	-6.0	1.7	-4.9	-0.1	-4.4	8.0	0.7	-0.5	-3.0	0.3	-6.0	0.6	-5.4	0.1	0.0
RO	0.8	-6.5	2.3	5.6	3.2	-2.1	3.9	3.8	-0.3	-6.6	4.8	-6.5	3.4	-10.2	1.5	8.7

(1) Countries are ranked by descending order of cumulative employment growth over the period 2013-2019.
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts

Graph 2.A1.6:**Real wages growth and productivity growth, 2004-2022**

Estimates for 2020-2022
Source: Ameco

3. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS: LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 CRISIS

All EU Member States adopted extraordinary measures to soften the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the labour market. In particular, countries have relied heavily on short-time work schemes and similar job retention measures. The EU contributed to these efforts by establishing a new instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE).

Those Member States that already had such schemes in place eased the conditions for access, lowered costs for firms, broadened their coverage and extended their duration. Those Member States that did not have such schemes in place swiftly introduced such forms of support. In addition, all Member States adopted measures providing income support to the self-employed and non-standard workers, strengthened sick leave and parental-leave benefits, promoted flexible work arrangements and reinforced unemployment benefit support. Finally, two Member States adopted outright bans on dismissals.

While it is too early to provide a deep assessment of the effects of this response on employment and the distribution of incomes, this chapter deepens the analysis of the effects of short-time work schemes on unemployment. These schemes have been effective in avoiding the misery of mass unemployment, in particular in countries with schemes that were well-established before the start of the pandemic. In countries where new schemes have been introduced in response to the emergency, the lower take-up might be due to design issues as well as to the time needed for employers to be fully aware of the potential of the schemes. Other factors that may explain the difference across countries in the take-up rate include the prevalence of contact-intensive jobs, the duration of the lockdown and the ensuing sheer size of the initial GDP shock. Finally, the use of short-time schemes is lower in segmented labour markets (i.e. with a high share of temporary contracts); this suggests that these schemes are an effective tool to protect employment against excessive labour shedding during recessions especially in inclusive labour markets.

3.1. INTRODUCTION

The policy response to the COVID-19 outbreak has been unique in the EU post-war history. National governments, supported by the EU, swiftly took a series of extraordinary measures to counter the negative impact of the shock on jobs, firms and households' incomes.

This chapter reviews the main measures adopted by EU Member States to support employment. Section 3.2 reviews the main measures that have been taken in favour of employees (Section 3.2.1), self-employed and non-standard workers (Section 3.2.2). The chapter looks in particular at the role of short-time work schemes, which have been the main policy tool put in place across Member States to mitigate the impact of the crisis. Section 3.3 takes stock of the key lessons from the past recessions for the current policy response. Section 3.4 provides some preliminary evidence on the use of short-time work schemes and their contribution to curb the increase in unemployment entailed by the large output losses during the first half of the year. Section 3.5 concludes by drawing some lessons for policy design in a context where the pandemic may bring differential effects across workers and firms and, looking forward, lead to considerable reallocation pressures.

3.2. THE POLICY RESPONSE TO COVID-19

This section provides an overview of the different income support and related measures put in place to shelter the active population from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic. The measures are discussed separately according to the target population – i.e. employees, the self-employed, and the unemployed – and type of measure.

3.2.1. Support measures for employed workers

Different measures have been deployed to support dependent workers and their families. As already discussed in the previous Chapters, short-time work schemes have been the main tool to preserve jobs, protect workers' incomes and

avoid mass lay-offs. Some countries complemented these schemes with restrictions to individual and collective dismissals or allowing more working time flexibility. In a context of severely constrained physical interactions, teleworking has been encouraged as an effective tool to enable people to keep working, while preventing the spread of the virus. It has been also necessary to adapt sickness benefits to protect incomes of workers in quarantine after being diagnosed with COVID-19 or exposed to the virus. In several Member States, schools were closed or teaching was undertaken on digital platforms. This required an adaptation of care and parental leave measures to allow parents to take care of their children. To mitigate the distributional effects of the crisis, several countries adopted targeted measures in favour of vulnerable groups. The next sub-sections will review these different responses more in detail.

3.2.1.1. Short-time work schemes

Short-time work schemes are public programmes aimed at avoiding excessive job destruction during downturns. They allow firms experiencing economic difficulties to reduce temporarily the working hours of their employees, who in turn receive public income support compensating (at least partly) for the hours not worked. Their main purpose is to protect the job match, thereby limiting the long-term consequences of a transitory shock. Short-time work schemes are used in case of external events hampering business activities (e.g. technical accidents, natural disasters, bad weather affecting works in construction or agriculture, causes of *force majeure*), and transitory business downturns (e.g. temporary reduction in turnover or orders).

They are beneficial for both firms and workers. A key feature of short-time work schemes is that the employment relationship is maintained even in cases of a full suspension of work. This allows companies to reduce their labour costs when their activity weakens, without incurring long and costly dismissal procedures and re-hiring and re-training costs once activities resume in full. ([67]) From the workers' perspective, these schemes provide replacement income while preventing dismissals, allowing the burden of the adjustment to be shared more equally across workers. The firm-specific human capital of the worker is preserved and individuals do not have to experience spells of unemployment.

Short-time work schemes smoothen economic fluctuations. The schemes reduce the volatility of employment and incomes, and enhance labour market resilience, alleviating the burden on unemployment benefit systems and reducing the costs for society of excessive labour shedding. Moreover, short-time work schemes often provide higher income support than unemployment benefit schemes ([68]), which implies that they have a stronger stabilising effect during recessions.

Short-time work schemes before the pandemic

A number of countries have well-established schemes, which were in place already before the crisis. Box 3.1 describes the main characteristics of the short-time work schemes before the pandemic, while the next sub-section describes the main changes, often temporary, introduced to these schemes in response to the pandemic. Although the specific parameters differ across countries, two broad groups can be distinguished:

Seven countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria and Portugal) have well-established short-time work schemes, which are regularly used by companies. In these countries, the company files a request for reduced hours and, once authorised by the public authorities, decides how to allocate the lower working hours among its employees up to a certain amount and within a certain period. The employer can use the authorised hours in full or in part. The employer pays the salary corresponding to the hours worked and an indemnity for the hours not worked. The latter is reimbursed (partly or fully) by the State. ([69]) Generally, these schemes are financed from a dedicated fund endowed with ad-hoc social security contributions.

([67]) For this reason, short-time work schemes are particularly prevalent in countries with above-average employment protection legislation and dismissal costs.

([68]) Differences are larger for countries with new schemes (OECD, 2020).

([69]) Belgium is an exception, as the workers receive the indemnity directly from the federal agency responsible for the payment of unemployment insurance benefits.

Box 3.1: Main characteristics of national short-time work schemes before the crisis

Seventeen Member States had short-time work schemes or partial unemployment schemes in place in before the COVID-19 crisis. These schemes were supported either through dedicated schemes, or through the general unemployment benefit system. In all Member States, companies have the possibility of temporarily reducing the working hours of their employees in case of need. However, not all countries had public schemes in place that provide compensation to workers for the hours not worked. And where they existed, STW schemes differed substantially across Member States. In particular, one could distinguish the following groups of countries: i) Member States where STW schemes have been well-established, permanent and ongoing; ii) Member States where workers on short-time work could claim 'partial' unemployment benefits; iii) Member States where STW schemes were provided in the form of ALMPs; and iv) Member States that had a legal framework in place, but the scheme was 'inactive'. ([1])

Table 1. Countries with short-time work schemes before the pandemic

Countries with permanent, ongoing STW schemes	Countries with 'partial' unemployment benefits	Countries where STW is supported through ALMPs	Countries with inactive STW schemes
Austria	Denmark	Croatia	Bulgaria
Belgium	Ireland	Slovakia	Sweden
Germany	The Netherlands		
France	Spain		
Italy	Finland		
Luxembourg			
Portugal			
Hungary			

Main design features

In the countries with permanent STW schemes, the use of STW has been generally allowed only under specific circumstances. In all countries, companies could make use of STW in case of unforeseeable events that affected the production process (e.g. technical accidents, bad weather conditions affecting works in construction or agriculture, causes of force majeure), and in case of a business downturn (e.g. temporary reduction in turnover, decline in orders). Furthermore, in some countries (Italy, Luxembourg) short-time work schemes could be used in case of more structural economic difficulties that required a restructuring of the company. In terms of procedure, besides the request for approval from the public authorities, the companies generally had an obligation to inform and consult with the workers' representatives before the start of short-time work. Eligibility conditions were designed in similar ways in countries where STW is financed through ALMPs or which have inactive or non-permanent STW schemes.

In the case of ('equivalent') partial unemployment benefits, the eligibility conditions for receipt apply to the individual worker, rather than the enterprise. In the countries where the compensation for the hours not worked has been provided through the general unemployment benefit systems, workers were subject to the same eligibility criteria that applied to the standard ('full') unemployment benefits. In particular, workers could claim the (partial) unemployment insurance benefit only if they had the necessary contribution record (which varied across Member States). Furthermore, they had to comply with the standard job-search and availability to work requirements (meaning that they were expected to accept possible offers for full-time jobs). This is normally not the case for STW schemes: since the work reduction is assumed to be temporary, the workers concerned are not considered as 'jobseekers', and are not required to search for alternative employment opportunities.

([1]) This was the case of Sweden, where a public STW scheme was legislated in 2014, but it could be 'activated' only in case of a severe and deep economic recession; and Bulgaria, where the scheme formally existed, but had no budget allocated.

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

The indemnity given to the workers for STW ranged between 60% and 80% of the employee's hourly wage. Under STW schemes, the indemnity was generally paid by the employer together with the salary, and the company was then reimbursed (either fully or partially) by the State. Belgium was an exception, as it was the individual workers who had to apply to receive the 'partial unemployment benefit', similarly to the 'normal' (full) unemployment insurance benefit([2]). In all countries, either the indemnity to the worker (e.g. Italy, Belgium, Portugal) or the reimbursement given to the employer (e.g. France, Luxembourg) were capped. In some countries (notably Germany), a higher replacement rate (compared to the one prescribed in the legislation) was usually established in collective agreements. In Slovakia, where short-time work has been supported from ALMPs, only non-wage costs (taxes and social contributions) were subsidized.

All countries have set clear limits to the maximum duration of STW. The maximum duration of STW could range from 3 months (Belgium) to 12 months (Germany, Italy). In Italy in case of restructuring, the extraordinary STW scheme can last for a maximum total period of 24 months. In some cases, the limit was not defined in terms of duration, but as a maximum amount of hours per calendar year for each worker (e.g. France and Luxembourg: about 1,000 hours per year for each worker). Other countries had set limits both with respect to the overall duration and the amount of hours per worker (e.g. Italy: max. 1 year, and 2/3 of total hours over a 2-year period). In some countries, (e.g. Germany, Portugal) ad-hoc extensions beyond the 'standard' maximum duration were possible.

Training opportunities were an additional optional component of short-time work schemes. For example, in Austria, reduced working time was seen as an opportunity for upskilling or re-skilling of the workers concerned. Employers received a top-up on the hourly short-time work subsidy for the time in training, accompanied by a subsidy for social security contributions and a 40% contribution to the costs of training. In Germany, public support was available for the training of low-skilled employees in short-time work. In Luxembourg and France, the indemnity to the workers was increased if they took part in vocational training during the hours not worked. In Portugal, employers that include short-time workers in a vocational training programme benefited from a reduction in their contributions to support the wage compensation paid to short-time workers.

Finally, in Sweden, next to the 'dormant' (recession-linked) state-financed scheme, STW has also been organised and operated based on social partners' agreements. During periods of temporary work reductions, workers could continue to receive up to their full wage on the basis of a collective agreement. The employer could then claim compensation for 60% of these expenses from a special fund. Since 1995 this fund had been entirely financed by employers' contributions.

Financing

The financing of STW schemes varied across Member States. In most countries, the schemes were entirely financed through general taxation (e.g. Luxembourg); through the national unemployment benefit fund/social security budget (e.g. Austria, Germany, Portugal), and hence, indirectly, with social contributions; or a combination of both (e.g. France). In Italy, STW was financed through ad-hoc contributions paid by the employers. The contribution rates varied depending on the size of the company and sector of activity, and were further adjusted according to past use ('experience rating'). Also in Belgium, while the scheme was financed through the general unemployment fund, companies that made excessive use of short-time work were charged with additional contributions and there was also an important contribution from the State (notably through VAT revenues). In Slovakia, funding came from the general government budget.

([2]) In this respect, the Belgian scheme is similar to 'partial unemployment' benefits found in Denmark, Ireland and Spain

(Continued on the next page)

Box (continued)

Level of expenditure

The level of expenditure on STW schemes varied considerably between countries and over time. Unfortunately, given the heterogeneity of STW schemes between countries, there is a lack of harmonised data([3]). From the data available (see Graph 1), it emerges that expenditure on STW schemes played a relatively important role only in few countries. For instance, between 2008 and 2018, expenditure ranged between 0.03% and 0.22% of GDP in Germany; between 0.05% and 0.24% in Italy; and between 0.09% and 0.53% in Belgium. However, it was almost negligible in France (reaching at most 0.02% of GDP at the height of the crisis). Expenditures on STW schemes have been more responsive to the cycle than the expenditure on unemployment insurance benefits. When expressed as a proportion of the latter, STW expenditure fluctuated between 8.5% and 53.7% in the period 2008-2018 in Germany and between 10% and 33-38% in Belgium and Italy.

Graph 1. Expenditure on short-time work schemes and unemployment benefits, and unemployment rate 2008-2018



([3]) Some information is available from Eurostat ESSPROS database (the 'European System of integrated Social Protection Statistics'). However, for a number of Member States the data on expenditure on short-time work schemes (classified in ESSPROS as 'partial unemployment benefits') is incomplete.

Five countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain) support the income of workers whose work hours are reduced through the unemployment benefit system. These schemes allow companies to reduce the working time and the workers involved to register as jobseekers and claim unemployment benefits for an amount proportional to the days not worked (*'partial' or 'temporary' unemployment benefits*). Generally, the eligibility conditions for these benefits are the same as for the standard unemployment benefits. Thus, workers can claim the *partial unemployment benefit* only if they have the necessary contribution record and comply with standard job-search and availability-to-work requirements. Usually, *partial unemployment benefit schemes* have lower replacement rates than *short-time work schemes*. ([70])

In addition to the above, a few other countries had very small or dormant schemes. In Croatia and Slovakia, support for short-time work has been implemented as a form of active labour market programme. Yet, until the COVID-19 outbreak, these programmes were relatively small in size (limited budget, low number of firms and workers covered). ([71]) Bulgaria and Hungary had a legal

([70]) The wage replacement rate is the share of the foregone earnings due to the reduced hours that is reimbursed by the short-time work scheme.

([71]) In Slovakia, the employer must retain jobs, even in the case of persisting serious operational problems, for at least 3 months prior to applying for the contribution. In Bulgaria, employers are not allowed to hire new workers in job positions for which reduced time is introduced. They also

framework in place (established after the 2009 crisis), but the schemes were not used in recent years. Sweden had introduced a scheme in 2014, to be activated only in case of severe recessions.

Changes introduced in response to the pandemic

In response to the pandemic, Member States with well-established schemes have simplified access and broadened coverage. The main changes made in response to the health crisis include the following:

- *Simplification of administrative procedures.* Many Member States have streamlined the procedures by shortening notification periods, automatically considering COVID-19 a cause of *force majeure*, softening the requirements of prior consultation of workers' representatives and shortening the time period for claiming benefits.

- *Broader coverage.* In countries where the schemes covered only some sectors, firms of a certain size (e.g. Italy), or certain contract types (e.g. Spain or France), the support has been extended to companies and sectors previously excluded. Eligibility conditions were also relaxed for workers already covered before the pandemic (Belgium) or with short contribution periods (Spain) without prejudice to their accrued entitlements for 'standard' unemployment benefits (Spain, Finland).

- *Reduced costs for employers.* In several countries, employers usually bear some costs for the hours not worked (e.g. by paying social security contributions in full, or by financing a share of the indemnity given to the workers). In response to the COVID-19 crisis, these costs have been temporarily reduced to zero.

- *Increased duration.* In view of the uncertain evolution of the pandemic, the maximum duration of support has been temporarily increased in many countries.

- *Increased generosity.* Some countries (e.g. Austria, Germany, France and Italy) have temporarily increased the indemnity granted to the workers for the hours not worked.

- *The requirements for firms to access short-time work schemes have been relaxed.* In several countries, the minimum fall in turnover that would allow firms to claim support from short-time work scheme has been lowered.

- *The restriction of taking another job when on short-time has been removed.* Usually, workers in short-time work cannot take up another job. In some countries (e.g. Germany, Spain) this restriction has been lifted, allowing cumulating additional earnings up to a maximum of total income equal to previous earnings.

Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands complemented their pre-existing partial unemployment benefit schemes with new temporary wage subsidy schemes for employment retention. These schemes directly subsidise the labour costs of companies affected by the pandemic, allowing them to continue paying salaries. Contrary to 'traditional' short-time work schemes, there is no explicit requirement to reduce working hours, and the amount of the subsidy is not linked to the amount of hours (not) worked.

All countries without short-time work schemes before the pandemic have taken emergency measures to prevent lay-offs in the spirit of short-time work. The new schemes introduced in response to the pandemic have been established on a temporary basis, to provide support at least to companies whose activities have been suspended by government order (and, possibly, also to other companies that can prove to have been severely affected by the pandemic). In particular, some countries (e.g. Greece, Lithuania and Romania), in which the legislation already allowed employers to reduce the working time or suspend the employment contracts in duly justified cases, have introduced public support providing replacement income to the affected workers. While in most cases support is provided both for partial reduction as well as for full suspension of work, in some countries the new schemes provide support only in case of full suspension (e.g. Slovenia, Slovakia), or only in case of partial reduction of work (e.g. Hungary, reduction between 15% and 75%). Furthermore, there can be limits to the partial

are not allowed to require overtime work or increase labour intensity for short-time workers.

reduction of working time (e.g. Bulgaria. only 50% part-time allowed).

Generally, the wage replacement rates vary between 50 to 80% of gross wages. ([72]) France provides a higher replacement rate for low wage earners. Czech Republic introduced a more generous wage replacement for workers in quarantine than for workers affected by the economic impact of the crisis. Germany provides a small top-up to the wage replacement of workers with dependent children. France, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland, Luxembourg and Portugal provide for a minimum floor of the short-time work benefit, linked to the minimum wage. In other countries, there is a maximum ceiling to this benefit, at 50% of the median wage (in Ireland and Poland) or above 200% of it (in Austria, France, Portugal, Bulgaria and the Netherlands). On the other hand, in some Member States (e.g. Croatia), the indemnity is a flat-rate, not linked to previous wages. Italy and Spain provide a high replacement rate for low wage earners; Cyprus and Lithuania are more generous towards middle-income groups.

The involvement of social partners in the design and implementation of short-time work schemes has varied across countries. In some cases, they were involved via tripartite social dialogue (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Malta, Portugal, Romania and Spain), or consulted by the responsible ministry in the course of the legislative process (e.g Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia). In other cases, social partners expressed their support for job retention schemes (e.g. in Ireland, Greece and Malta). While some countries streamlined the consultation of workers and their representatives related to the activation of short-time work in companies (Spain), other Member States maintained this role (e.g. Sweden).

Since the end of the summer, some Member States started scaling back some of the emergency measures. In Denmark, Estonia and Sweden, the emergency measures that expired in summer were not renewed. Other Member States have started restricting access to the schemes to companies still directly affected by containment measures (Belgium, Malta and Cyprus). Finally, the validity of the emergency measures was extended until the end of 2020 (France, Italy and Greece) or 2021 (Germany). Other countries are still considering such an extension (Spain).

By establishing the new European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE), Member States have expressed solidarity towards EU firms and workers and those Member States with tighter financing conditions. As part of the EU response to the COVID-19 crisis, the Council established in May 2020, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission, this new instrument aimed at protecting employees and self-employed against the risk of unemployment. ([73]) SURE provides loans to the Member States to finance the setting-up or the extension of short-time work schemes or similar measures. The only requirement is that Member States have experienced a sudden and severe increase in public expenditure on eligible schemes since 1 February 2020 (Box 3.2).

3.2.1.2. *Sickness benefits*

Before the pandemic, all Member States provided sickness benefits. ([74]) In all countries, employees are entitled to the payment of their salary by the employer during an initial period of sickness or for the entire duration of sick leave. ([75]) Social security provides also for sickness benefits that extend income support beyond the employer's obligations. Yet, this does not always apply to self-employment or workers in non-standard employment contracts. ([76])

([72]) Duell 2020. Legislative provisions are defined in relation to gross wages in some Member States and in relation to net wages in others and are hence not directly comparable due to tax progressivity.

([73]) The European Commission has coordinated and supported the national responses to counter socioeconomic impact of the pandemic with comprehensive interventions.

([74]) Spasova S., D. Bouget and B. Vanhercke (2016 and 2020).

([75]) Sick pay is usually state-mandated, except in Denmark, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal where the payment is ensured by collective agreements or at discretion of the employer.

([76]) For example in the Netherlands, insurance against the loss of income due to illness is not compulsory for the self-employed; similarly, in Italy, self-employed have no access to sickness insurance. Conversely, sickness benefit coverage is mandatory in some countries, e.g. Portugal and France, but with different waiting periods as compared to permanent employees (OECD, 2020)

Box 3.2: The EU instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE)

SURE has helped Member States to finance the set up or the extension of short-time work schemes or similar measures. Measures 'similar' to short-time work schemes are considered those that contribute to preserve employment during the crisis. These include labour costs reductions and comparable measures supporting the self-employed, income support to employees related to the continuation or resumption of work. The instrument also allows financing some health-related expenditures. In light of the national competences in the design of social protection, and to allow for a broader coverage of all various national schemes, no specific conditionality for the access to the EU instrument was imposed on the effectiveness and efficiency of the national schemes. The only requirement is that Member States have experienced a sudden and severe increase in public expenditure on eligible schemes since 1 February 2020. This assessment was based on an increase in the expenditure on short-time work and similar schemes compared to the previous year; yet, planned expenditure has also been considered eligible, if related to measures that were already adopted or credibly announced.

Member State requests for SURE support have been quite heterogeneous. To date, eighteen Member States have applied for SURE and 90% of the total envelope has been allocated. These are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. The Commission has processed all requests and presented proposals for Council Implementing Decisions to grant support. The Council has adopted all these proposals. Some Member States reported a very high number of measures (Portugal, Belgium), while others only one or two (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia). All Member States have requested support for short-time work schemes, except for Hungary (where this scheme is supported under the CRII+), and Ireland (which requested financing for a temporary wage subsidy scheme). Only a minority of countries included health-related measures in their requests (Belgium, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania and Hungary, see Graph 1 and Annex 1).

All requests for financial support have been satisfied in full within the limits set by the regulation. For Italy, Spain and Poland, the amount requested is above the maximum amount of €60 billion established in the SURE Regulation for the three Member States representing the largest share of the loans granted. These requests have been reduced proportionally, by 3.7% (Graph 2). Support ranges from €27.4 billion (Italy) to less than €200 million (Latvia). As a percentage of GDP, the support is the highest for Portugal (Graph 3). On average, SURE support covers 25% of the public deficit forecast for 2020 (Graph 4). Some Member States included expenditure mainly for 2020, while others - such as Portugal, Italy, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia - asked for support for planned expenditure up to the end of 2021 (Graph 5).

SURE offers financial assistance in the form of loans. The Commission issues bonds on the financial markets for a value of up to €100 billion, guaranteed by a system of bilateral guarantees provided by all Member States (of €25 billion) and then lends the proceeds to the Member States requesting financial assistance. ([1]) The Commission has to pay the interest and reimburse the bonds at the terms of maturity and it passes on these exact same conditions to Member States along with a small fee (not proportional to the size of the loan disbursement) to cover the transaction costs of the Commission. Thus, for the countries with borrowing costs exceeding those of the EU, the allocation of SURE loans is a tangible expression of genuine EU solidarity. SURE bonds are used for a clearly identified social objective, to alleviate the social impact of the pandemic and its consequences across the EU, thereby showing their compliance with the Social Bond Principles.

([1]) The Commission issues the SURE bonds as Social Bonds. Social Bonds aim to finance projects with an identified social objective. The Commission adopted an independently evaluated Social Bond Framework to provide investors with confidence that the funds mobilised will serve a truly social objective. This framework is the Social Bond Principles, established by an Executive Committee for which the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) acts as a Secretariat.

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Box (continued)

Graph 1. Breakdown of SURE support by types of measures



***Source*:** European Commission calculations based on Member State requests for SURE support.

Graph 2. Amount of support allocated until November 2020, in million EUR and as a percentage of GDP



***Note*:** GDP for 2020 based on the Autumn European Economic Forecast.

***Source*:** European Commission calculations based on Member State requests for SURE support.

Graph 3. The amount of SURE support as % of the public deficit forecast for 2020



***Note*:** Public deficit based on the European Economic Forecast, Autumn 2020.

Source: European Commission calculations based on Member State requests for SURE support.

Graph 4. The amount of SURE support requested for already incurred versus planned expenditure



***Source*:** European Commission calculations based on Member State requests for SURE support.

The first issuances of SURE bonds in October-November 2020 have been a marked success. SURE bonds are an attractive investment option in the financial market as they are fully secured by the EU Budget ("triple AAA rating"); hence they carry comparatively a very low risk. The Commission will proceed further with issuing SURE Social Bonds in the first half of 2021.

The response to the crisis has varied across countries. While many governments modified the existent schemes, seven countries did not introduce any measure with regard to sickness benefits (Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovenia). It is worth noting that Germany already had a generous system in place. In a number of countries, duration and/or generosity of paid sick leave have been temporarily increased. The waiting period has been shortened in Denmark for the self-employed and for all workers in Estonia, France, Sweden, Finland and Ireland (for the last two, only for workers affected by COVID-19).

All countries have provided the same level of benefits to workers in quarantine or to infected workers. In most cases, self-isolated workers have been granted the standard sickness benefits as sick individuals. ([77]) Yet, most countries have limited their duration to the quarantine period (two weeks). In Romania, self-isolated workers have been entitled to 75% of sickness benefit. In some countries, workers in quarantine can claim different benefits other than sickness benefits: for

([77]) Some countries (Austria, Germany, Finland and Sweden) provide the same benefit already as provided in the legislation enacted before the pandemic.

example, in Belgium and in France workers who self-isolate are supported in the framework of the respective national short-time work schemes.

Governments have opted for extending duration and increasing generosity of sickness benefits. In some cases, the duration has been limited to six weeks with a possibility of further extension (e.g. Sweden), or to three months (e.g. Denmark). In Finland the benefit has no time limit, as the social security institution (KELA) provides the allowance until the end of the health emergency. Benefit levels have been increased in Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. In a large number of countries (e.g. Austria, Czech Republic, Germany Ireland), the benefit has been extended beyond sickness workers also to take care of children or other members of the family. Ireland increased the weekly benefit payment from EUR 203 to EUR 350. In several countries coverage has been extended to the self-employed infected or in quarantine (e.g. Austria, Germany, Spain, Hungary). In some, self-employed have access to sickness benefit only if they have voluntary insurance (Austria, Czech Republic, The Netherlands and Poland). In Italy, self-employed have no access to sickness benefits, while this is the case in Belgium only for workers in quarantine.

In many countries, the contribution of employers to sickness benefits has been lowered. In Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and Latvia employers have been fully reimbursed for the cost due to continued remuneration of quarantine or sick workers. ([78]). In Slovenia the government assumes the entire costs of sick pay. In Portugal, only the costs for workers in quarantine are covered by the State. There was no support for employers for the cost paid for sick leave.

3.2.1.3. Teleworking

Legislative measures have been introduced to facilitate teleworking. Some Member States had to modify their laws to permit remote working and/or impose it to employers (e.g. Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain).

Some countries have provided extra support. In Belgium, the state issued an "office allowance" up to EUR 126.94 per month for heating, electricity and small office equipment. Some countries promoted the implementation of teleworking by offering refunds to companies that invested on teleworking equipment (e.g. Malta) or providing credit lines to promote the digitalization of SMEs (e.g. Spain).

3.2.1.4. Care support in case of closure of school/institution

More than half of the Member States have adapted their rules on entitlements to family- and care-related leave to make it compatible with school closures. In some countries, this new leave measure has been linked to other already existing schemes. In Austria, workers have been entitled to receive child and leave benefits for up to three weeks for children under 14 years of age. In other cases, the absence from work was considered as sick leave, so workers benefited from sick allowances (e.g. Lithuania). In France, similar arrangements applied to those workers whose job did not permit teleworking. In Greece, the state introduced a "special purpose leave" of three days per week, which does not count as annual leave, allowing workers to take as many days as required during the period of school closure. Bulgaria increased the existing unpaid leave from 30 to 60 days.

Some countries have offered monetary compensation to parents taking care of their children during school closures. In Germany, parents of children under 12 years of age have been entitled to 67% of their monthly net income (up to EUR 2016) for six weeks. As a prerequisite, working parents must be the only care providers and have exhausted their flexitime and overtime credits. In the Czech Republic, workers have been entitled to 60% of their daily income wage. In Poland, workers with children up to 8 years of age can receive an additional care allowance for two weeks. In Portugal, one of the parents can stay at home to take care of their children under 12 years with a guaranteed income of 67% of their average wage. Romania has granted workers with paid days off. In Estonia, the government has

([78]) In Austria, employers are reimbursed for sick payments only from day 11.

temporarily provided financial benefits to workers who have taken unpaid leave. In case of a child with a severe disability, the allowance amounts up to 70% of the worker's average annual income. In Cyprus, parents with children less than 15 years have been granted special paid leave based on their salaries. Luxembourg implemented paid family leave for workers that need to take care of a disabled or elderly dependent person. In Romania, parents have been entitled to additional paid family leave.

3.2.1.5. Parental leave

Some countries have allowed for an extension of parental leave benefits' coverage to other groups or of its maximum duration. In Austria, not only children but also people with disabilities are included, and in Lithuania grandparents are entitled as recipients as well. In Belgium, the government has introduced the right to a "corona-related parental leave". In a similar fashion, Latvia has extended and increased the parental leave allowance and a special support scheme for parents of disabled children. Regarding time extensions, in Italy special parental leave (50% of the salary) has been extended to 30 days, and duration restrictions to unpaid leave were lifted.

3.2.1.6. Employment protection

- **Some countries have prohibited employers to fire workers because of the pandemic**. Spain implemented a temporary ban on dismissal for economic reasons (linked to the COVID-19 pandemic) and a suspension of temporary contracts. Also Italy has temporarily prohibited the dismissal of workers for economic reasons (but temporary contracts are allowed to expire). Similar provisions are valid for firms applying for the job retention schemes in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia.

- **Other countries have temporarily adjusted employment protection legislation**. Belgium allowed temporarily the use of short consecutive fixed-term contracts in critical sectors, without triggering a conversion into open-ended contracts. Finland introduced an extension in the notice period for workers' dismissals in the health care and social service sectors.

3.2.1.7. Working time

- **Some countries have modified working time regulations to respond to the new challenges**. Finland introduced a temporary derogation, between March and June 2020, aimed at obtaining workers' consent to work overtime, ensure regular rest periods and ensure that workers in the health care and social service sectors are entitled to their annual leaves. Spain introduced a temporary right for workers to reduce or adapt their working hours. Hungary and Finland implemented measures providing more flexibility for their workers in terms of their working time and organisation. In Slovakia, workers were allowed to use previously accumulated compensatory time-off.

3.2.1.8. Measures targeted to "essential workers"

Most countries have also adopted measures to prevent labour shortages in occupations that are essential to deal with the pandemic. These include most notably health care, but also parts of the public administration and social services. To this end, Italy has eased requirements to enter the medical profession, and Luxembourg has introduced special leave for volunteers to provide essential tasks. In the Netherlands, the state provided free childcare services for workers in critical sectors (healthcare, public transport and emergency service). A number of countries (e.g. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Spain) have introduced some form of public duty to work for medical staff and partly also for other essential workers, which may include a temporary ban on taking annual leave or exercising the right to strike. In the Czech Republic and Spain, students of medicine have been called to work. Several countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Poland) have relaxed working time restrictions to ensure the availability of essential workers for longer hours. Conversely, Slovenia has introduced a 'risk allowance' for medical staff dealing with these extraordinary conditions. In Hungary, health care workers receive the benefit of free use of public transport service during the state of emergency.

3.2.1.9. *Measures targeted to low-income and low-skilled*

Some countries have provided additional transfers to alleviate the effects of the crisis. Germany provided a means-tested child supplement of EUR 185 per child per month – additional to the child- and housing-benefit. In Portugal, domestic workers were entitled to an extra financial support of 66% of their salary – up to three times the minimum wage. In Slovenia, recipients of financial social assistance and income support were also eligible for a one-off allowance of EUR 150 and vouchers of EUR 200 were granted to people over 18 years old. In Ireland, the state implemented a supplementary welfare allowance in a weekly and means-tested basis for people with not enough income. In Austria, the "Family Hardship Compensation" was extended to families that because of the pandemic have joined the short-time work scheme or have become unemployed. The Belgian government established for the hospitality and cultural sector a EUR 300 cheque for the purchase of goods and services (the cheque is tax-free and not subject to social security contributions). In Croatia, the minimum wage increased from EUR 425 to EUR 525 which costs were covered by the government for three months. In Slovakia, the state provided support in the form of household equipment and clothes up to EUR 1600 per year per person. Bulgaria provided a lump sum of EUR 200 to families with children under 14 of which one of the parents was on unpaid leave. A new minimum income scheme was introduced in Spain ensuring income transfers according to a vulnerability assessment and family composition.

In some cases, countries introduced measures to lower rent payments. Spain suspended first-home mortgage payments and payments for other consumer loans for three months, evictions for non-payment of rent for six months and provided microcredits at zero interest rate and without commission to pay the rent. In a similar fashion, Sweden reduced rents of most vulnerable sectors by financially compensating property owners. In Lithuania, the procedures to access social housing have been eased. Additionally, the state reimbursed the heating costs and provided a supplement on top of the child allowance for the most economically hit families.

3.2.2. Support measures for self-employed and non-standard workers

Self-employed and non-standard workers are often less protected against labour market shocks. Many of the measures to prevent layoffs and provide income replacement during unemployment and sickness did not cover all participants of the labour market. Therefore, most Member States provided additional support to self-employed and non-standard workers (such as temporary agency workers, apprentices and seasonal workers), who otherwise would have fallen out of the scope of the supportive measures.

For the self-employed the vast majority of the Member States has adopted some form of income support. These schemes support self-employed people who either had to suspend their activity due to measures imposed on them aiming to prevent the spread of the virus or whose income has significantly dropped as a result of the current crisis. Overall, 24 Member States have adopted such income support schemes. In general terms, most of these schemes impose a minimum level of decline in income – for example in Austria: 50%, Cyprus: 25%, France: 70%, Slovak republic: 20%, Spain: 75% – compared to the level of income in same period of the previous tax year or the previous month. The compensation is defined as a monthly or weekly benefit – with possible extension – in several countries (e.g. Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal), and in some Member States such support is given as a one-off lump-sum payment (e.g. Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland). In the first case, the exact amount is determined either as a percentage of the expected income or as a portion of the minimum or average national income.

These schemes are often subject to strict eligibility conditions. In most cases, these income support schemes are designed to assist self-employed and SMEs, that otherwise would not have enough liquidity to cover their expenses in the emergency period. Therefore, these schemes include a maximum ceiling, determined as a percentage of declared income or turnover (e.g. France, Latvia, Netherlands, Malta, Slovak Republic), or as a threshold above which self-employed would not be eligible for compensation (e.g. Austria, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Spain). Additional eligibility conditions may apply in

relation to the number of staff employed by the self-employed person. Such requirement can be found in Denmark, where self-employed are eligible with a maximum of 10 employees, in Germany, with different amounts of compensation up to 5 and up to 10 employees and in Luxembourg, with maximum 10 employees. These ceilings and extra conditionality aim to prevent the misallocation of funds to those entities that would be able to have access to other sources of liquidity such as guaranteed loans.

A number of Member States extended coverage of sick-leave benefits to the self-employed. Rules of social security and sickness insurance can differ considerably across Member States. Where the original rules did not provide a sufficient level of protection, Member States adjusted the rules of sickness insurance in order to compensate self-employed infected by COVID-19 or being quarantined. Finland, Portugal and Sweden decided to cover all the costs of the sickness leave for the period of self-isolation, which is 14 days in most of the cases. Other EU countries, such as Cyprus, Slovakia and Spain offer an income replacement of 60%, 55% and 70%. In Ireland, workers can also apply for an enhanced illness benefit worth EUR 350 per week, paid maximum for two weeks. The waiting period for these payments has also been cut shorter by governments and national agencies. These new rules help to adapt the sickness insurance schemes to the changed needs in the respective countries. Several Member States deal with the current situation under the rules of their existing social insurance schemes, since they already cover self-employed.

Tax deferral options have also been made available for self-employed workers. As for dependent workers and SMEs, most of the Member States made it possible for self-employed to defer their taxes and social contributions or to pay them in instalments in the future. At least 12 Member States allowed delayed payment of social contributions by self-employed, such as Belgium, Germany, Greece, Poland and Spain. Furthermore, in Belgium self-employed can ask for a revision of their pre-paid taxes, while in Estonia self-employed can claim some of their advanced payments back or use those for other tax purposes in the future. Several EU countries have also extended certain social benefit payment periods for those whose concession or renewal period would expire during the emergency period (e.g. Portugal, Hungary). Paid care leave has also been expanded in some cases by governments in the Czech Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal in order to allow self-employed to take care of children out of school or their elderly relatives.

Further support measures have been taken for non-standard workers such as temporary agency workers, seasonal workers and apprentices. These workers tend to be more exposed to shocks and changes on the labour market. With the objective to cover labour shortages, some countries facilitated the working visa procedures for specific sectors such as agriculture and healthcare (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, and Spain). Croatia has extended its income support to seasonal workers to cover the emergency period. Germany and Luxembourg have made their short-time work scheme available also for temporary agency workers. In France, temporary agency workers are to be paid for the entire period of their initial assignment even if they cannot continue their work due to the confinement, while the Spanish government granted EUR 430 allowance to those whose temporary contract expired but do not have access to regular unemployment benefits. Lastly, in Portugal people participating in vocational training are entitled to 50% of their remuneration up to the national minimum wage. Moreover, Austria, Denmark, France and Germany invested financial resources in programmes that aim to support and increase the number of apprenticeships.

3.2.3. Support measures for the unemployed

Member States have reinforced their unemployment benefit schemes. Despite the aforementioned measures, the number of unemployed people has risen while those who were already unemployed before the pandemic face increased difficulties to find a new job. In response, several Member States have eased the access to unemployment benefits schemes and extended their duration. Some Member States, such as Austria and Croatia, have simplified the procedure to apply for unemployment benefits online applications. Access to the schemes has also been simplified by relaxing the conditions, for instance in Germany, or by eliminating the initial

waiting period as in Finland. The most widely adopted measure is the general prolongation of the maximum duration of unemployment benefits for recipients whose eligibility would have expired during the emergency period.([79]) Some countries such as Ireland, Latvia and Spain introduced extraordinary unemployment benefits for workers that lost their job because of the pandemic and were not eligible for unemployment benefits. Because of the increase in the number of unemployed, some governments (e.g. Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, and Poland) have reallocated budgetary resources for job search and retraining instruments as a first step of rolling out long-term reintegration strategies.

3.3. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EU COUNTRIES DURING PAST RECESSIONS

Experiences of past recessions provide insights for assessing the policy response during the COVID-19 pandemic. This section reviews briefly the policy response of European countries to the 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis and provides a more detailed overview of the empirical findings related to the use of short-time work schemes in past recessions. This evidence is based on the experience of the few countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy) that had well-established short-time work schemes in place already before the pandemic.

In the 2008-2009 economic and financial crisis, European countries contained job losses by relying on shortened hours and short-time work schemes. This contributed to lowering the magnitude of labour shedding at the onset of the crisis, in particular in manufacturing. The in-built capacities of the social safety nets were also playing their role as automatic stabilisers to cushion the impact of the economic downturn. In addition, Member States implemented a wide range of employment and social policies aimed at containing the labour market impact of the crisis. These involved support to employment by cutting labour costs, the reduction of social security contributions, subsidies to encourage flexible working time, the reinforcement of activation, investment in training and life-long learning, reinforcement of social protection and the provision of support to the purchasing power of vulnerable groups, or to households in general. While labour market measures typically represented a smaller share of the 2008-2009 fiscal stimulus, overall considerable budgets were allocated to supporting employment (European Commission 2009).

The take-up of short-time work in Europe followed a clear cyclical and seasonal pattern, concentrated in larger firms in the industrial sector. Before the current COVID-19 crisis, firms in the industrial sector were the most likely to rely on short-time work, while the take-up was lower in services. In the latter sector, firms mainly adjusted employment through layoffs or a greater reliance on fixed-term employment and non-standard employment. In some countries (e.g. Italy), this was also due to most businesses in the service sector being ineligible for short-time work schemes. Larger firms were typically more likely to use short-time work than smaller ones, as they usually face larger dismissal and hiring costs.

The take-up of short-time work schemes has varied depending on the availability and costs of alternative strategies to adjust to economic downturns. In countries with more stringent employment protection legislation, firms were more likely to use short-time work arrangements (Cahuc, 2019). In France, the reduction in the standard working hours to 35 hours a week in early 2000 led to a decline in the use of short-time work as employers used the reduction in working time to negotiate greater flexibility in the volume of hours worked (Calavrezo et al., 2009). Micro-evidence on Germany found that companies with a high proportion of employees with non-standard contracts (e.g. temporary, fixed-term, freelancers) used less short-time work schemes (Crimmann and Wießner, 2009). Evidence on 2008-2010 economic and financial crisis shows that the reduction by German firms of overtime hours and of the hours accumulated in working time accounts complemented the role of short-time work in mitigating the effect of the recession on employment (Bellmann et al., 2013). Short-time work schemes were less common in countries with more flexible labour markets (e.g. Baltic and

([79]) Countries that extended the duration of benefits include Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain.

Central and Eastern European countries), and lay-offs were the major adjustment tool.

In past recessions, short-time work schemes contributed to stabilising employment at the macroeconomic level. Abraham and Houseman (1994) compared labour market adjustment in downturns in the US and in Europe (Belgium, Germany and France) and found that, while employment adjusted more slowly in Europe, short-time work allowed firms to adjust working hours faster in downturns. Subsequent studies confirmed this difference between the US and the European labour markets (Hijzen and Venn, 2011; Cahuc, 2019; Mosley, 2020). As an adjustment tool, short-time work is easier to implement than downward wage adjustment and it has a stabilising impact, as the short-time work support keeps wages at a level which is higher than the one that would be implied by massive labour shedding (Arpaia et al., 2010).

There is mixed evidence on the impact of short-time work schemes on job preservation in the supported firms. In Germany, comparing firms that used the scheme with those that did not, Boeri and Brücker (2011) and Bellmann and Gerner (2011) found that short-time work had a positive impact on employment. According to Lydon et al (2019), firms using the schemes are significantly less likely to layoff permanent workers in response to a negative shock. Yet, Kruppe and Scholz (2014) showed that there is no significant difference in employment reduction in comparison with establishments not using the scheme, as establishments without short-time work used other mechanisms to hoard labour. Studies were more likely to find a positive impact on job preservation over a short time period. Giupponi and Landais (2018) find a strong positive impact of short-time work schemes on the preservation of employment in Italy. This impact is welfare enhancing in the short-term, as the rate of job separation would be inefficiently high during a temporary negative shock, due to firms facing liquidity constraints and due to the fact that firms do not take into account the benefits workers reap from continued employment. Job retention schemes are also more targeted to low incomes (OECD, 2020). However, job retention may be inefficient in case of more persistent shocks (Guipponi and Landais, 2018).

A prolonged use of short-time work may hinder structural change. The experience of past recessions suggests that the protracted use of short-time work schemes may be detrimental to job creation and productivity. Short-time work schemes support workers' incomes and mitigate employment losses during downturns, in particular at an early stage of the slowdown. Yet, their continued use by firms that are unviable in the long-term may weaken the employment prospects of workers that remain inactive for long in the firm, delay their deployment towards more productive firms and hamper the recovery. ([80]) Looking forward, the short-time work schemes need to be adapted to make them an effective tool to support jobs in the short-term and employment in the medium- to long-term. This involves some adaptations of the schemes along the following lines:

- The maximum duration of the scheme needs to be limited in time, but sufficiently responsive to changes in economic conditions at the firm and/or at the aggregate level.

- Schemes could incorporate incentives for firms to use the short-time work only in case of a shortfall of demand, but quickly revert to full-time working as soon as economic conditions improve. For this, firms may be asked to participate in the costs of the scheme (e.g. through experience rated contribution rates).

- Workers could be involved in training activities or receive job-search assistance while on short-time work. In addition, workers that take a new job before the maximum duration of short-time work period is exhausted may keep receiving, as a supplement to the wage in the new job, part of the short-time work benefits that they would have been entitled to receive when staying in their previous job. This would ease

([80]) On a sample of Swiss firms, Kopp and Siegenthaler (2019) show that firms that used the short-time scheme until the legal maximum duration dismiss after the expiration of the scheme more workers than firms that resume to regular work schedule before benefits' exhaustion. Giupponi and Landais (2019) show that two years after the end of short-time working, there are no significant differences in the employment probability, earnings, and total income of workers who were in the scheme and workers who were laid off. In other words, STW does not seem to provide any significant insurance to workers in the medium or long run.

workers' transitions towards expanding firms, in particular in the green and digital sectors.

3.4. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SHORT-TIME WORK SCHEMES

This section assesses the use, impact and future outlook of short-time work schemes in the COVID-19 crisis, based on the available information. The focus on this instrument is warranted as short-time work has been the main tool used by Member States in addressing the immediate labour market impact of the current pandemic.

3.4.1. Measurement issues

Information on the effective number of participants and hours of short-time work is not fully comparable across countries. The procedures that firms have to follow to apply for the schemes, the national authorities involved and the level of governance (local or central) at which the decision to grant short-time work occurs can differ across countries. This, together with lags in the reporting of national information, has implications for the availability of data on the effective number of workers in a short-time work scheme.

Cross-country differences in reporting practices also challenge comparability. In some countries, national agencies report the number of authorised hours and not necessarily the number of workers involved. Authorised hours can be converted into full-time equivalents assuming that each worker is at a zero hour short-time working regime and that he/she would otherwise work for the same number of average hours worked. However, this is a rough assumption. In the context of the COVID-19 crisis, Italian authorities have started to release the number of beneficiaries, but no data are available for the past years. In other countries, data only show requests of firms for short-time work (Germany) or authorised hours (France). Finally, some countries (Austria) report the number of persons on short-time work, not just applications, but this information is available with a lag.

There can be a gap between the number of hours for short-time work requested by firms and the number of hours effectively used. This gap is typical in short-time work schemes, as firms ask for authorisation in advance, and being risk-averse they tend to request an excessive number of hours of short-time work as a buffer in a context of uncertainty about what the demand for goods and services they produce would be. This gap implies that information on the effectively used hours of short-time work becomes available with a delay. This concern might have been less compelling during the first period of pervasive lockdown when a large number of sector and firms were hit by a sudden and unexpected stop of their activities. However, with selective lockdown, it is less evident that firms might use all the authorised short-time work hours, as long as their businesses continue to run although not at a full speed.

Member States and Eurostat both made considerable efforts to monitor the use of short-time work schemes during the COVID-19 crisis. Still, the availability of data is uneven. National administrations have made efforts to increase the frequency of monitoring, in some cases providing data on a daily or weekly basis. However, data availability is uneven and it is not always possible to link the data released since February with past time series. Data have also been more subject to revisions than in the past. Eurostat reports on the jobs and hours benefiting from COVID-19 related to government subsidies in a harmonised way ([81]). The next section aims to exploit this data to the extent possible.

3.4.2. The take-up of short-time work across Europe and its drivers

In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the use of short-time work has reached unprecedented levels. Table 3.1 reports the uptake of short-time work schemes at the peak of the first wave of the pandemic (April or May depending on the countries). In all Member States, the number of people in short-time work schemes reached an historical record, higher than the levels achieved at the onset of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. For example, more than 5 million people were in these schemes in France and Germany and almost 5 million in Italy. Preliminary figures suggest that

([81]) Administrative data on the jobs benefitting from government measures; Administrative data on the jobs benefitting from government measures by country and sector NACE

while many workers have gradually moved out of short-time work schemes during the summer, the number of workers in these schemes remain historically high. Graph 3.1 depicts the longer time trend and the unprecedented increase in the coverage of short-time work schemes during the COVID-19 crisis, which has been much higher than at the peak of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis ([82]).

By April 2020, about one fifth of employees across Europe was in a short-time work scheme. Graph 3.2 shows the share of people in short-time work as a percentage of the total number of employees. The take-up ranges from less than 10% in Nordic and Central and Eastern European countries (except Romania) to more than 15% in the other Member States, with a maximum of about 30% or above in Belgium, France and Croatia. As a percentage of the total number of employees, the share of workers in job retention schemes has been usually higher in countries where these schemes represent a standard tool to preserve employment during a temporary shortfall of demand. Conversely, the share of employees in short-time work has been lower in countries that have introduced these schemes in response to the COVID-19 crisis.

([82]) European Commission (2020) Employment and Social Developments in Europe and OECD (2020).

Table 3.1: **People in short-time work at peak of the first wave of the pandemic**

	People in short-time work at peak (April or May) (1000s)	People in short-time work at peak (April or May) as % of total number of employees	Strictness of lockdown measures: average February-May (max=3)	Share of temporary contracts in total number of employees
AT	1018	25.5%	2.3	8.7%
BE	1150	28.2%	2.7	10.8%
BG	129	4.9%	1.0	4.3%
CY	147	37.5%	2.2	13.7%
CZ	126	2.7%	2.4	7.8%
DE	6699	16.3%	2.0	12.0%
EE	121	20.7%	2.7	3.1%
EL	900	27.5%	1.7	12.6%
ES	2318	13.3%	2.6	26.3%
FI	184	7.8%	1.6	15.5%
FR	8775	34.4%	2.7	16.3%
HR	578	39.1%	2.2	18.1%
HU	129	3.0%	2.0	6.6%
IE	365	18.8%	2.5	9.7%
IT	4679	24.0%	2.6	17.1%
LT	96	7.8%	2.5	1.5%
LU	115	26.3%	2.4	9.2%
LV	42	5.4%	1.9	3.2%
MT	5	2.3%	:	9.1%
NL	2141	26.8%	2.7	20.2%
PL	558	4.3%	2.0	21.7%
PT	939	22.0%	2.6	20.8%
RO	827	12.4%	2.0	1.4%
SE	345	7.0%	1.0	15.7%
SI	182	21.4%	2.5	13.2%
SK	392	18.5%	2.0	7.8%
Total	32960	18.4%	2.2	11.8%

Strictness of the lockdown is the average degree of restriction of workplace closing measures with weights equal to the number of days that a restriction of specific type has been in place; Min (no restriction)=0, Max=3. The average excludes days without restrictions. For Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal the peak is in May. For Czech Republic, only the number of companies applying/ benefitting are available. The number of workers is estimated based on the average number of workers per company.
Source: National sources; Hale, T., N. Angrist, B. Kira, A. Petherick, T. Phillips, Samuel Webster. "Variation in Government Responses to COVID-19" Version 5.0. Blavatnik School of Government Working Paper.

Graph 3.1: **Workers in short-time work 2008Q1-2020Q3 (in millions)**



(1) France and Italy: workers=FTE (1643 annual hours). Data refer to averages per quarter
Source: National sources.

Differences in the take-up of short-time work schemes across EU countries depend on a number of factors. These include the generosity of the scheme, the stringency of the lockdown and its length, structural features of the labour market, notably the prevalence of temporary employment and the number of jobs that can be performed remotely. The use of short-time work has been particularly relevant in services (mainly hotels and restaurants) and in retail trade. The lower take-up in Member States with newly established schemes could have been in part due to the design of their schemes or to implementation delays. Uncertainty has been a major hallmark of the COVID-19 crisis. Public schemes that were in place at the onset of the crisis and that credibly communicated a duration of support at least commensurate with the lockdown were better at reducing firms' uncertainty and securing a larger take-up. Furthermore, in some newly established schemes (e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia and Hungary), the requirement for firms to share part of the costs could have reduced the take-up. In Poland, the requirement of not making any employees redundant after the end of the subsidy might have discouraged firms to participate in the scheme in the uncertain economic situation.

Graph 3.2: **Employees on short-time work as a percentage of all employees**



Source: Eurostat, and national sources

The stringency of the lockdown has had an impact on the number of beneficiaries in short-time work. Graph 3.3 shows on the horizontal axis a measure of strictness of the lockdown and on the vertical axis the share of workers in short-time work schemes. There is a positive relationship between the stringency of the workplace closure measures and the share of workers in short-time work. Differences in the lockdown measures account alone for 22% of the differences across countries in the number of beneficiaries of short-time work. ([83]) This suggests that with the lockdown measures becoming less pervasive and more selective, also the number of potential beneficiaries of short-time work is expected to decline, as witnessed in the months after the summer.

([83]) This conclusion is suggested by the coefficient of determination (the R^2 in Graph 3.2), representing how much of the variability in one variable is explained by another variable in a linear regression.

Graph 3.3: **The use of short-time work at the peak of the first pandemic wave (April-May) and number of days of workplace closure**



(1) The strictness of the workplace closure measures is the average of the lockdown measures with weights equal to the number of days that a restriction of a specific type has been in place; Min(no restriction)=0, max=3. The average excludes days with no restrictions.
Source: National Sources and Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker.

Short-time work is more frequent in services. Hotels, restaurants and retail trade are the industries that have used more intensively the short-time work scheme (Table 3.2). Unlike in Spain and Portugal, the share of employment in short-time work in manufacturing is large in Germany and France. These sectors have a large share of contact-intensive occupations and a small share of occupations that can potentially be performed remotely (Table 3.3). On the other hand, sectors like public administration, education, healthcare and financial sectors have a lower share of workers in short-time work as they are considered essential, have low levels of employment in high-contact occupations and/or have the possibility to work remotely.

Table 3.2: **Use of short-time work schemes by sector**

Sector	Spain		Portugal*		France		Germany	
	% STW	% Total	% STW	% Total	% STW	% Total	% STW	% Total
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	0.2	4.0	0.7	8.6	0.4	2.7	0.2	1.4
Mining and quarrying	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
Manufacturing	8.9	10.0	9.2	15.7	16.0	9.2	28.6	17.2
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply	0.1	1.2	0.1	1.1	1.0	0.0	0.4	1.2
Construction	4.1	6.2	3.1	6.1	11.5	6.2	5.9	5.6
Wholesale and retail trade	24.6	17.2	22.1	15.0	16.1	13.4	17.4	13.3
Transportation and storage	3.5	4.6	3.1	3.7	7.9	5.0	5.6	5.2
Accommodation and food service activities	30.7	7.9	25.7	7.0	8.9	4.5	8.6	4.2
Information and communication	1.1	2.5	1.1	2.0	2.9	3.2	2.2	2.9
Financial and insurance activities	0.2	1.8	0.3	1.7	1.3	2.8	0.6	2.5
Real estate activities	0.7	1.1	2.5	0.8	1.0	1.3	0.4	1.1
Professional, scientific and technical act.; administrative and support service act.	7.8	12.4	6.9	12.0	20.2	15.7	15.5	13.9
Public admin., defence, education, human health and social work activities	8.7	22.1	10.6	15.2	7.1	29.6	9.3	24.8
Arts, entertainment and recreation	9.3	8.7	9.8	4.5	5.8	5.4	5.0	6.7

(1) Data for Spain: 30 April; Portugal: 14 April; France: 4 May and Germany: 26 April. *Data for Portugal refers to the share of firms (not workers).
Source: National administrations and Eurostat.

Table 3.3: **Physical proximity risk and potential for teleworking by sector**

Sector	% employment in high contact-intensity occupations				% employment in high tele-workable occupations			
	ES	PT	FR	DE	ES	PT	FR	DE
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	5.2	3.1	4.9	10.4	8.6	16.5	13.8	51.1
Mining and quarrying	14.1	5.9	21.1	18.6	26.9	35.8	56.2	34.6
Manufacturing	14.7	10.4	14.7	16.1	33.9	43.9	38.8	32.1
Electricity, Gas, and Water Supply	24.1	24.1	25.3	22.6	29.6	40.5	43.5	36.6
Construction	6.9	6.4	10.0	10.7	18.0	20.9	21.9	23.6
Wholesale and retail trade	72.4	69.1	65.8	56.7	19.2	20.7	27.0	21.9
Transportation and storage	58.8	61.5	49.0	55.9	6.3	9.7	11.9	14.0
Accommodation and food service activities	63.6	60.4	53.5	43.5	14.4	24.5	25.2	18.4
Information and communication	16.3	16.9	18.9	17.5	82.8	89.3	84.1	77.9
Financial and insurance activities	64.2	48.9	60.3	65.1	89.7	90.9	82.6	57.8
Real estate activities	82.8	62.7	58.9	55.7	87.1	77.8	72.8	67.8
Professional, scientific and tech. act.; admin. and support service act.	39.3	41.2	34.9	31.3	54.0	63.1	56.6	56.7
Public admin., defence, edu., human health and social work activities	48.1	41.2	42.7	51.3	26.5	28.2	32.1	35.8
Arts, entertainment and recreation	17.0	14.1	24.0	25.1	15.7	19.7	29.6	37.1

(1) See Barbieri et al. (2020) for information on how to calculate the share of employment in high-contact and high tele-workable occupations.
Source: EU-LFS and O*NET.

There is no simple relationship between the share of temporary contracts and the share of workers in short-time work schemes. Graph 3.4 suggests that there is a negative relationship, but only conditional on the relative share of temporary contracts. In a group of countries with a relatively low share of temporary contracts, a lower proportion of people in short-time work is recorded in countries where the share of temporary contracts is high. ([84]) This relation is also visible for countries with a higher share of temporary contracts; yet, the relation is less strong, which suggests that other factors may have influenced the share of workers in short-time work schemes. The proportion of people affected by short-time work is smaller in countries like Spain or Portugal where, with the lockdown, many expiring temporary contracts were not renewed. Conversely, France and Belgium extended the eligibility of their schemes to temporary workers to prevent a sharp rise in unemployment among them. However, there are countries such as the Netherlands and Portugal where both the share of temporary contracts and the share of short-time work are relatively high.

([84]) The fitted relation is a non-linear power function that implies proportionality between the growth in the share of short-time work employment and the growth in the share of temporary contracts.

Graph 3.4: **People in short-time work schemes and share of temporary contracts**



Source: National sources and Eurostat LFS.

There is a weak relationship between the proportion of people employed in short-time work and those in high-contact occupations. Graph 3.5 shows that the proportion of workers in short-time work is higher in economies that are more vulnerable to social distancing (measured by the share of employment in high-contact occupations). Graph 3.6 shows that the relation with the share of employment in countries with a high potential for remote work is less strong, probably due to technical and cultural barriers that prevent a broader use of teleworking in some Member States.

Graph 3.5: **Workers in short-time work and employment in high contact-intensity occupations**



(1) See Chapter 1 for the methodology adopted to build an index of contact-intensive occupations
Source: European Commission calculations based on O*Net, LFS and national sources.

Graph 3.6: **Workers in short-time work schemes and employment in high-teleworkable occupations**



Source: European Commission calculations based on O*Net, LFS and national sources.

The stringency of workplace closure and the share of temporary contracts are positively correlated with the share of people in short-time work schemes, but only for countries with well-established schemes. A multivariate regression allows assessing whether several variables jointly explain differences across countries in the share of workers in job retention schemes. Table 3.4 reports the results of a country-level regression of the share of workers in short-time work schemes on the strictness of the lockdown, the share of temporary contracts and the share of employment in high-contact occupations. The main results can be summarised as follows:

For the sample that includes all countries, column 1 suggests that countries with more stringent lockdown and with a structure of employment that is more vulnerable to social distancing have a relatively higher share of workers in short-time schemes.

Columns 2 and 3 focus on countries with well-established short-time work schemes. For this sub-sample, estimates suggest that the share of temporary contracts and the stringency of the lockdown jointly account for 71% of the differences across countries in the share of workers in job retention schemes. In a cross-country comparison, a gap in the stringency of about 1.5 – i.e. the difference between the minimum value of the stringency indicator, i.e. the one observed for Sweden, and the median value, i.e. that of

Table 3.4: **Determinants of the share of employees in short-time work at the peak of the first pandemic wave (April-May 2020)**

	All countries	Countries with well-established	Countries with well-established	Countries with new schemes	Countries with new schemes
Strictness of workplace closures measures	10.9***	15.6**	15.3**	7.8*	8.9**
	(2.6)	(5.0)	(4.7)	(4.1)	(3.1)
Share of temporary contracts	-0.02	-0.72***	-0.77***	0.34	
	(0.34)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.55)	
Share of employment in high contact occupations	1.25**	-0.2		1.1	1.3*
	(0.54)	(0.3)		(1.24)	(0.7)
Constant	-84.1	3	-2.9	-42.8	-51.3
	(25.5)	(17.4)	(10.6)	(34.2)	(28.7)
R-squared adjusted	0.35	0.66	0.71	0.23	0.27

European Commission calculations

(1) The strictness of the workplace closure measures is the average of the degree of restriction of the lockdown measures with weights equal to the number of days that a restriction of specific type has been in place; Min(no restriction)=0, max=3. The average excludes days with no restrictions.
Source: Own calculations on Eurostat LFS , National sources and Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker

Luxembourg – predicts a difference in the share of workers in short-time schemes of about 23 pps. ([85])

For countries with newly established schemes (Columns 4 and 5), the share of workers in short-time work depends on the degree of stringency of the lockdown and on the proportion of workers in contact-intensive occupations. Countries with more stringent lockdown measures have a higher share of workers in short-time work schemes. ([86]) The positive impact of the share of workers in contact-intensive occupations suggests that countries where this share is high also experience a relatively large share of people in job retention schemes. A difference between two countries in the share of workers in contact-intensive occupations of 10 pps leads to a gap in the share of short-time working of about 13 pps.

3.4.3. The impact of short-time work on unemployment

Short-time work schemes have mitigated the impact of the recession on unemployment. Graph 3.8 reports the estimate of an Okun's relationship for respectively the group of countries with well-established and the group of countries with new short-time work schemes. ([87]) The widespread use of short-time work contributed to curbing the job destruction that many countries would have experienced following the severe output losses of the first two quarters of 2020. This is particularly the case for countries with well-established schemes, perhaps because employers in these countries have a long practice with these schemes during recessions. Conversely, in countries where these schemes were introduced more recently, in part due to implementation delays, they have barely dampened the increase in unemployment in comparison with what could have been expected on the basis of historical evidence. ([88])

([85]) This prediction is not far from the effective difference of about 20pps in the coverage of short-time work schemes between Luxembourg and Sweden. The stringency is an ordinal index defined between 0 and 3, with no unit of measurement. A value of 0 corresponds to "no measures"; 1 to "recommended closing or work from home" ; 2 to "require closing or work from home for some sectors or categories of workers"; 3 to "require closing or work from home all but essential workplaces (e.g. grocery stores, doctors)".

([86]) It is also worth noting that the impact of the lockdown is weaker than in countries with well-established schemes. Yet, the fit is also lower for the countries with new work schemes

([87]) Okun's law quantifyies the response of the unemployment rate to changes in GDP. The estimate is based using quarterly unemployment rate and GDP growth data over the period 2000Q1-2020Q2 with two lags of GDP and robust standard errors.

([88]) OECD (2020) shows that countries with job retention schemes experience lower increases in the unemployment rate than unemployment insurance-based countries.

Graph 3.7: **Impact of short-time work schemes on unemployment rate**



(1) The chart shows the actual unemployment rate (UR); the UR in absence of short-time work schemes; the UR in absence of short-time work schemes assuming that some of dismissed workers become inactive. The last calculation is based on quarterly transition rates from unemployment into inactivity. For Germany, transitions rates are not available; instead, transitions rates of Denmark are used, as the two countries have similar inactivity rates.
Source: Eurostat.

These countries have also experienced a lower drop of GDP in response to less strict lockdown measures. Graph 3.7 compares by country the actual unemployment rate with the unemployment rate that would have been observed had all workers in short-time work schemes become unemployed or only part of them with the remaining part leaving the labour force. ([89]) In both cases, the increase in unemployment is much smaller than the hypothetical one without short-time work schemes. Splitting the countries in two groups reveals that the increase in unemployment without short-time work schemes would have been higher in countries with well-established schemes than in countries that introduced these schemes in response to the pandemic. This may be due to implementation delays or to a lower take up in a context of a relatively less strong drop of GDP and less strict lockdown measures. This shows the increasing value over time of well-established short time work schemes, which can contribute significantly to increasing employment resilience.

([89]) In the regression-based approach (Graph 3.8), countries are split in two groups and an elasticity of unemployment to GDP is estimated for each of them. Subsequently, the gap between the effective unemployment rate and the one predicted by GDP growth is compared for the two groups. Graph 3.8 provides an alternative way of identifying the effect of the short-time work schemes on unemployment. It assumes that either all workers in these schemes would have been unemployed without them or only a fraction of them as part of jobless workers would have become inactive.

3.5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

An unprecedented policy response by the EU and its Member States has averted mass unemployment. Since the onset of the crisis, Member States have deployed all available resources to cope with the sudden shutdown of several activities and the weakening of demand that accompanied mandatory and self-imposed social distancing measures. All countries have helped households with family care needs, extended access to sick leave – including to *self-employed* –, strengthened support to infected workers and lowered the labour cost for employers. Access to unemployment benefits has been extended to many previously excluded categories, such as workers with *non-standard contracts* (e.g. apprentices, temporary agency workers) and the *self-employed.* Many firms and public authorities have been encouraged to adopt teleworking as a buffer to support production during the lockdown period.

The short-time work schemes have been the most common tool to preserve jobs during the first lockdown. Before the pandemic, seventeen countries had job retention schemes. By spring 2020, all Member States had schemes to prevent job destruction in the spirit of short-time work schemes. Countries that had these schemes in place before the pandemic have modified their design to maximise their take-up.

The main objective of job retention schemes has been to avert mass unemployment and cope with the uncertainty created by the health crisis. Compared to 'normal' times, the concerns of an excessive use by firms of short-time working appear less compelling. In this respect, subsidising firms for short-time work has been justified by the need to ensure a high take-up. Similarly, the uncertainty about the duration of the crisis has warranted the lengthening of government's support. Finally, in the context of the rapid and sudden shutdown, broadening the scope of the

Graph 3.8: **Actual unemployment rate in the presence of short-time work schemes and Okun's prediction**



(1) Okun's law refers to the relationship between unemployment and GDP growth. Estimates based on a regression in first differences with two lags of GDP growth for the period 2000Q3-20019Q4 on a panel of EU28 countries, with country specific fixed-effects and country specific responses of unemployment changes to GDP growth. Countries with consolidated short time work schemes: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden.
Source: European Commission calculations.

schemes to cover the largest number of firms and workers was necessary to minimise the distributional implications associated with the fact that non-standard work and SMEs were usually not eligible.

The design of short-time work schemes has not always allowed firms to fully adjust the hours worked. Preserving viable job matches contributes to retaining the firm-specific human capital and the capacity of the firm to grow once activity recovers. Schemes with rigid conditions to adjust hours instead might lead to excessive job dismissals. This may have lowered the impact of some of these schemes in limiting a rise in the unemployment rate.

Requiring workers in short-time work to be engaged in training is uncommon. Idle time on short-time work schemes offers an ideal opportunity for upskilling and/or re-skilling. However, participation in training during short-time work is usually not mandatory. This might be related to the significant bottlenecks to the expansion of digital up-skilling schemes. Nonetheless, as the crisis drags on, training and distance learning linked to short-time work schemes could be encouraged, also with a view to preparing workers to the digital and green transitions.

Employment policies should anticipate a gradual phasing-out of short-time work. The preservation of jobs has been the main concern in the labour market at the onset of the COVID-19 crisis. It is important that such support is maintained as long as the confidence is still affected by the pandemic. As the economy recovers from the health shock, the phasing-out of the schemes will allow quickly resuming production and a gradual labour re-allocation. The pandemic has accelerated the adoption of new technologies (e.g. on-line shopping and remote working) and some firms might become unviable. Encouraging workers at risk of becoming redundant to engage in job-search activities and support (i.e. training) while on short-time work might ease their transitions to other jobs, improve their employability and foster the reallocation of employment towards expanding firms, most notably in the green and digital sectors.

Policies that favour reallocation tailored to the economic situation in each country could be promoted in parallel to a well-timed phasing out of short-time work schemes. These policies could involve wage subsidies to incentivize work in expanding sectors as well as in sectors critical for the response to pandemics, such as healthcare, social care, the production and retail of food and other necessary items.

APPENDIX 1
Annex to the chapter 3

Table 3.A1.1: **Eligible measures under SURE by country**

Country	Amount (EUR bn)	Eligible measures
Belgium	**7.77**	**(1)** temporary unemployment scheme **(2)** the COVID-19 replacement income for self-employed **(3)** the COVID-19 parental leave **(4)** a number of regional schemes that provide income support to the self-employed, one-person companies, and other types of employees, who do not qualify for other kinds of income support **(5)** providing hygiene training, the provision of protective material for residential and care centres, hospitals and medical service providers and information campaigns in the German-speaking Community.
Bulgaria	**0.51**	**(1)** Wage subsidy measure from March to June **(2)** Wage subsidy measure from July to end-2020.
Cyprus	**0.48**	**(1)** special leave scheme for parents **(2)** schemes supporting companies respectively for the partial and total suspension of their operations **(3)** special scheme for the self-employed **(4)** special scheme for hotel units and tourist accommodation **(5)** special scheme to support businesses related to the tourism industry or affected by tourism or associated with businesses subject to mandatory total suspension **(6)** special scheme for supporting businesses exercising special predefined activities, **(7)** subsidisation scheme of very small and small enterprises and self-employed **(8)** sickness benefit scheme.
Czechia	**2.00**	**(1)** short-time work scheme known as the "Antivirus" Programme (with its sub-programmes Option A and Option B) **(2)** Scheme compensating non-wage labour costs ("Antivirus" Programme Option C) **(3)** scheme providing a tax bonus for the self-employed **(4)** partial waiver of social and health security contributions due by the self-employed **(5)** care allowance for the self-employed.
Ireland		**(1)** Temporary wage subsidy scheme.
Greece	**2.73**	**(1)** special allowance provided to private sector employees whose labour contracts were suspended because of the crisis **(2)** financing of these private sector employees social security coverage during the suspension period **(3)** the special allowance provided to self-employed professionals **(4)** the short-time work scheme **(5)** and the employer social security contributions for employees in seasonal enterprises of the tertiary sector.
Spain	**21.32**	**(1)** short-time work scheme **(2)** full or partial social security contribution exemption for employees participating in the STW scheme **(3)** benefit for the cessation of activity for the self-employed **(4)** benefit for workers in the tourism sector **(5)** exemption for employers from payment of social security contributions **(6)** extension of health benefits for workers absent due to COVID-19.
Croatia	**1.02**	**(1)** job preservation subsidies in sectors affected by COVID–19 **(2)** aid for reduced working hours.
Italy	**27.44**	**(1)** short-time work schemes for employees **(2)** allowances for the self-employed **(3)** allowances for fixed-term employees in agriculture, workers in the entertainment industry, collaborators of sport associations, domestic workers and on-call workers **(4)** baby-sitting vouchers **(5)** additional parental leave benefits **(6)** additional disability leave benefits **(7)** non-repayable grants to self-employed workers and individual enterprises **(8)** tax credits in support of public health measures.
Lithuania	**0.60**	**(1)** wage subsidies during idle time **(2)** wage subsidies after idle time **(3)** measure providing benefits to the self-employed **(4)** measure providing benefits for self-employed small farmers.
Latvia	**0.19**	**(1)** scheme for the compensation of idle workers **(2)** downtime allowance scheme **(3)** workers' bonus for children scheme **(4)** scheme for wage subsidies for the tourism and export industry **(5)** wage support payments for medical professionals **(6)** wage support payments for workers in the cultural industry **(7)** expenditure on protective personal equipment and **(8)** COVID-19 related sickness benefit.
Hungary	**0.5**	**1)** Upgrading accommodation at tourist destinations **2)** Temporary state aid for the food-processing companies **3)** Temporary state aid for horticultural companies. **4)** Temporary state aid for fish farming companies. **5)** Extension of child care benefits **6)** Suspension of social contribution tax of employers in certain sectors **7)** Suspension of training levy of employers in certain sectors **8)** Reduction of the rehabilitation contribution tax of employers in certain sectors **9)** Tax holiday for small taxpayers', including self employed **10)** Lump-sum benefit of healthcare workers and other personnel **11)** Health protection at state-owned companies **12)** Personal health protection of state officials **13)** Infrastructure and protection investments in hospitals **14)** Personal protection tools and equipments in hospitals **15)** Exemption of personnel costs from small enterprise tax.
Malta	**0.24**	**(1)** wage supplement measure **(2)** disability benefit measure **(3)** parent benefit measure and **(4)** medical benefit measure.

(Continued on the next page)

Table (continued)

Poland	**11.24**	**(1)** reduction in social security contributions for the self-employed and companies employing up to 50 people **(2)** a downtime benefit for the self-employed and those working on civil law contracts **(3)** subsidies towards salaries and social security contributions **(4)** subsidies to the self-employed without employees **(5)** loans convertible into subsidies granted to the self-employed, micro-companies and non-government organisations
Portugal	**5.93**	**(1)** measure to support the maintenance of employment contracts through the temporary interruption of work or reduction of normal working time **(2)** new and simplified special support for the maintenance of employment contracts through the temporary interruption of work or reduction of normal working time **(3)** training allowance to cover income replacement, as well as the linked costs for training, to take place during working hours as an alternative to reducing working time for firms participating in measure 1 or 2. **(4)** special support for firms for the resumption of business activity **(5)** income stabilisation supplement for employees benefitting from measures 1 or 2 **(6)** special support for self-employed persons, informal workers and managing partners **(7)** family allowance for employees prevented from working due to the need to assist their children under 12 years old or other dependents **(8)** special support for the maintenance of trainers' employment contracts **(9)** number of regional employment-related measures in the autonomous region of the Azores **(10)** number of regional employment-related measures in the autonomous region of Madeira **(11)** an allowance for employees and self-employed that are temporarily prevented from exercising their professional activity due to being in prophylactic isolation **(12)** a sickness allowance owing to the contraction of COVID-19 **(13)** purchase of personal protective equipment to be used in the workplace, notably in public hospitals, line ministries, municipalities and the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira **(14)** school hygiene campaign aimed at ensuring the safe return to work of lecturers, other staff members and students **(15)** the testing for the contraction of COVID-19 of inpatients and workers of public hospitals, as well as of employees of nursing homes and childcare facilities **(16)** a special compensation for workers in the National Health Service involved in fighting the COVID-19 outbreak.
Romania	**4.10**	**(1)** scheme that provides a benefit to employees of employers that reduce or temporarily interrupt their activity due to the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak **(2)** scheme that provides a benefit for persons whose employment contract was suspended for at least 15 days during the state of emergency or alert **(3)** short-time work scheme **(4)** benefit to self-employed and liberal professions who stopped working entirely or reduced working hours due to the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak **(5)** Support to day-labourers **(6)** bonus for additional work for public health officials **(7)** childcare bonus for employees in specific sectors **(8)** bonus for medical personnel that participate in the medical actions against COVID-19.
Slovenia	**1.11**	**(1)** wage compensation scheme **(2)** exemption from the payment of social security insurance contributions for employees benefitting from the wage compensation scheme **(3)** short-time work scheme **(4)** scheme that subsidised the payment of pension and disability insurance contributions for employees that remained in the workplace **(5)** measure financing social security contributions for self-employed persons, farmers and religious workers and **(6)** a basic income support for self-employed persons, farmers and religious workers.

Source: European Commission.

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Statistical annex

APPENDIX 1
Statistical annex

Belgium	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	11274	11331	11375	11427	11485	0.5 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	7281	7290	7266	7289	7307	0.3 %
(% of total population)	64.6	64.3	63.9	63.8	63.6	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4921	4929	4940	5000	5044	0.9 %
Male	2640	2649	2652	2664	2681	0.6 %
Female	2281	2281	2289	2335	2362	1.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.6	67.6	68.0	68.6	69.0	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	30.0	28.5	28.1	29.6	31.0	1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.1	85.1	84.8	85.0	84.8	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	46.6	48.1	51.3	52.6	54.3	1.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.0	68.0	68.3	69.0	69.6	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	64.8	65.0	65.7	65.9	64.9	-1.0 pps
Male	72.2	72.3	72.8	72.8	73.1	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	32.8	30.7	30.6	31.4	32.5	1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.9	90.4	90.0	89.6	89.3	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	52.2	53.6	56.9	57.9	59.8	1.9 pps
Female	63.0	62.9	63.2	64.3	64.9	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	27.1	26.1	25.4	27.8	29.4	1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.2	79.8	79.6	80.3	80.3	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	41.2	42.8	45.8	47.4	48.9	1.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	61.8	62.3	63.1	64.5	65.3	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	23.4	22.7	22.7	25.0	26.6	1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.5	79.1	79.5	80.4	80.8	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	44.0	45.4	48.3	50.3	52.1	1.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	36.0	36.0	35.5	35.5	36.0	0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	64.0	64.4	65.1	66.6	67.6	1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	81.8	82.2	82.2	83.4	83.8	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	62.8	63.3	64.1	65.4	66.3	0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	54.6	55.1	56.5	57.8	58.1	0.3 pps
Male	65.5	66.5	67.5	68.2	68.9	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	25.0	24.0	24.4	26.4	27.3	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.5	83.8	84.4	84.5	84.7	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	48.9	50.7	53.8	55.1	57.3	2.2 pps
Female	58.0	58.1	58.7	60.7	61.7	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	21.7	21.4	20.9	23.5	25.8	2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.5	74.3	74.6	76.2	76.8	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	39.3	40.2	42.8	45.6	47.0	1.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4499.3	4540.6	4587.2	4699.4	4770.7	1.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.5	1.6	0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.0	0.9	1.0	2.4	1.5	-0.9 pps
Male	-0.2	1.5	1.2	1.4	1.2	-0.2 pps
Female	0.4	0.2	0.9	3.7	1.8	-1.8 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.8	13.5	13.1	12.7	12.9	0.2 pps
Male	17.5	17.3	16.3	15.8	16.1	0.4 pps
Female	9.5	9.2	9.3	9.1	9.2	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.0	9.1	10.4	10.7	10.8	0.1 pps
Male	8.3	8.3	9.7	9.8	10.2	0.4 pps
Female	9.7	10.0	11.2	11.7	11.5	-0.2 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	24.3	24.7	24.5	24.5	24.9	0.4 pps
Male	9.3	9.5	10.2	10.0	10.5	0.5 pps
Female	41.4	42.1	41.2	41.0	41.0	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.4	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	8.5	7.8	7.1	6.0	5.4	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	22.1	20.1	19.3	15.8	14.2	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.7	7.1	6.2	5.4	4.8	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	5.6	5.7	5.9	4.3	4.1	-0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	17.0	16.1	14.8	13.3	12.2	-1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.7	8.1	7.2	6.0	5.3	-0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.6	4.2	4.3	3.5	3.2	-0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.6	7.0	6.2	5.2	4.8	-0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	15.8	15.2	14.0	12.3	10.4	-1.9 pps
Male	9.1	8.1	7.1	6.3	5.7	-0.6 pps
Female	7.8	7.6	7.1	5.6	4.9	-0.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	51.7	51.6	48.8	48.7	43.5	-5.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.3	41.3	40.3	40.2	40.2	0.0 %
Male	42.3	42.2	41.1	41.0	41.1	0.2 %
Female	39.3	39.5	38.7	38.7	38.6	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	1.0	-1.5	-1.3	0.7	1.4	0.7 pps
Building and construction	-0.4	0.8	0.9	2.5	1.7	-0.8 pps
Services	1.9	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.7	0.1 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.5	0.0	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.1	0.6	1.9	1.8	2.1	0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.2	-1.3	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.3 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.1	0.1	1.2	1.6	2.0	0.4 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.1	0.5	1.9	2.2	2.6	0.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	-0.1 pps

Bulgaria	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	7178	7128	7076	7025	6976	-0.7 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	4727	4659	4595	4531	4474	-1.3 %
(% of total population)	65.8	65.4	64.9	64.5	64.1	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	3276	3200	3278	3240	3276	1.1 %
Male	1744	1710	1751	1737	1755	1.1 %
Female	1532	1490	1526	1503	1521	1.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	69.3	68.7	71.3	71.5	73.2	1.7 pps
Young (15-24)	26.0	23.9	26.3	23.7	23.9	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.2	82.0	84.3	84.3	85.8	1.5 pps
Older (55-64)	58.0	58.8	61.8	63.7	66.9	3.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	69.3	68.7	71.4	71.5	73.3	1.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	48.9	58.9	56.8	55.9	56.0	0.1 pps
Male	73.2	72.7	75.4	75.9	77.6	1.8 pps
Young (15-24)	30.5	28.0	30.5	27.9	27.6	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.4	85.7	88.0	88.3	90.0	1.8 pps
Older (55-64)	62.7	63.4	66.8	69.1	72.0	2.9 pps
Female	65.4	64.6	67.1	67.0	68.7	1.7 pps
Young (15-24)	21.2	19.6	21.8	19.3	20.0	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.8	78.2	80.5	80.2	81.4	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	53.8	54.6	57.3	58.7	62.2	3.6 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	62.9	63.4	66.9	67.7	70.1	2.4 pps
Young (15-24)	20.3	19.8	22.9	20.7	21.8	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.1	76.2	79.4	80.1	82.3	2.1 pps
Older (55-64)	53.0	54.5	58.2	60.7	64.4	3.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	29.6	29.6	33.4	34.8	38.4	3.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	67.2	67.8	71.7	72.4	74.6	2.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.0	84.2	85.5	86.1	88.5	2.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	62.9	63.4	66.9	67.8	70.1	2.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	45.5	53.3	52.3	53.9	56.0	2.0 pps
Male	65.9	66.7	70.6	71.5	74.1	2.6 pps
Young (15-24)	24.0	23.1	26.5	24.2	25.0	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.5	79.2	82.8	83.5	86.0	2.5 pps
Older (55-64)	56.8	58.3	62.5	65.4	69.2	3.8 pps
Female	59.8	60.0	63.1	63.9	66.0	2.2 pps
Young (15-24)	16.5	16.3	19.1	17.0	18.4	1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	73.6	73.0	75.8	76.5	78.3	1.8 pps
Older (55-64)	49.5	51.0	54.3	56.4	59.9	3.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2973.5	2954.3	3073.4	3068.9	3136.3	2.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.4	0.5	1.8	-0.1	0.3	0.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.6	-0.6	4.0	-0.1	2.2	2.3 pps
Male	1.8	-0.2	4.4	-0.1	2.3	2.5 pps
Female	1.3	-1.2	3.6	-0.2	2.0	2.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.1	10.8	10.8	10.6	9.9	-0.7 pps
Male	14.1	13.5	13.5	13.4	12.5	-0.9 pps
Female	7.7	7.8	7.6	7.3	6.9	-0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.4	4.1	4.4	4.0	4.3	0.3 pps
Male	4.7	4.5	4.9	4.4	4.6	0.2 pps
Female	4.1	3.6	3.9	3.7	4.0	0.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.2	2.0	2.2	1.8	1.9	0.1 pps
Male	1.9	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.7	0.0 pps
Female	2.5	2.2	2.4	2.0	2.1	0.1 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.0	1.0	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.2	7.6	6.2	5.2	4.2	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	21.6	17.2	12.9	12.7	8.9	-3.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	8.5	7.1	5.9	5.0	4.1	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	8.7	7.3	5.9	4.6	3.9	-0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	25.5	22.5	18.3	15.7	13.2	-2.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.4	6.8	5.3	4.6	3.4	-1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.0	3.4	3.1	2.4	1.9	-0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.2	7.7	6.2	5.3	4.3	-1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	9.8	8.1	6.4	5.7	4.5	-1.2 pps
Female	8.4	7.0	6.0	4.7	3.9	-0.8 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	61.1	58.9	54.9	58.3	56.5	-1.8 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.5	40.6	40.4	40.2	40.0	-0.5 %
Male	40.8	40.8	40.6	40.5	40.2	-0.7 %
Female	40.2	40.3	40.1	39.9	39.7	-0.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.6	-3.7	6.4	-6.1	-4.4	1.7 pps
Building and construction	2.5	-3.9	0.1	5.2	6.0	0.8 pps
Services	1.0	3.0	0.6	1.3	1.7	0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	2.3	1.3	1.1	0.5	-0.8	-1.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	5.6	5.8	10.5	9.7	6.9	-2.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	3.1	3.2	6.3	5.4	1.6	-3.9 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	7.3	6.4	12.4	6.6	11.3	4.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	7.6	6.4	12.3	6.3	11.1	4.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	3.6	3.3	1.7	3.2	3.3	0.1 pps

Czechia	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10543	10565	10590	10626	10669	0.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	7026	6968	6917	6879	6856	-0.3 %
(% of total population)	66.6	66.0	65.3	64.7	64.3	-0.5 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5201	5226	5248	5267	5259	-0.1 %
Male	2900	2906	2912	2915	2914	0.0 %
Female	2301	2321	2336	2352	2345	-0.3 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.0	75.0	75.9	76.6	76.7	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	32.5	32.0	31.7	30.4	29.7	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.6	88.9	89.1	89.3	89.1	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	58.0	60.8	63.6	66.5	68.0	1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.9	74.9	75.7	76.4	76.5	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	78.0	82.6	82.0	82.9	83.8	0.8 pps
Male	81.4	82.2	82.9	83.3	83.4	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	37.4	37.5	36.5	34.4	33.4	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	95.4	95.4	95.7	95.9	95.9	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	68.3	70.9	73.2	75.3	76.2	0.9 pps
Female	66.5	67.6	68.7	69.6	69.8	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	27.4	26.2	26.6	26.2	25.8	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.4	82.1	82.1	82.3	81.8	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	48.3	51.2	54.5	58.0	60.1	2.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	70.2	72.0	73.6	74.8	75.1	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	28.4	28.6	29.1	28.4	28.0	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.5	85.7	86.7	87.5	87.4	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	55.5	58.5	62.1	65.1	66.7	1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	22.3	23.7	26.1	26.5	28.1	1.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	75.4	77.4	78.9	80.1	80.7	0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.6	83.4	84.2	85.6	84.9	-0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	70.1	71.8	73.5	74.7	75.0	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	74.4	79.3	79.8	81.2	81.7	0.6 pps
Male	77.9	79.3	80.9	81.8	81.9	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	33.1	33.8	33.8	32.2	31.6	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.9	92.7	93.7	94.4	94.5	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	65.5	68.2	71.7	74.0	74.7	0.7 pps
Female	62.4	64.4	66.2	67.6	68.1	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	23.4	23.2	24.3	24.3	24.3	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.7	78.4	79.3	80.1	80.0	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	45.9	49.3	53.0	56.6	58.9	2.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4934.3	5015.9	5093.9	5146.8	5151.0	0.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.3	0.2	-1.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.0	1.7	1.6	1.0	0.1	-1.0 pps
Male	0.4	1.1	1.3	0.7	0.0	-0.6 pps
Female	1.8	2.4	1.8	1.5	0.1	-1.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.3	16.2	16.1	16.0	15.7	-0.2 pps
Male	20.2	19.5	19.8	19.9	19.5	-0.4 pps
Female	11.4	11.9	11.6	11.1	11.1	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.0	9.7	9.6	8.4	7.8	-0.6 pps
Male	8.4	8.1	7.8	6.5	6.2	-0.3 pps
Female	11.9	11.6	11.7	10.6	9.6	-1.0 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.3	5.7	6.2	6.3	6.3	0.0 pps
Male	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.8	0.2 pps
Female	9.3	10.0	10.9	10.9	10.6	-0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.1	4.0	2.9	2.2	2.0	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	12.6	10.5	7.9	6.7	5.6	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.6	3.5	2.7	2.0	1.8	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	4.4	3.8	2.4	2.0	2.0	0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	23.1	20.9	13.3	10.8	10.9	0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	4.8	3.6	2.7	2.1	1.8	-0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.4	1.9	1.5	1.2	1.0	-0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.1	4.0	2.9	2.3	2.0	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	4.5	4.1	2.6	2.1	2.4	0.3 pps
Male	4.2	3.4	2.3	1.8	1.7	-0.1 pps
Female	6.1	4.7	3.6	2.8	2.4	-0.4 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	47.4	42.1	35.0	30.6	30.0	-0.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.2	40.5	40.3	40.1	40.1	0.0 %
Male	41.2	41.5	41.3	41.1	41.0	-0.2 %
Female	38.7	39.2	38.8	38.8	38.7	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.4	-1.1	0.5	1.3	-2.8	-4.1 pps
Building and construction	-1.7	-0.8	0.0	1.2	0.9	-0.3 pps
Services	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.3	0.8	-0.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	3.4	2.5	1.5	0.8	-1.1	-1.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.1	4.0	7.2	8.1	6.3	-1.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.1	2.8	5.8	5.4	2.3	-3.0 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	4.0	3.8	7.8	7.7	6.4	-1.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	4.1	3.8	7.8	7.8	6.4	-1.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	3.9	0.9	3.6	1.8	2.1	0.3 pps

Denmark	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5682	5729	5765	5794	5817	0.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3644	3669	3684	3695	3704	0.2 %
(% of total population)	64.1	64.0	63.9	63.8	63.7	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2804	2842	2870	2892	2930	1.3 %
Male	1475	1486	1501	1514	1534	1.4 %
Female	1329	1356	1369	1378	1395	1.3 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.9	77.5	77.9	78.2	79.1	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	58.5	59.5	60.4	60.1	61.1	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.4	86.0	85.8	86.1	86.5	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	65.9	68.6	70.9	71.8	73.8	2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.7	77.9	78.6	78.9	79.8	0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.8	72.1	70.8	71.3	71.6	0.3 pps
Male	80.2	80.2	80.7	81.1	82.0	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	58.1	57.9	59.6	59.4	60.5	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.3	89.6	89.3	89.6	90.1	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	71.2	73.2	75.0	76.5	78.4	2.0 pps
Female	73.6	74.7	75.1	75.3	76.1	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	58.9	61.2	61.2	60.8	61.8	1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.4	82.4	82.2	82.6	82.8	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	60.7	64.1	66.7	67.2	69.3	2.1 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.0	72.7	73.2	74.1	75.0	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	51.3	52.3	52.9	53.7	55.0	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.5	81.5	81.4	82.2	82.6	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	63.0	65.8	68.2	69.2	71.3	2.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	51.4	53.3	52.9	52.9	53.2	0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	77.2	77.4	78.3	79.4	79.9	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	85.2	85.0	85.5	86.3	87.4	1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.2	73.5	74.3	75.2	75.9	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	58.9	62.1	62.1	62.9	65.1	2.2 pps
Male	75.2	75.5	76.0	76.9	78.0	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	50.4	50.1	51.9	52.4	54.2	1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.4	85.5	85.0	85.9	86.3	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	68.4	70.1	72.2	73.8	75.8	2.0 pps
Female	68.7	69.8	70.5	71.3	72.0	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	52.3	54.6	53.9	55.2	55.8	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.5	77.3	77.7	78.5	78.8	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	57.7	61.6	64.4	64.6	66.9	2.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2622.6	2667.5	2698.1	2739.3	2779.1	1.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.2	-0.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.7	1.7	1.1	1.5	1.5	-0.1 pps
Male	2.0	1.3	1.0	1.6	1.6	0.0 pps
Female	1.3	2.2	1.3	1.5	1.3	-0.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.9	7.8	7.4	7.2	7.4	0.2 pps
Male	10.7	10.4	10.0	9.7	9.9	0.2 pps
Female	4.9	4.9	4.5	4.3	4.7	0.3 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.4	12.9	12.3	10.7	10.8	0.1 pps
Male	7.7	11.4	11.2	9.3	9.6	0.3 pps
Female	9.2	14.4	13.4	12.0	12.0	0.0 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	23.8	25.0	24.7	23.9	24.2	0.3 pps
Male	14.7	15.2	15.3	14.5	15.3	0.8 pps
Female	33.9	35.9	35.0	34.3	33.9	-0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.7	3.4	3.3	2.8	2.6	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.3	6.0	5.8	5.1	5.0	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	12.2	12.2	12.4	10.5	10.1	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.7	5.3	5.1	4.5	4.5	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	4.4	4.1	3.7	3.6	3.4	-0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	10.8	9.5	10.0	8.9	8.7	-0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.5	5.3	4.8	4.2	4.2	0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.1	4.0	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.8	5.6	5.5	4.7	4.8	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	14.3	13.9	12.3	11.8	9.1	-2.7 pps
Male	6.1	5.6	5.6	4.9	4.8	-0.1 pps
Female	6.5	6.4	6.1	5.3	5.3	0.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	25.7	20.4	20.5	19.1	16.5	-2.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.6	38.9	39.0	38.6	38.2	-1.0 %
Male	40.7	40.2	40.2	39.7	39.3	-1.0 %
Female	37.8	37.0	37.2	37.0	36.6	-1.1 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	2.0	-1.3	1.0	-0.6	-0.5	0.1 pps
Building and construction	2.8	3.1	3.5	3.7	1.9	-1.8 pps
Services	2.1	2.9	2.4	1.9	1.4	-0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.5	2.1	0.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.7	1.3	1.7	1.8	1.5	-0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.3	1.1	0.5	1.2	0.7	-0.5 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.2	2.1	-0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.2	2.1	-0.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.0	1.5	1.3	0.6	1.6	1.0 pps

Germany	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	81687	82349	82657	82906	83093	0.2 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	52964	53802	53797	53524	53545	0.0 %
(% of total population)	64.8	65.3	65.1	64.6	64.4	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	41117	41932	42094	42094	42427	0.8 %
Male	21926	22399	22504	22485	22619	0.6 %
Female	19191	19533	19590	19609	19809	1.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	77.6	77.9	78.2	78.6	79.2	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	48.8	49.2	49.9	50.3	51.4	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.6	87.3	87.3	87.7	88.0	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	69.4	71.3	72.6	73.6	74.7	1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	78.7	79.4	79.8	80.1	80.6	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	69.3	68.1	68.2	70.0	71.6	1.6 pps
Male	82.1	82.2	82.4	82.9	83.5	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	50.5	50.9	51.3	52.5	54.2	1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.5	91.9	91.9	92.3	92.7	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	75.3	76.9	77.9	78.7	79.5	0.8 pps
Female	73.1	73.6	74.0	74.3	74.9	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	47.1	47.4	48.3	47.8	48.4	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.5	82.6	82.5	82.9	83.3	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	63.8	65.9	67.5	68.6	70.0	1.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.0	74.7	75.2	75.9	76.7	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	45.3	45.7	46.5	47.2	48.5	1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.7	83.9	84.2	84.9	85.4	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	66.2	68.6	70.1	71.4	72.7	1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	46.1	47.0	47.6	48.3	49.4	1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	78.0	78.9	79.5	80.2	80.8	0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	87.8	87.9	88.1	88.5	89.0	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	75.4	76.5	77.3	77.8	78.4	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	62.9	62.2	62.6	64.8	66.6	1.8 pps
Male	78.0	78.4	78.9	79.7	80.5	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	46.5	46.9	47.4	48.8	50.6	1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.1	88.1	88.4	89.0	89.6	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	71.3	73.7	75.0	76.1	77.1	1.0 pps
Female	69.9	70.8	71.5	72.1	72.8	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	44.0	44.5	45.5	45.4	46.1	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.2	79.7	80.0	80.6	81.1	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	61.2	63.5	65.4	66.9	68.4	1.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	39175.9	40165.1	40481.6	40635.7	41065.1	1.1 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.4	0.9	-0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.7	2.5	0.8	0.4	1.1	0.7 pps
Male	0.5	2.7	0.8	0.3	0.9	0.7 pps
Female	0.9	2.3	0.7	0.5	1.2	0.7 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.6	9.3	9.1	8.8	8.5	-0.2 pps
Male	12.1	11.6	11.2	10.9	10.7	-0.2 pps
Female	6.8	6.7	6.6	6.3	6.1	-0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.2	13.2	12.9	12.6	12.0	-0.6 pps
Male	13.1	13.2	13.0	12.9	12.3	-0.6 pps
Female	13.2	13.2	12.9	12.4	11.7	-0.7 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	26.8	26.7	26.9	26.8	27.2	0.4 pps
Male	9.3	9.4	9.7	9.6	9.9	0.3 pps
Female	46.6	46.5	46.4	46.3	46.7	0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.7	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.5	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	4.6	4.1	3.8	3.4	3.1	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	7.2	7.1	6.8	6.2	5.8	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.4	3.9	3.5	3.2	3.0	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	4.7	3.9	3.4	2.9	2.7	-0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	11.4	10.3	9.7	9.0	8.1	-0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	4.3	3.8	3.4	2.9	2.8	-0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.9	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.2	3.6	3.2	2.9	2.6	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	9.2	8.6	8.1	7.5	6.9	-0.6 pps
Male	5.0	4.5	4.1	3.8	3.5	-0.3 pps
Female	4.2	3.8	3.3	2.9	2.7	-0.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	44.0	41.1	41.9	41.3	38.1	-3.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.2	41.2	40.9	40.7	40.6	-0.2 %
Male	42.0	42.0	41.6	41.4	41.3	-0.2 %
Female	39.8	39.8	39.5	39.4	39.4	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.8	-1.6	-1.3	-1.1	-1.5	-0.4 pps
Building and construction	0.0	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.5	0.0 pps
Services	0.9	1.4	1.5	1.3	0.5	-0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.4	0.3	0.8	1.6	0.5	-1.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.8	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.0	0.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.2	0.8	-0.4 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.5	2.2	3.4	2.4	2.4	0.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.5	2.1	3.1	2.7	2.9	0.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.5	1.0	1.2	-0.1	-0.3	-0.2 pps

Estonia	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	1313	1316	1316	1319	1325	0.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	853	849	844	843	842	-0.1 %
(% of total population)	65.0	64.5	64.1	63.9	63.6	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	654	658	665	666	665	-0.3 %
Male	338	343	346	347	345	-0.4 %
Female	316	315	320	320	319	-0.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.7	77.5	78.8	79.1	78.9	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	41.8	43.2	46.1	47.3	44.6	-2.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.9	87.8	88.6	88.3	87.8	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	68.7	71.0	72.2	72.9	75.5	2.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.0	77.6	78.8	79.0	78.9	-0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.0	76.6	79.2	79.4	78.9	-0.6 pps
Male	80.4	81.9	82.7	82.6	82.1	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	45.8	46.2	49.7	49.5	46.3	-3.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.6	93.7	93.3	93.4	92.5	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	67.7	70.4	71.9	70.8	73.4	2.5 pps
Female	73.0	73.2	75.1	75.6	75.8	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	37.8	40.4	42.5	45.1	43.1	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.0	81.8	83.7	83.0	82.8	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	69.5	71.4	72.3	74.5	77.4	2.8 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.9	72.1	74.1	74.8	75.3	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	36.3	37.5	40.5	41.7	39.7	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.0	82.6	83.9	84.2	84.3	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	64.5	65.2	68.0	69.0	72.5	3.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	39.9	41.8	44.9	45.0	41.3	-3.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	74.0	74.0	76.2	77.4	78.1	0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	85.2	84.1	85.5	85.2	86.4	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.5	72.9	74.6	75.3	75.7	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.0	67.4	71.2	71.7	73.1	1.4 pps
Male	75.3	75.7	77.4	78.1	78.7	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	39.4	38.8	42.8	43.5	41.5	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.7	87.9	88.5	89.5	89.5	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	63.0	63.8	66.7	65.9	69.6	3.7 pps
Female	68.5	68.6	70.9	71.4	71.9	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	33.1	36.1	38.2	39.9	38.0	-1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.2	77.2	79.2	78.7	78.7	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	65.8	66.5	69.3	71.5	74.9	3.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	613.1	612.3	625.6	630.2	634.1	0.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.9	0.3	2.7	1.2	1.3	0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.3	-0.1	2.2	0.7	0.6	-0.1 pps
Male	2.6	0.2	2.0	1.3	0.9	-0.4 pps
Female	1.9	-0.5	2.4	0.1	0.3	0.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.3	9.5	9.9	10.4	10.8	0.3 pps
Male	11.9	12.1	13.3	14.0	14.6	0.5 pps
Female	6.4	6.7	6.3	6.5	6.7	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.4	3.7	3.1	3.5	3.1	-0.4 pps
Male	3.9	3.9	3.4	3.6	3.1	-0.5 pps
Female	3.0	3.5	2.9	3.3	3.2	-0.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.5	9.9	9.5	11.1	11.3	0.2 pps
Male	6.0	6.8	6.0	7.2	7.1	-0.1 pps
Female	13.4	13.3	13.3	15.3	15.9	0.6 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.2	6.8	5.8	5.4	4.4	-1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	13.1	13.4	12.1	11.8	11.1	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.5	5.9	5.3	4.6	4.0	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	6.0	8.1	5.7	5.4	4.0	-1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	12.8	13.4	11.4	10.7	10.3	-0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.7	8.0	6.8	5.9	4.9	-1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.0	3.8	3.3	3.5	2.9	-0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.8	6.1	5.2	4.7	4.1	-0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	9.3	12.1	10.2	9.8	7.3	-2.5 pps
Male	6.2	7.4	6.2	5.4	4.1	-1.3 pps
Female	6.1	6.1	5.3	5.3	4.8	-0.5 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	38.8	31.6	33.2	23.7	19.5	-4.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.7	40.1	40.3	39.8	39.9	0.3 %
Male	40.2	40.8	40.9	40.6	40.5	-0.2 %
Female	39.2	39.3	39.6	38.8	39.1	0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	7.5	0.8	-9.0	-3.6	-4.2	-0.6 pps
Building and construction	8.1	-12.1	3.1	5.5	1.6	-3.9 pps
Services	0.8	4.5	6.1	0.5	1.9	1.3 pps
Manufacturing industry	5.8	0.7	3.5	-1.1	-1.6	-0.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.7	2.2	10.5	9.0	9.3	0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	2.6	-0.1	7.2	4.6	5.9	1.3 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	4.6	5.4	7.7	5.6	7.2	1.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	4.7	5.3	7.9	5.7	7.1	1.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	-1.0	2.9	2.7	3.1	3.7	0.6 pps

Ireland	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	4696	4749	4802	4861	4927	1.4 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3081	3110	3141	3176	3219	1.4 %
(% of total population)	65.6	65.5	65.4	65.3	65.3	0.0 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2220	2260	2282	2316	2358	1.8 %
Male	1206	1221	1227	1241	1264	1.8 %
Female	1014	1039	1055	1075	1094	1.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.1	72.7	72.7	72.9	73.3	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	47.4	50.5	46.7	46.7	47.1	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.0	82.0	82.9	83.2	83.5	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	60.2	60.7	62.0	63.3	64.1	0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.8	72.2	72.0	72.0	72.5	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.6	75.6	76.1	78.0	77.2	-0.8 pps
Male	79.0	79.2	78.8	78.8	79.2	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	50.1	52.6	47.8	48.4	48.2	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.6	89.3	90.1	90.0	90.6	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	70.7	70.1	70.8	72.1	72.5	0.4 pps
Female	65.2	66.3	66.6	67.1	67.4	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	44.6	48.3	45.5	45.0	45.9	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.6	74.9	75.9	76.7	76.7	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	49.8	51.4	53.3	54.7	55.9	1.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.8	66.4	67.7	68.6	69.5	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	37.8	42.0	40.0	40.3	41.2	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.7	75.8	78.0	79.2	80.1	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	55.4	56.8	58.4	60.4	61.8	1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	36.1	37.5	37.0	37.0	37.7	0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	64.6	67.1	67.5	69.4	70.3	0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	81.9	82.5	84.2	84.6	85.2	0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	64.7	66.1	67.1	67.9	68.9	1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	65.2	68.7	70.4	72.6	72.7	0.2 pps
Male	70.3	71.8	73.0	74.1	75.0	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	38.3	42.2	40.2	41.2	41.4	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.1	82.3	84.5	85.7	86.7	1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	64.6	65.1	66.5	68.5	69.9	1.3 pps
Female	59.4	61.1	62.4	63.3	64.2	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	37.3	41.7	39.7	39.4	41.0	1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	68.5	69.6	71.7	72.9	73.6	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	46.4	48.5	50.3	52.3	53.9	1.6 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1994.7	2066.4	2125.1	2180.0	2238.5	2.7 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	3.6	3.7	3.0	3.2	2.9	-0.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	3.2	3.6	2.8	2.6	2.7	0.1 pps
Male	3.3	3.3	2.7	2.6	2.5	-0.1 pps
Female	3.1	3.9	3.1	2.5	2.9	0.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.3	14.0	13.4	12.9	12.5	-0.5 pps
Male	20.5	19.9	19.1	18.3	17.5	-0.7 pps
Female	7.0	7.1	6.8	6.8	6.6	-0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.6	9.0	9.1	9.9	9.7	-0.2 pps
Male	9.6	8.6	8.8	9.5	8.9	-0.6 pps
Female	9.7	9.4	9.4	10.4	10.4	0.0 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	22.2	21.9	20.1	19.5	19.7	0.2 pps
Male	12.9	12.9	10.9	10.6	10.1	-0.5 pps
Female	33.1	32.4	30.6	29.9	30.6	0.7 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.3	6.7	4.7	3.5	3.2	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	10.0	8.4	6.7	5.8	5.0	-0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	20.2	16.8	14.4	13.8	12.5	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-49)	8.9	7.5	5.8	4.8	4.1	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	7.9	6.5	5.8	4.6	3.6	-1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	18.4	15.6	12.6	10.8	9.7	-1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	12.6	10.2	8.6	7.1	6.1	-1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.7	5.1	4.1	3.8	3.2	-0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.9	8.5	6.8	5.7	4.9	-0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	11.4	9.1	7.5	6.9	5.7	-1.2 pps
Male	10.8	9.1	7.1	5.8	5.2	-0.6 pps
Female	8.9	7.6	6.3	5.7	4.7	-1.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	55.0	52.2	46.4	37.1	33.0	-4.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.9	40.1	40.2	40.6	40.5	-0.2 %
Male	41.8	42.0	42.1	42.5	42.4	-0.2 %
Female	36.7	37.1	37.1	37.6	37.5	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	1.4	3.6	-2.4	-3.0	-4.4	-1.4 pps
Building and construction	16.2	9.3	8.4	11.4	2.6	-8.8 pps
Services	2.2	3.8	3.0	3.4	2.8	-0.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	5.6	6.2	1.1	-1.3	2.0	3.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.0	2.5	2.9	2.6	3.5	0.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-5.2	1.4	1.3	2.3	0.4	-1.9 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.8	1.8	2.2	3.1	3.7	0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.8	1.7	2.2	3.4	3.4	0.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	20.8	-1.7	5.9	5.2	2.6	-2.6 pps

Greece	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10821	10776	10755	10733	10725	-0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6987	6937	6886	6831	6771	-0.9 %
(% of total population)	64.6	64.4	64.0	63.6	63.1	-0.5 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4738	4732	4701	4657	4634	-0.5 %
Male	2621	2613	2605	2590	2571	-0.7 %
Female	2117	2119	2096	2068	2063	-0.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.8	68.2	68.3	68.2	68.4	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	26.0	24.6	25.1	23.3	22.5	-0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.4	85.5	85.0	85.0	85.4	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	41.6	44.9	46.7	48.5	49.8	1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.4	67.8	68.0	68.0	68.2	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.8	73.9	71.9	70.9	72.1	1.2 pps
Male	75.9	76.2	76.4	76.6	76.7	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	27.7	26.4	26.2	25.1	23.9	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.1	93.2	93.0	93.2	93.2	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	54.9	57.3	59.8	61.4	63.8	2.5 pps
Female	59.9	60.4	60.3	59.9	60.4	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	24.3	22.9	23.9	21.5	21.0	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.7	77.7	77.0	76.7	77.6	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	29.5	33.6	34.9	36.8	37.3	0.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	50.8	52.0	53.5	54.9	56.5	1.6 pps
Young (15-24)	13.0	13.0	14.1	14.0	14.6	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	64.5	66.0	67.4	68.9	70.8	1.9 pps
Older (55-64)	34.3	36.3	38.3	41.1	43.2	2.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	39.7	39.4	39.8	39.9	39.0	-1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	48.8	50.1	51.8	53.1	55.1	2.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	67.9	69.6	70.8	73.3	75.2	1.9 pps
Nationals (15-64)	50.8	52.0	53.6	55.1	56.7	1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	51.0	52.0	51.9	51.8	53.0	1.1 pps
Male	59.3	61.0	62.7	64.7	65.9	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	15.1	14.7	15.9	15.9	15.9	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	73.7	76.0	77.5	79.6	80.8	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	44.9	46.2	49.6	53.3	56.1	2.8 pps
Female	42.5	43.3	44.4	45.3	47.3	2.0 pps
Young (15-24)	10.9	11.3	12.4	12.0	13.2	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	55.4	55.9	57.2	58.2	60.8	2.6 pps
Older (55-64)	24.7	27.2	28.0	30.0	31.6	1.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	3548.0	3610.3	3682.7	3751.1	3824.6	2.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-2.9	3.4	-0.5	1.4	1.2	-0.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.0	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.0	0.1 pps
Male	1.6	2.1	2.2	2.4	0.9	-1.5 pps
Female	2.5	1.2	1.7	1.1	3.5	2.3 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	29.9	29.5	29.4	29.1	27.9	-1.1 pps
Male	35.3	34.2	34.4	34.0	32.9	-1.1 pps
Female	22.5	22.9	22.4	22.1	21.1	-1.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.9	11.2	11.4	11.3	12.6	1.3 pps
Male	11.4	10.3	9.9	9.5	10.9	1.4 pps
Female	12.6	12.3	13.3	13.5	14.5	1.0 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.4	9.8	9.7	9.1	9.1	0.0 pps
Male	6.7	6.9	6.6	6.1	5.9	-0.2 pps
Female	13.1	13.7	14.1	13.2	13.5	0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.8	7.1	6.8	6.4	6.0	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	24.9	23.6	21.5	19.3	17.3	-2.0 pps
Young (15-24)	49.8	47.3	43.6	39.9	35.2	-4.7 pps
Prime age (25-49)	24.4	22.8	20.7	18.9	17.1	-1.8 pps
Older (55-64)	17.5	19.2	18.1	15.3	13.4	-1.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	27.2	26.9	24.8	22.8	21.6	-1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	27.7	26.2	24.0	21.9	19.7	-2.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	20.0	18.1	16.6	14.3	12.3	-2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	24.6	23.3	21.2	19.0	16.8	-2.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	30.9	29.6	27.8	26.9	26.5	-0.4 pps
Male	21.8	19.9	17.8	15.4	14.0	-1.4 pps
Female	28.9	28.1	26.1	24.2	21.5	-2.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	73.0	71.8	72.6	70.1	69.9	-0.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	42.8	43.1	42.9	42.6	42.4	-0.5 %
Male	44.2	44.6	44.4	44.1	43.8	-0.7 %
Female	40.6	40.8	40.7	40.4	40.2	-0.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-3.5	-2.3	0.7	0.7	-1.9	-2.6 pps
Building and construction	-4.3	1.0	-3.3	1.6	-0.5	-2.1 pps
Services	-3.0	6.2	-0.6	1.3	1.8	0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	-6.5	4.6	-1.5	1.3	2.7	1.4 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-0.6	-3.7	1.5	1.8	1.0	-0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.3	-3.1	1.1	1.9	0.8	-1.1 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-3.0	-1.4	2.5	2.5	3.3	0.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	-2.7	-0.7	1.4	2.0	2.1	0.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	2.6	-3.8	1.8	0.2	0.6	0.4 pps

Spain		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1	- **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	46410	46450	46533	46729	47104	0.8 %
2	- **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	30642	30536	30531	30671	30909	0.8 %
	(% of total population)	66.0	65.7	65.6	65.6	65.6	0.0 pps
3	- **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	22767	22657	22558	22607	22804	0.9 %
	Male	12232	12120	12064	12089	12145	0.5 %
	Female	10535	10536	10495	10518	10659	1.3 %
4	- **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.3	74.2	73.9	73.7	73.8	0.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	34.7	33.0	33.3	33.0	33.0	0.0 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	87.4	87.4	87.0	86.9	87.0	0.1 pps
	Older (55-64)	57.6	59.2	59.6	60.5	61.6	1.1 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	73.8	73.8	73.5	73.4	73.5	0.1 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	78.0	77.2	76.8	76.1	75.9	-0.1 pps
	Male	79.5	79.2	78.9	78.8	78.5	-0.3 pps
	Young (15-24)	36.2	34.7	35.1	35.1	35.1	0.0 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	92.6	92.5	92.0	91.9	91.7	-0.2 pps
	Older (55-64)	66.2	67.0	67.9	68.4	69.2	0.7 pps
	Female	69.0	69.2	68.8	68.6	69.0	0.4 pps
	Young (15-24)	33.2	31.3	31.5	30.8	30.7	0.0 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	82.0	82.3	82.0	81.8	82.3	0.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	49.4	51.7	51.8	52.9	54.4	1.5 pps
5	- **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	57.8	59.5	61.1	62.4	63.3	0.9 pps
	Young (15-24)	17.9	18.4	20.5	21.7	22.3	0.6 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	69.4	71.5	73.2	74.7	75.8	1.1 pps
	Older (55-64)	46.9	49.1	50.5	52.2	53.8	1.7 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	46.2	48.1	49.6	51.3	52.2	1.0 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	57.5	58.7	59.8	60.6	61.1	0.5 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	76.7	77.9	79.4	80.1	80.3	0.2 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	58.3	59.9	61.4	62.8	63.7	0.9 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	54.2	56.6	58.5	59.4	60.7	1.2 pps
	Male	62.9	64.8	66.5	67.9	68.7	0.8 pps
	Young (15-24)	18.6	19.4	21.2	22.7	24.3	1.5 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	75.1	77.4	79.2	80.8	81.6	0.8 pps
	Older (55-64)	54.0	55.7	57.8	59.7	61.1	1.3 pps
	Female	52.7	54.3	55.7	56.9	57.9	1.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	17.3	17.2	19.7	20.5	20.1	-0.4 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	63.7	65.6	67.1	68.6	69.9	1.4 pps
	Older (55-64)	40.1	42.8	43.5	44.9	46.9	2.0 pps
6	- **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	17717.5	18182.7	18648.5	19136.3	19567.9	2.3 %
7	- **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.8	2.1	2.6	2.3	2.2	-0.1 pps
	Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.3	-0.4 pps
	Male	3.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.0	-0.6 pps
	Female	2.5	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.6	-0.1 pps
8	- **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.4	16.1	15.7	15.2	14.9	-0.3 pps
	Male	20.2	19.7	19.3	18.6	18.2	-0.5 pps
	Female	11.8	11.9	11.4	11.1	11.0	-0.1 pps
9	- **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	25.2	26.1	26.8	26.9	26.3	-0.6 pps
	Male	25.1	25.8	26.0	26.0	25.4	-0.6 pps
	Female	25.3	26.5	27.6	27.8	27.3	-0.5 pps
10	- **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.6	15.1	14.9	14.5	14.5	0.0 pps
	Male	7.8	7.6	7.2	6.7	6.8	0.1 pps
	Female	25.1	24.1	24.1	23.9	23.7	-0.2 pps
11	**Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.9	9.3	9.1	8.1	7.9	-0.2 pps
12	- **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	22.1	19.6	17.2	15.3	14.1	-1.2 pps
	Young (15-24)	48.3	44.4	38.6	34.3	32.5	-1.8 pps
	Prime age (25-49)	20.6	18.2	15.9	14.0	12.9	-1.1 pps
	Older (55-64)	18.6	17.0	15.3	13.8	12.6	-1.2 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	31.2	28.2	25.2	22.3	20.5	-1.8 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	21.6	19.2	17.0	15.5	14.5	-1.0 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	13.3	11.7	10.0	9.0	8.7	-0.3 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	21.0	18.8	16.4	14.4	13.3	-1.1 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	30.5	26.7	23.9	21.9	20.1	-1.8 pps
	Male	20.8	18.1	15.7	13.7	12.5	-1.2 pps
	Female	23.6	21.4	19.0	17.0	16.0	-1.0 pps
13	- **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	51.6	48.3	44.4	41.7	37.8	-3.9 pps
14	- **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.6	40.4	40.1	40.3	39.9	-1.0 %
	Male	41.5	41.3	41.0	41.2	40.8	-1.0 %
	Female	39.1	39.0	38.8	38.9	38.7	-0.5 %
15	- **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
	Agriculture	0.0	4.5	2.9	-0.4	-2.6	-2.2 pps
	Building and construction	6.7	1.5	4.3	7.5	5.2	-2.3 pps
	Services	3.9	1.8	2.9	2.1	2.6	0.5 pps
	Manufacturing industry	2.2	3.5	2.7	1.8	2.3	0.5 pps
16	- **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
	Compensation per employee	1.0	-0.1	0.7	1.3	2.1	0.8 pps
	Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.0	-0.9	-0.5	-0.2	0.7	0.8 pps
	Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.2	0.2	0.8	1.8	2.2	0.4 pps
	Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.8	0.4	0.8	1.9	1.8	-0.1 pps
	Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.0	0.9	0.3	0.1	-0.3	-0.4 pps

France	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	66581	66831	67063	67265	67456	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	40957	40911	40890	40856	40815	-0.1 %
(% of total population)	61.5	61.2	61.0	60.7	60.5	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	29182	29215	29238	29360	29246	-0.4 %
Male	15117	15100	15134	15151	15035	-0.8 %
Female	14065	14115	14104	14209	14211	0.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.3	71.4	71.5	71.9	71.7	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	37.2	37.0	36.9	37.5	36.9	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.5	87.5	87.4	87.6	87.4	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	52.6	53.8	54.9	56.1	56.9	0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.8	72.0	72.1	72.3	72.2	-0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	64.1	64.0	63.9	66.1	65.2	-0.9 pps
Male	75.3	75.3	75.6	75.7	75.3	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	40.4	39.9	40.3	41.1	39.8	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.5	92.4	92.6	92.4	91.9	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	55.1	56.2	56.9	58.4	59.4	1.0 pps
Female	67.3	67.6	67.6	68.1	68.2	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	33.9	34.2	33.5	33.9	34.0	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.7	82.8	82.5	83.1	83.1	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	50.3	51.5	53.1	53.9	54.6	0.7 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	63.8	64.2	64.7	65.3	65.5	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	28.0	28.0	28.7	29.7	29.7	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.4	79.7	80.0	80.5	80.9	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	48.7	49.9	51.3	52.3	53.0	0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	39.7	38.8	39.7	39.5	38.7	-0.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	65.9	66.1	66.2	66.7	66.3	-0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	81.4	82.4	82.9	82.8	83.3	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	64.8	65.2	65.8	66.2	66.4	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	50.8	51.4	52.0	55.1	55.4	0.4 pps
Male	67.1	67.5	68.4	68.9	68.8	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	30.0	29.9	31.0	32.2	31.5	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.7	84.3	85.0	85.2	85.2	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	50.7	51.7	52.8	54.3	55.4	1.1 pps
Female	60.6	60.9	61.2	61.9	62.4	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	26.0	26.0	26.4	27.2	27.8	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	75.3	75.4	75.2	76.1	76.8	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	46.9	48.2	50.0	50.5	50.9	0.4 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	26136.4	26255.3	26463.8	26686.3	26750.9	0.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.2	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.1	0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.2	-0.6 pps
Male	-0.2	0.5	1.1	0.6	-0.3	-0.8 pps
Female	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.1	0.8	-0.3 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.8	11.0	10.8	10.9	11.3	0.4 pps
Male	14.1	14.3	13.8	14.0	14.5	0.4 pps
Female	7.3	7.5	7.7	7.6	8.0	0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.0	16.2	16.8	16.6	16.3	-0.3 pps
Male	15.4	15.7	16.2	16.1	15.9	-0.2 pps
Female	16.6	16.6	17.4	17.2	16.7	-0.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.4	18.3	18.2	18.0	17.5	-0.5 pps
Male	7.4	7.6	7.7	7.8	7.5	-0.3 pps
Female	30.0	29.7	29.5	28.8	28.0	-0.8 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.0	8.1	7.8	7.5	6.7	-0.9 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	10.4	10.0	9.4	9.0	8.5	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	24.7	24.5	22.1	20.8	19.6	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	9.2	8.9	8.5	8.1	7.5	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	7.4	7.2	6.5	6.7	6.8	0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	17.8	18.3	17.3	16.3	15.8	-0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	10.8	10.7	10.1	9.7	9.2	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	6.4	5.8	5.3	5.5	5.1	-0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.8	9.5	8.8	8.5	8.0	-0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	20.7	19.7	18.6	16.7	15.0	-1.7 pps
Male	10.8	10.2	9.5	9.0	8.5	-0.5 pps
Female	9.9	9.8	9.4	9.1	8.4	-0.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	44.2	45.7	45.4	42.0	40.5	-1.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.8	39.1	39.0	39.0	38.8	-0.5 %
Male	39.9	40.2	39.9	40.0	39.8	-0.5 %
Female	37.3	37.5	37.6	37.5	37.4	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.3	-0.8	-0.4	0.3	-1.1	-1.4 pps
Building and construction	-2.5	-2.3	-0.7	1.9	2.4	0.5 pps
Services	0.8	1.5	2.6	2.3	1.7	-0.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.0	-0.6	-0.6	0.3	0.5	0.2 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.1	1.2	2.0	1.8	-0.1	-1.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.1	0.8	1.4	0.8	-1.4	-2.1 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.8	1.1	1.5	2.7	1.8	-0.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.5	1.3	2.0	2.0	1.9	-0.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.9	0.5	1.1	0.8	0.4	-0.4 pps

Croatia	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	4208	4172	4130	4091	4067	-0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	2786	2753	2720	2689	2658	-1.1 %
(% of total population)	66.2	66.0	65.9	65.7	65.4	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1865	1806	1807	1783	1768	-0.8 %
Male	998	968	973	953	951	-0.3 %
Female	867	838	835	829	818	-1.4 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	66.9	65.6	66.4	66.3	66.5	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	33.2	37.2	35.7	33.5	33.2	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.5	82.0	83.3	83.4	83.6	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	44.3	42.2	43.6	44.8	45.5	0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.0	65.7	66.5	66.3	66.5	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	44.4	37.8	43.7	67.5	69.9	2.4 pps
Male	71.6	70.3	71.5	70.9	71.5	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	38.2	41.9	40.9	37.9	38.8	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.9	85.2	86.7	86.4	86.9	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	54.9	50.7	52.8	53.4	54.2	0.8 pps
Female	62.3	60.9	61.4	61.7	61.5	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	28.0	32.3	30.2	28.8	27.3	-1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.1	78.8	79.9	80.3	80.2	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	34.4	34.2	35.1	36.7	37.5	0.7 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	56.0	56.9	58.9	60.6	62.1	1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	19.1	25.6	25.9	25.6	27.7	2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.3	72.4	74.9	77.0	78.3	1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	39.2	38.1	40.4	42.8	44.0	1.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	28.0	27.4	24.4	25.8	26.7	0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	58.0	59.5	62.6	63.9	65.5	1.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	78.7	79.7	81.5	81.5	81.8	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	56.0	57.0	59.0	60.6	62.1	1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	38.9	34.1	42.5	58.1	61.4	3.3 pps
Male	60.3	61.4	63.8	65.4	67.0	1.6 pps
Young (15-24)	22.4	28.9	29.8	30.5	33.2	2.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	75.4	76.3	78.7	80.4	81.7	1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	48.2	45.1	49.0	51.0	52.6	1.6 pps
Female	51.6	52.4	54.0	55.9	57.1	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	15.7	22.2	21.8	20.3	21.9	1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	69.3	68.5	71.1	73.5	74.9	1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	30.7	31.6	32.3	35.2	35.9	0.7 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1559.1	1566.6	1603.0	1630.2	1649.6	1.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.3	0.2	2.4	2.6	3.1	0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.1	0.5	2.3	1.7	1.2	-0.5 pps
Male	0.6	0.6	2.7	1.3	1.4	0.1 pps
Female	1.8	0.4	1.9	2.2	1.0	-1.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.9	11.8	10.5	10.2	10.5	0.3 pps
Male	16.4	14.9	12.6	12.2	13.3	1.1 pps
Female	8.9	8.1	7.9	7.8	7.2	-0.6 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	20.2	22.2	20.7	19.9	18.1	-1.8 pps
Male	20.4	21.9	20.6	19.4	16.9	-2.5 pps
Female	19.9	22.4	20.7	20.6	19.3	-1.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.0	5.6	4.8	5.2	4.8	-0.4 pps
Male	4.8	4.4	3.8	3.8	3.1	-0.7 pps
Female	7.3	7.1	6.0	6.8	6.7	-0.1 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.4	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	16.2	13.1	11.2	8.5	6.6	-1.9 pps
Young (15-24)	42.3	31.3	27.4	23.7	16.6	-7.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	14.4	11.6	10.1	7.7	6.3	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	11.6	9.6	7.5	4.4	3.4	-1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	22.5	18.1	20.5	12.1	9.6	-2.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	18.1	14.7	11.7	9.2	7.0	-2.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	9.4	7.9	7.2	6.1	5.4	-0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	16.4	13.3	11.3	8.5	6.7	-1.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.2	0.0	-14.2 pps
Male	15.6	12.5	10.6	7.7	6.2	-1.5 pps
Female	16.9	13.8	11.9	9.4	7.2	-2.2 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	63.1	50.6	41.0	40.2	35.9	-4.3 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.6	39.7	39.9	39.7	39.5	-0.5 %
Male	40.1	40.2	40.4	40.1	39.9	-0.5 %
Female	38.9	39.2	39.3	39.3	39.1	-0.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.8	-17.4	-6.2	-8.6	1.3	9.9 pps
Building and construction	5.2	2.7	-1.4	12.2	5.7	-6.5 pps
Services	2.8	3.2	5.5	1.3	0.4	-0.9 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.9	3.0	2.4	3.4	5.3	1.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.7	0.4	0.2	3.8	1.5	-2.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.6	0.5	-0.9	1.8	0.0	-1.8 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.7	-9.6	5.0	6.5	3.2	-3.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.7	-9.3	5.0	6.6	3.8	-2.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.2	3.2	1.0	0.2	-0.2	-0.4 pps

Italy		2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1	- **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	60731	60628	60537	60459	60339	-0.2 %
2	- **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	39035	38871	38726	38588	38428	-0.4 %
	(% of total population)	64.3	64.1	64.0	63.8	63.7	-0.1 pps
3	- **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	24997	25243	25340	25327	25254	-0.3 %
	Male	14382	14464	14467	14450	14367	-0.6 %
	Female	10615	10779	10873	10877	10887	0.1 %
4	- **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.0	64.9	65.4	65.6	65.7	0.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	26.2	26.6	26.2	26.1	26.1	0.0 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	76.8	77.5	77.9	77.9	78.1	0.2 pps
	Older (55-64)	51.1	53.4	55.4	57.0	57.4	0.5 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	63.3	64.3	64.8	65.0	65.1	0.1 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	70.3	70.4	70.8	71.2	70.9	-0.3 pps
	Male	74.1	74.8	75.0	75.1	75.0	-0.1 pps
	Young (15-24)	30.4	30.2	30.0	29.9	29.8	-0.1 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	87.7	88.2	88.5	88.4	88.5	0.1 pps
	Older (55-64)	63.3	65.9	67.0	68.6	68.6	0.0 pps
	Female	54.1	55.2	55.9	56.2	56.5	0.3 pps
	Young (15-24)	21.7	22.8	22.1	21.9	22.0	0.1 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	65.9	66.8	67.3	67.4	67.8	0.4 pps
	Older (55-64)	39.6	41.7	44.5	46.1	47.0	0.9 pps
5	- **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	56.3	57.2	58.0	58.5	59.0	0.5 pps
	Young (15-24)	15.6	16.6	17.1	17.7	18.5	0.8 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	68.2	68.8	69.4	69.8	70.5	0.6 pps
	Older (55-64)	48.2	50.3	52.2	53.7	54.3	0.6 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	42.2	42.9	43.4	43.8	44.0	0.2 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	62.9	63.7	64.1	64.3	64.9	0.6 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	76.3	77.5	78.2	78.7	78.9	0.2 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	56.0	57.0	57.7	58.2	58.8	0.6 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	58.9	59.5	60.6	61.2	61.0	-0.2 pps
	Male	65.5	66.5	67.1	67.6	68.0	0.4 pps
	Young (15-24)	18.6	19.2	20.1	20.8	21.5	0.7 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	78.6	79.3	79.9	80.3	80.8	0.6 pps
	Older (55-64)	59.3	61.7	62.8	64.2	64.6	0.4 pps
	Female	47.2	48.1	48.9	49.5	50.1	0.6 pps
	Young (15-24)	12.4	13.7	13.9	14.3	15.2	0.9 pps
	Prime age (25-54)	57.9	58.5	59.0	59.4	60.1	0.7 pps
	Older (55-64)	37.9	39.7	42.3	43.9	44.6	0.8 pps
6	- **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	21972.6	22241.1	22443.6	22585.7	22687.1	0.4 %
7	- **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.7	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.5	-0.4 pps
	Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.7	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.4	-0.2 pps
	Male	1.0	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.2	-0.4 pps
	Female	0.4	1.4	1.3	0.7	0.8	0.1 pps
8	- **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	21.9	21.5	20.8	20.6	20.4	-0.2 pps
	Male	26.2	25.6	25.2	24.8	24.4	-0.4 pps
	Female	15.9	15.8	14.9	14.9	14.9	0.1 pps
9	- **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.1	14.0	15.5	17.1	17.1	0.0 pps
	Male	13.6	13.5	15.1	16.6	16.8	0.2 pps
	Female	14.6	14.7	16.0	17.7	17.5	-0.2 pps
10	- **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.3	18.5	18.5	18.4	18.7	0.3 pps
	Male	8.0	8.2	8.3	8.0	8.2	0.2 pps
	Female	32.4	32.7	32.5	32.4	32.9	0.5 pps
11	**Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.0	11.9	11.6	12.1	12.3	0.2 pps
12	- **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	11.9	11.7	11.2	10.6	10.0	-0.6 pps
	Young (15-24)	40.3	37.8	34.7	32.2	29.2	-3.0 pps
	Prime age (25-49)	11.2	11.1	10.9	10.3	9.8	-0.5 pps
	Older (55-64)	5.5	5.7	5.8	5.7	5.4	-0.3 pps
	Low-skilled (15-64)	15.9	16.0	15.8	14.9	14.1	-0.8 pps
	Medium-skilled (15-64)	11.5	11.2	10.6	10.2	9.6	-0.6 pps
	High-skilled (15-64)	7.2	6.9	6.5	6.1	5.9	-0.2 pps
	Nationals (15-64)	11.6	11.4	11.1	10.4	9.7	-0.7 pps
	Non-nationals (15-64)	16.3	15.4	14.4	14.1	13.9	-0.2 pps
	Male	11.4	10.9	10.4	9.8	9.1	-0.7 pps
	Female	12.7	12.8	12.4	11.8	11.1	-0.7 pps
13	- **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	58.9	58.3	58.7	59.0	56.9	-2.1 pps
14	- **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.7	39.9	40.0	40.1	40.1	0.0 %
	Male	40.9	41.1	41.2	41.3	41.2	-0.2 %
	Female	37.5	37.7	37.7	37.8	37.9	0.3 %
15	- **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
	Agriculture	1.4	2.7	-1.7	1.8	0.2	-1.6 pps
	Building and construction	-1.2	-0.1	-0.9	0.0	-0.6	-0.6 pps
	Services	1.6	2.2	2.5	1.4	0.9	-0.6 pps
	Manufacturing industry	-0.9	0.9	0.6	1.1	0.3	-0.8 pps
16	- **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
	Compensation per employee	1.0	0.4	0.4	2.0	1.1	-0.9 pps
	Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.0	-1.0	-0.1	1.0	0.8	-0.2 pps
	Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-0.3	-0.8	0.6	1.4	2.6	1.2 pps
	Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.5	-0.1	0.4	0.8	2.0	1.2 pps
	Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.1	-0.1	0.5	0.0	-0.2	-0.2 pps

Cyprus	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	848	852	860	870	880	1.2 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	559	556	564	568	572	0.7 %
(% of total population)	65.9	65.2	65.6	65.3	65.0	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	413	408	417	426	435	2.1 %
Male	210	209	215	220	226	2.8 %
Female	202	199	202	207	209	1.3 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	73.9	73.4	73.9	75.0	76.0	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	37.8	37.3	36.6	39.2	38.8	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.9	86.8	87.5	87.2	88.3	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	57.4	59.0	60.0	64.7	65.2	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.9	73.0	73.7	75.3	75.9	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	78.3	75.2	74.8	73.6	76.8	3.2 pps
Male	78.8	78.7	78.8	79.9	81.5	1.5 pps
Young (15-24)	36.9	35.8	33.2	36.5	37.6	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.6	92.2	93.0	92.8	93.4	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	70.0	70.5	71.6	75.2	76.7	1.5 pps
Female	69.4	68.5	69.3	70.4	71.0	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	38.9	38.5	39.9	41.7	39.8	-1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.8	81.8	82.5	82.1	83.5	1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	45.3	47.8	48.9	54.7	54.2	-0.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	62.7	63.7	65.6	68.6	70.5	2.0 pps
Young (15-24)	25.4	26.3	27.5	31.3	32.4	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.5	76.6	78.4	80.4	82.6	2.2 pps
Older (55-64)	48.5	52.2	55.3	60.9	61.1	0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	40.7	42.6	41.7	44.2	46.2	2.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	62.4	62.6	66.4	69.8	70.9	1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	78.3	78.3	79.1	80.8	83.2	2.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	61.6	63.2	65.2	68.8	70.1	1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.5	65.7	67.1	67.5	72.2	4.7 pps
Male	66.7	68.6	70.0	73.3	76.2	2.9 pps
Young (15-24)	24.0	26.5	24.2	27.3	30.4	3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.6	81.7	83.6	86.2	88.4	2.2 pps
Older (55-64)	57.7	60.9	64.9	70.3	72.0	1.6 pps
Female	59.0	59.2	61.4	64.2	65.2	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	26.7	26.3	30.7	35.1	34.1	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.7	72.0	73.5	75.0	77.1	2.1 pps
Older (55-64)	39.4	43.7	46.2	52.0	50.8	-1.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	350.0	353.9	369.8	389.7	403.5	3.5 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.6	4.7	5.4	5.3	3.1	-2.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-1.4	1.1	4.5	5.4	3.5	-1.8 pps
Male	-0.9	2.4	4.6	5.7	4.9	-0.8 pps
Female	-1.9	-0.2	4.4	5.0	2.1	-2.9 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.0	12.2	11.4	11.7	12.0	0.3 pps
Male	15.9	15.5	13.7	14.1	14.4	0.3 pps
Female	9.9	8.6	8.9	9.1	9.3	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.4	16.5	15.3	13.8	13.7	-0.1 pps
Male	13.2	11.7	12.0	10.5	9.5	-1.0 pps
Female	23.4	21.3	18.6	17.2	18.2	1.0 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.0	13.4	12.2	10.8	10.2	-0.6 pps
Male	10.3	11.3	9.1	7.5	6.3	-1.2 pps
Female	15.8	15.6	15.6	14.4	14.6	0.2 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.0	9.3	8.2	6.9	5.8	-1.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	15.0	13.0	11.1	8.4	7.1	-1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	32.8	29.1	24.7	20.2	16.6	-3.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	13.1	11.7	10.4	7.8	6.4	-1.4 pps
Older (55-64)	15.6	11.5	7.8	5.8	6.3	0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	19.4	16.4	14.9	10.4	8.2	-2.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	16.7	14.5	11.6	8.9	8.1	-0.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	12.1	10.9	9.8	7.7	6.2	-1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	15.5	13.4	11.5	8.6	7.6	-1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	13.7	12.6	10.5	8.3	6.1	-2.2 pps
Male	15.1	12.7	10.9	8.1	6.3	-1.8 pps
Female	14.8	13.4	11.3	8.8	8.0	-0.8 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	45.6	44.5	40.7	31.6	29.1	-2.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.5	40.9	40.7	40.3	39.9	-1.0 %
Male	41.7	42.0	42.0	41.4	40.8	-1.4 %
Female	39.1	39.6	39.2	38.9	38.7	-0.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	2.2	3.5	-1.3	-2.0	1.4	3.4 pps
Building and construction	-0.5	8.0	15.0	13.9	7.2	-6.7 pps
Services	2.4	5.8	6.4	5.7	2.7	-3.0 pps
Manufacturing industry	2.7	5.3	5.9	6.3	3.4	-2.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-1.4	-0.9	1.7	1.3	1.8	0.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.8	-0.4	0.6	0.1	0.9	0.9 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	-2.1	-0.5	2.3	3.6	4.8	1.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	-2.0	-0.3	2.7	3.6	3.1	-0.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.6	1.7	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	0.0 pps

Latvia	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	1977	1959	1941	1926	1913	-0.7 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1275	1254	1230	1216	1204	-1.0 %
(% of total population)	64.5	64.0	63.3	63.1	62.9	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	965	957	946	945	931	-1.5 %
Male	486	479	475	475	468	-1.5 %
Female	479	478	471	470	463	-1.6 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.7	76.3	77.0	77.7	77.3	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	41.3	39.7	39.7	37.7	36.3	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.6	87.8	88.5	89.1	88.3	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	65.5	67.6	67.9	70.8	72.1	1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	76.1	76.9	77.5	78.2	77.7	-0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.3	72.8	73.2	74.3	74.1	-0.2 pps
Male	78.9	78.8	79.8	80.4	79.8	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	45.2	43.2	42.8	40.6	39.6	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.7	90.2	91.8	92.1	91.2	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	68.0	69.5	69.2	72.5	73.0	0.5 pps
Female	72.8	74.0	74.3	75.1	75.0	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	37.1	35.9	36.6	34.8	32.8	-1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.6	85.5	85.4	86.0	85.5	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	63.6	66.1	66.9	69.4	71.4	2.0 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.1	68.7	70.1	71.8	72.3	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	34.5	32.8	33.0	33.1	31.8	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.2	79.7	81.2	82.7	83.1	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	59.4	61.4	62.3	65.4	67.3	1.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	34.7	35.5	35.8	35.1	36.4	1.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.8	68.2	70.5	72.7	72.4	-0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	85.1	86.5	86.9	88.9	89.0	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.8	69.6	70.9	72.7	72.8	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	63.6	63.5	64.4	65.9	68.4	2.5 pps
Male	69.9	70.0	71.9	73.6	73.9	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	37.1	34.0	35.0	35.5	33.9	-1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.2	81.4	83.5	84.6	85.2	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	60.1	61.3	62.4	66.4	67.6	1.3 pps
Female	66.4	67.6	68.4	70.1	70.7	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	31.9	31.6	30.9	30.6	29.6	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.3	78.1	79.0	80.7	81.0	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	58.9	61.4	62.2	64.6	67.1	2.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	867.9	862.3	861.9	873.3	870.3	-0.3 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.4	-0.3	0.0	1.5	-0.1	-1.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.1	-0.6	0.0	1.3	-0.3	-1.7 pps
Male	1.0	-1.4	0.7	1.5	-0.1	-1.7 pps
Female	1.2	0.0	-0.8	1.2	-0.5	-1.7 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.6	11.8	11.8	11.0	11.0	0.0 pps
Male	14.7	14.7	13.9	12.9	12.7	-0.2 pps
Female	8.5	9.0	9.8	9.1	9.3	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.8	3.7	3.0	2.7	3.2	0.5 pps
Male	4.6	4.6	3.7	3.0	3.9	0.9 pps
Female	3.0	2.8	2.4	2.4	2.5	0.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.2	8.5	7.7	7.3	8.4	1.1 pps
Male	4.5	6.1	4.8	4.7	5.8	1.1 pps
Female	10.0	10.8	10.6	9.8	10.9	1.1 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.4	3.1	2.7	2.4	1.8	-0.6 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.9	9.6	8.7	7.4	6.3	-1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	16.3	17.3	17.0	12.2	12.4	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	9.5	9.3	8.3	7.2	5.9	-1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	9.3	9.2	8.3	7.6	6.6	-1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	22.3	21.1	19.2	16.8	14.1	-2.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	11.1	11.6	10.4	8.7	7.3	-1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.0	4.4	4.0	3.8	3.7	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.6	9.5	8.5	7.1	6.3	-0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	13.2	12.7	12.1	11.3	7.7	-3.6 pps
Male	11.1	10.9	9.8	8.4	7.2	-1.2 pps
Female	8.6	8.4	7.7	6.4	5.4	-1.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	45.5	41.5	37.4	42.0	37.9	-4.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.8	40.3	39.9	39.9	39.6	-0.8 %
Male	40.1	40.6	40.3	40.3	39.9	-1.0 %
Female	39.5	39.9	39.5	39.5	39.4	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	7.2	-3.4	-3.4	-0.1	0.8	0.9 pps
Building and construction	-1.8	-8.0	5.4	9.4	2.4	-7.0 pps
Services	2.3	-0.1	-0.2	1.7	-0.8	-2.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.3	0.4	0.0	1.1	0.6	-0.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	7.6	7.3	7.6	8.1	8.8	0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	7.6	6.4	4.5	4.0	6.3	2.2 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	7.3	6.8	6.5	12.1	7.2	-4.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	7.4	6.1	6.6	10.7	7.1	-3.6 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	2.6	2.7	3.3	2.5	2.1	-0.4 pps

Lithuania	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	2905	2868	2828	2802	2794	-0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1935	1899	1854	1828	1814	-0.7 %
(% of total population)	66.6	66.2	65.6	65.2	64.9	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1434	1433	1408	1413	1416	0.2 %
Male	710	709	697	704	707	0.4 %
Female	724	724	711	709	709	0.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.1	75.5	75.9	77.3	78.0	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	33.8	35.4	35.0	36.5	37.3	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.3	89.3	89.3	89.6	90.3	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	66.2	70.0	71.3	73.9	73.5	-0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	74.1	75.5	76.0	77.3	78.0	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.3	70.5	73.9	77.5	80.2	2.7 pps
Male	75.8	77.1	77.4	78.9	79.2	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	36.7	38.7	37.8	38.7	38.9	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.4	90.2	90.4	91.0	91.4	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	69.8	73.6	73.3	76.2	74.6	-1.6 pps
Female	72.5	73.9	74.6	75.8	76.9	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	30.8	31.8	32.2	34.1	35.7	1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.2	88.5	88.1	88.3	89.2	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	63.3	67.2	69.6	72.0	72.5	0.5 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	67.2	69.4	70.4	72.4	73.0	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	28.3	30.2	30.4	32.4	32.9	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.6	82.7	83.3	84.6	85.1	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	60.4	64.6	66.1	68.5	68.4	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	19.9	19.2	20.9	22.7	23.2	0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	66.1	67.6	68.8	71.0	70.6	-0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	88.7	90.4	90.0	90.5	90.8	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	67.2	69.4	70.4	72.4	73.0	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.5	64.8	71.2	73.2	76.7	3.6 pps
Male	68.0	70.0	70.6	73.3	73.5	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	30.9	32.5	32.3	34.1	33.4	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.8	82.6	83.1	85.2	85.4	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	62.4	66.9	67.1	70.5	69.4	-1.1 pps
Female	66.5	68.8	70.2	71.6	72.5	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	25.7	27.8	28.4	30.6	32.3	1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.4	82.9	83.6	84.1	84.8	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	58.8	62.8	65.2	67.0	67.5	0.6 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	1300.6	1317.7	1305.6	1323.7	1324.3	0.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.4	2.3	-0.7	1.4	0.5	-0.9 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.0	1.3	-0.9	1.4	0.0	-1.3 pps
Male	0.9	0.9	-1.1	2.9	0.2	-2.7 pps
Female	1.1	1.7	-0.7	0.0	-0.1	-0.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.8	11.1	10.9	10.8	10.9	0.1 pps
Male	13.4	14.3	13.8	13.4	14.2	0.8 pps
Female	8.4	8.1	8.1	8.3	7.7	-0.5 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.1	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.5	-0.1 pps
Male	2.4	2.2	2.1	1.7	1.5	-0.2 pps
Female	1.8	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.4	0.0 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.6	7.1	7.6	7.1	6.4	-0.7 pps
Male	5.5	5.4	5.7	5.2	4.7	-0.5 pps
Female	9.7	8.8	9.4	8.9	8.0	-0.9 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.4	2.2	2.3	1.7	1.5	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.1	7.9	7.1	6.2	6.3	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	16.3	14.5	13.3	11.1	11.9	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	8.6	7.4	6.6	5.6	5.8	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	8.7	7.7	7.3	7.2	6.9	-0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	27.3	25.9	21.6	18.5	18.8	0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	11.9	10.6	9.6	8.2	8.6	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.7	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.0	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.3	8.1	7.3	6.3	6.5	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	10.1	9.1	8.6	6.9	7.1	0.2 pps
Female	8.2	6.7	5.7	5.4	5.5	0.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	42.8	38.2	37.7	32.2	30.6	-1.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.6	39.7	39.3	39.4	39.5	0.3 %
Male	40.1	40.3	39.9	39.9	39.9	0.0 %
Female	39.1	39.1	38.7	38.9	39.0	0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	0.2	-10.3	-3.0	-6.3	-10.1	-3.8 pps
Building and construction	6.4	-1.4	-3.5	3.2	3.4	0.2 pps
Services	0.0	4.0	-0.6	1.7	1.8	0.1 pps
Manufacturing industry	2.1	3.4	-0.6	5.3	-0.2	-5.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	5.8	6.4	9.5	7.9	10.2	2.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	5.7	4.7	5.1	4.2	7.2	3.0 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	5.4	8.2	9.6	10.0	3.0	-7.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	5.9	8.2	8.8	9.7	38.2	28.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.6	0.2	5.0	2.5	3.9	1.4 pps

Luxembourg	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	569	584	597	609	622	2.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	386	396	407	415	423	1.9 %
(% of total population)	67.8	67.7	68.2	68.1	68.0	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	274	277	286	295	304	3.2 %
Male	149	151	153	158	165	4.4 %
Female	125	126	133	137	140	1.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	70.9	70.0	70.2	71.1	72.0	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	35.2	30.7	30.5	33.1	34.6	1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.7	87.2	88.0	88.4	88.5	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	40.4	41.7	41.0	41.9	45.0	3.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.8	66.1	65.7	66.1	66.9	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.1	73.8	74.4	75.8	76.9	1.1 pps
Male	76.0	75.1	74.0	74.7	76.4	1.7 pps
Young (15-24)	36.3	30.5	32.5	33.8	37.9	4.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.9	93.0	91.9	92.2	92.8	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	45.4	49.1	46.7	47.4	51.2	3.8 pps
Female	65.6	64.7	66.2	67.4	67.4	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	34.2	30.9	28.2	32.2	31.5	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.4	81.1	84.0	84.5	84.0	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	35.1	34.0	35.2	36.2	38.5	2.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	66.1	65.6	66.3	67.1	67.9	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	29.0	24.9	25.8	28.4	28.7	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.6	82.5	83.7	83.9	84.3	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	38.4	39.6	39.7	40.5	43.1	2.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	46.8	42.1	42.0	44.8	44.2	-0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	65.9	65.3	67.8	67.6	66.7	-1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.3	83.8	84.0	83.7	84.7	1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	63.9	63.3	63.2	63.2	64.1	1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	68.4	67.7	69.2	70.8	71.6	0.8 pps
Male	71.3	70.5	69.9	70.6	72.1	1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	29.5	24.3	26.8	28.5	31.2	2.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.3	88.5	87.4	88.0	88.6	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	42.9	46.4	45.3	45.5	48.8	3.3 pps
Female	60.8	60.4	62.6	63.4	63.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	28.9	25.5	24.7	28.4	26.2	-2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	75.7	76.4	79.8	79.7	79.9	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	33.5	32.4	34.0	35.0	37.1	2.1 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	255.2	259.4	269.9	278.4	287.3	3.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.6	3.0	3.4	3.7	3.6	-0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	5.1	1.6	4.0	3.1	3.2	0.0 pps
Male	4.3	1.6	1.8	3.1	4.2	1.0 pps
Female	6.1	1.7	6.7	3.1	2.2	-0.9 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.6	9.0	8.9	7.5	7.4	-0.1 pps
Male	9.4	10.3	9.7	8.4	8.4	0.0 pps
Female	7.5	7.5	8.0	6.4	6.4	-0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.2	9.0	9.1	9.8	9.2	-0.6 pps
Male	10.2	8.9	8.8	9.1	9.3	0.2 pps
Female	10.2	9.1	9.4	10.7	9.1	-1.6 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	18.5	19.2	19.6	17.8	17.0	-0.8 pps
Male	5.6	6.2	6.1	5.8	5.6	-0.2 pps
Female	34.2	35.1	35.3	31.8	30.4	-1.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.7	2.2	2.6	2.2	2.2	0.0 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.7	6.3	5.5	5.6	5.6	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	17.3	18.9	15.4	14.2	17.0	2.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.8	5.3	4.9	5.0	4.7	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	4.7	5.0	3.3	3.6	4.1	0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	10.7	9.9	8.9	8.4	8.9	0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.3	6.8	5.3	5.6	6.3	0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.7	4.0	3.9	4.3	3.6	-0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.3	4.2	3.9	4.4	4.1	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	8.9	8.2	6.9	6.6	6.9	0.3 pps
Male	6.1	6.0	5.6	5.3	5.7	0.4 pps
Female	7.4	6.6	5.5	5.9	5.5	-0.4 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	28.4	34.9	38.1	24.7	22.7	-2.0 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.3	41.1	40.8	40.6	40.5	-0.2 %
Male	42.2	42.0	41.6	41.3	41.2	-0.2 %
Female	39.7	39.5	39.5	39.4	39.4	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.7	-1.0	0.1	-0.5	-1.0	-0.5 pps
Building and construction	1.8	3.4	3.1	3.5	3.8	0.3 pps
Services	2.8	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.0	-0.2 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.8	1.1	0.2	1.4	0.3	-1.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.8	0.8	3.0	3.3	1.7	-1.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.6	0.0	1.2	0.7	-1.7	-2.4 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.5	1.1	2.6	2.0	2.4	0.4 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	0.6	1.2	4.0	2.2	2.4	0.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.7	1.5	-1.6	-0.6	-1.3	-0.7 pps

Hungary	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	9843	9814	9788	9776	9771	0.0 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6530	6478	6415	6370	6327	-0.7 %
(% of total population)	66.3	66.0	65.5	65.2	64.8	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4483	4543	4565	4582	4595	0.3 %
Male	2426	2465	2485	2500	2521	0.9 %
Female	2057	2079	2080	2083	2074	-0.4 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.6	70.1	71.2	71.9	72.6	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	31.0	32.3	32.4	32.3	32.2	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.8	86.1	86.9	87.0	87.0	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	48.1	52.1	53.6	55.8	58.0	2.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.6	70.1	71.2	72.0	72.6	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.6	68.4	62.5	64.1	72.4	8.3 pps
Male	75.3	76.9	78.2	79.1	80.0	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	34.4	36.1	36.5	37.1	37.3	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.0	92.4	93.3	93.3	93.4	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	57.8	62.4	64.5	67.1	70.6	3.6 pps
Female	62.2	63.5	64.2	64.9	65.3	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	27.5	28.2	28.2	27.2	26.9	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.6	79.8	80.4	80.7	80.6	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	39.9	43.5	44.3	46.3	47.2	0.9 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	63.9	66.5	68.2	69.2	70.1	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	25.7	28.1	29.0	29.0	28.5	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.6	82.2	83.7	84.1	84.4	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	45.3	49.8	51.7	54.4	56.7	2.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	33.9	36.6	38.5	39.4	39.4	0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.8	71.5	73.1	73.7	74.8	1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.1	84.4	84.3	85.1	85.2	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	63.9	66.5	68.2	69.3	70.1	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.5	65.3	60.6	60.3	69.2	8.9 pps
Male	70.3	73.0	75.2	76.3	77.3	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	28.1	31.5	32.9	33.4	32.8	-0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.8	88.2	90.1	90.4	90.8	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	54.4	59.7	62.5	65.5	69.0	3.5 pps
Female	57.8	60.2	61.3	62.3	63.0	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	23.1	24.6	24.8	24.3	24.0	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	74.4	76.2	77.2	77.7	78.0	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	37.7	41.5	42.4	44.9	46.2	1.2 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4175.8	4309.4	4373.4	4410.7	4436.0	0.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.2	3.7	1.9	2.3	1.3	-1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.6	3.2	1.5	0.9	0.6	-0.3 pps
Male	2.8	3.2	2.2	0.9	1.0	0.1 pps
Female	2.4	3.2	0.6	0.8	0.1	-0.7 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.2	10.0	9.7	9.7	10.1	0.4 pps
Male	12.6	12.1	11.5	11.6	12.2	0.6 pps
Female	7.4	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.5	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.4	9.7	8.8	7.3	6.6	-0.7 pps
Male	11.6	9.4	8.2	6.7	6.1	-0.6 pps
Female	11.1	10.2	9.5	7.9	7.1	-0.8 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.7	4.8	4.3	4.2	4.4	0.2 pps
Male	4.0	3.1	2.7	2.5	2.5	0.0 pps
Female	7.7	6.8	6.3	6.3	6.8	0.5 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.1	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.9	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.8	5.1	4.2	3.7	3.4	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	17.3	12.9	10.7	10.2	11.4	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.0	4.5	3.7	3.4	3.0	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	5.8	4.4	3.6	2.6	2.2	-0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	17.4	13.3	11.2	10.4	9.8	-0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.4	4.8	3.8	3.4	3.0	-0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.4	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.6	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.9	5.2	4.2	3.7	3.4	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	6.6	5.1	3.8	3.5	3.4	-0.1 pps
Female	7.0	5.1	4.6	4.0	3.5	-0.5 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	45.5	46.5	40.4	38.6	32.0	-6.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.3	39.8	39.3	38.8	39.1	0.8 %
Male	39.9	40.4	39.9	39.3	39.5	0.5 %
Female	38.6	39.1	38.6	38.1	38.6	1.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	0.7	7.9	2.8	-1.7	-1.7	0.0 pps
Building and construction	-1.4	7.0	8.8	11.1	5.4	-5.7 pps
Services	2.9	3.6	1.9	2.4	2.4	0.0 pps
Manufacturing industry	-0.5	4.6	4.3	2.6	0.7	-1.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.0	2.4	7.0	6.5	5.2	-1.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.8	1.1	2.9	1.6	0.4	-1.2 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	3.9	5.1	13.4	11.3	11.0	-0.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.9	5.1	13.4	11.3	11.0	-0.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.6	-1.5	2.3	3.1	3.3	0.2 pps

Malta	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	445	456	469	485	505	4.0 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	299	304	313	326	341	4.6 %
(% of total population)	67.0	66.8	66.9	67.1	67.5	0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	206	215	226	243	259	6.3 %
Male	125	129	135	144	153	6.7 %
Female	81	86	91	100	105	5.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.9	70.6	72.2	74.7	75.9	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	51.6	51.8	52.9	56.0	55.9	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.7	83.2	84.6	86.1	87.2	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	44.5	47.5	48.3	51.9	51.9	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.0	69.4	70.6	72.7	74.1	1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.5	78.3	80.7	83.2	82.3	-0.9 pps
Male	81.5	82.5	83.4	84.8	85.3	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	53.7	54.5	54.3	55.7	56.6	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	95.4	95.8	96.1	96.4	96.6	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	63.3	65.0	66.1	69.5	67.2	-2.3 pps
Female	55.5	58.0	60.2	63.8	65.5	1.7 pps
Young (15-24)	49.4	48.8	51.4	56.3	55.1	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	67.2	69.6	71.9	74.6	76.5	1.9 pps
Older (55-64)	25.8	30.0	30.5	34.0	36.1	2.1 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.1	67.2	69.2	71.9	73.2	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	45.6	46.2	47.3	50.9	50.7	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.2	80.0	81.8	83.6	84.5	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	42.2	45.8	47.2	50.1	51.1	1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	53.1	55.6	56.4	59.7	63.5	3.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	69.9	70.8	73.0	74.0	73.6	-0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	88.1	89.0	90.2	90.7	87.4	-3.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	64.2	66.0	67.9	70.3	71.8	1.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	72.1	75.5	76.4	78.8	77.7	-1.2 pps
Male	77.1	78.9	80.1	81.5	82.4	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	46.6	48.7	48.6	49.3	50.9	1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.5	92.3	93.1	93.5	93.9	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	59.6	62.7	64.5	67.2	66.2	-1.0 pps
Female	52.5	55.0	57.6	61.5	62.8	1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	44.5	43.5	45.9	52.7	50.8	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	64.0	66.7	69.4	72.5	73.7	1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	25.2	29.0	29.8	32.7	35.4	2.8 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	194.4	204.6	216.8	234.4	249.3	6.4 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	4.1	4.3	8.1	6.0	5.8	-0.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	4.1	5.2	6.0	8.1	6.4	-1.8 pps
Male	4.3	4.4	5.0	6.9	7.2	0.3 pps
Female	3.7	6.5	7.4	10.0	5.2	-4.8 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.3	13.6	14.4	13.7	15.0	1.3 pps
Male	17.4	18.7	18.6	17.6	18.9	1.3 pps
Female	6.9	5.9	8.1	8.0	9.2	1.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.5	7.6	6.0	7.9	9.1	1.2 pps
Male	6.5	6.6	5.3	7.3	7.8	0.5 pps
Female	9.0	8.9	6.9	8.6	10.8	2.2 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.3	13.9	13.7	13.2	12.2	-1.0 pps
Male	6.4	6.0	6.3	6.5	5.9	-0.6 pps
Female	26.5	25.9	24.6	22.8	21.4	-1.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.3	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.0	-0.4 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.4	4.7	4.0	3.7	3.6	-0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	11.6	10.7	10.6	9.1	9.3	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.3	3.9	3.2	2.9	3.2	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	5.2	3.4	2.5	3.3	1.5	-1.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	8.8	7.5	6.2	5.5	4.8	-0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	3.6	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.4	-0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	2.0	1.7	2.0	1.9	2.6	0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.6	4.9	3.8	3.3	3.0	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	4.6	3.6	5.3	5.2	5.7	0.5 pps
Male	5.4	4.4	3.8	3.8	3.4	-0.4 pps
Female	5.4	5.2	4.3	3.5	4.0	0.5 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	50.2	50.0	50.8	48.1	25.2	-22.9 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.2	40.7	40.0	40.3	41.2	2.2 %
Male	41.3	41.7	41.0	41.2	42.0	1.9 %
Female	38.0	38.6	38.2	38.5	39.7	3.1 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-2.2	2.1	3.2	3.3	2.6	-0.7 pps
Building and construction	4.8	0.9	4.5	4.9	14.0	9.1 pps
Services	4.9	7.1	10.0	7.6	8.3	0.7 pps
Manufacturing industry	2.4	-1.8	3.2	1.8	-1.0	-2.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	5.9	6.0	0.1	3.7	2.8	-0.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.6	4.5	-2.1	1.6	0.6	-1.0 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	8.1	0.8	2.6	2.6	-0.1	-2.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	8.1	0.8	2.5	2.7	0.0	-2.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	5.3	-0.4	-0.1	-0.8	-0.8	0.0 pps

Netherlands	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	16940	17030	17131	17232	17345	0.7 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	10950	10988	11044	11070	11116	0.4 %
(% of total population)	64.6	64.5	64.5	64.2	64.1	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8719	8754	8805	8884	8993	1.2 %
Male	4641	4645	4659	4699	4745	1.0 %
Female	4078	4109	4146	4185	4247	1.5 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	79.6	79.7	79.7	80.3	80.9	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	68.5	68.2	68.3	68.9	70.0	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.1	86.9	86.7	87.0	87.4	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	67.1	68.4	69.5	70.8	72.0	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	80.2	80.3	80.4	81.0	81.6	0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	69.0	68.8	68.4	68.7	70.7	2.0 pps
Male	84.6	84.4	84.2	84.7	85.1	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	67.6	67.2	67.0	68.0	69.7	1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.1	91.7	91.3	91.7	91.5	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	77.6	78.2	79.0	80.0	81.0	1.0 pps
Female	74.7	75.0	75.2	75.8	76.7	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	69.4	69.2	69.7	69.8	70.3	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.1	82.2	82.0	82.4	83.3	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	56.7	58.6	60.2	61.8	63.1	1.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	74.1	74.8	75.8	77.2	78.2	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	60.8	60.8	62.3	63.9	65.3	1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.2	82.9	83.5	84.6	85.2	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	61.7	63.5	65.7	67.7	69.7	2.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	57.0	57.8	58.8	60.4	61.3	0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	76.5	77.4	78.0	79.1	80.2	1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	87.4	87.4	87.8	88.5	88.6	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	74.9	75.6	76.7	78.1	79.1	1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	59.8	61.5	62.8	63.8	66.1	2.2 pps
Male	79.0	79.6	80.4	81.6	82.2	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	59.9	59.6	61.0	62.8	64.7	1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.5	88.1	88.4	89.2	89.3	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	71.1	72.8	74.8	76.6	78.3	1.7 pps
Female	69.2	70.1	71.3	72.8	74.1	1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	61.7	62.1	63.6	65.2	66.0	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.0	77.7	78.6	79.9	81.1	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	52.4	54.2	56.6	58.8	61.2	2.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8115.5	8223.4	8376.4	8543.3	8689.2	1.7 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.0	1.5	2.4	2.6	1.9	-0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.1	1.3	1.9	2.0	1.7	-0.3 pps
Male	0.7	1.1	1.5	1.7	1.4	-0.3 pps
Female	1.5	1.6	2.3	2.3	2.1	-0.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.3	15.5	15.5	15.4	15.4	0.0 pps
Male	18.3	18.6	18.4	18.4	18.4	0.0 pps
Female	12.0	12.1	12.2	12.0	12.0	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	20.0	20.6	21.7	21.4	20.2	-1.2 pps
Male	18.8	19.3	20.4	19.9	19.0	-0.9 pps
Female	21.2	22.0	23.1	23.0	21.4	-1.6 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	50.0	49.7	49.8	50.1	50.2	0.1 pps
Male	26.5	26.2	27.0	27.5	27.9	0.4 pps
Female	76.9	76.4	75.8	75.6	75.2	-0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.0	4.9	4.1	3.5	2.7	-0.8 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.9	6.0	4.9	3.8	3.4	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	11.3	10.8	8.9	7.2	6.7	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.6	4.6	3.7	2.8	2.6	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	8.1	7.2	5.5	4.5	3.2	-1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	11.3	10.0	8.5	6.7	5.9	-0.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	7.0	6.1	4.8	3.6	3.2	-0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.8	3.5	2.9	2.4	2.2	-0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.6	5.8	4.7	3.6	3.1	-0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	13.3	10.6	8.2	7.2	6.6	-0.6 pps
Male	6.5	5.6	4.5	3.7	3.4	-0.3 pps
Female	7.3	6.5	5.3	4.0	3.4	-0.6 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	43.2	42.4	40.0	36.8	30.1	-6.7 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.5	41.7	41.5	41.3	41.2	-0.2 %
Male	42.1	42.3	42.0	41.8	41.7	-0.2 %
Female	39.6	39.9	39.8	39.5	39.4	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.5	1.0	1.0	1.5	0.5	-1.0 pps
Building and construction	-0.9	0.7	3.3	3.2	3.3	0.1 pps
Services	2.4	2.5	3.0	3.0	1.4	-1.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.1	0.5	0.8	2.1	2.2	0.1 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	-0.3	1.6	1.0	2.0	2.9	0.9 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.0	0.8	-0.3	-0.6	-0.1	0.5 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	0.0	0.5	1.4	2.3	2.2	-0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.9	0.6	1.6	2.1	1.9	-0.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.0	0.6	0.5	-0.2	-0.2	0.0 pps

Austria	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	8630	8740	8795	8838	8878	0.5 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	5721	5790	5800	5809	5819	0.2 %
(% of total population)	66.3	66.3	65.9	65.7	65.5	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4319	4412	4433	4461	4484	0.5 %
Male	2287	2340	2350	2369	2378	0.4 %
Female	2032	2072	2083	2092	2106	0.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.5	76.2	76.4	76.8	77.1	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	57.4	57.5	56.1	56.6	56.4	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.0	88.4	88.7	88.5	89.0	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	48.6	51.7	53.6	56.2	56.4	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	76.2	77.2	77.3	77.4	77.8	0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.5	71.3	72.4	74.0	73.5	-0.6 pps
Male	80.1	80.7	81.0	81.6	81.8	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	60.7	60.2	58.4	59.5	60.3	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.6	91.8	92.3	92.1	92.4	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	57.4	61.2	63.0	66.0	65.6	-0.4 pps
Female	70.9	71.7	71.8	72.0	72.3	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	54.1	54.6	53.7	53.8	52.5	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.4	84.9	85.0	84.8	85.7	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	40.2	42.7	44.5	46.6	47.4	0.8 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.1	71.5	72.2	73.0	73.6	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	51.4	51.0	50.6	51.3	51.6	0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.5	83.6	84.1	84.5	85.3	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	46.3	49.2	51.3	54.0	54.5	0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	47.2	47.3	46.9	48.2	48.2	0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	73.5	73.8	74.5	75.4	76.1	0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.3	84.0	84.6	84.5	84.7	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.5	73.3	73.8	74.4	75.0	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	63.3	62.6	64.5	66.7	66.8	0.1 pps
Male	75.1	75.4	76.2	77.4	78.0	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	54.0	52.9	52.1	53.9	54.8	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.6	86.6	87.2	87.8	88.5	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	54.1	57.6	60.1	63.5	63.1	-0.3 pps
Female	67.1	67.7	68.2	68.6	69.2	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	48.7	49.0	49.0	48.7	48.4	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.3	80.6	81.0	81.3	82.1	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	38.8	41.1	42.8	44.8	46.0	1.2 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4067.6	4142.7	4185.3	4241.1	4280.2	0.9 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.6	1.3	1.6	1.7	1.1	-0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	0.8	1.8	1.0	1.3	0.9	-0.4 pps
Male	0.9	2.0	1.0	1.8	0.8	-0.9 pps
Female	0.8	1.7	1.1	0.8	1.0	0.2 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	11.0	10.8	10.6	10.4	10.6	0.3 pps
Male	13.3	13.2	12.9	12.6	12.9	0.4 pps
Female	8.4	8.1	7.9	7.9	8.1	0.2 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.1	9.0	9.2	9.1	8.7	-0.4 pps
Male	9.1	8.9	9.2	8.8	8.5	-0.3 pps
Female	9.1	9.1	9.2	9.4	8.9	-0.5 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	27.3	27.8	27.9	27.3	27.2	-0.1 pps
Male	9.8	10.5	10.6	10.0	9.5	-0.5 pps
Female	46.8	47.1	47.2	46.9	47.1	0.2 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	3.4	3.6	3.5	2.9	2.4	-0.4 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.7	6.0	5.5	4.9	4.5	-0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	10.6	11.2	9.8	9.4	8.5	-0.9 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.2	5.4	5.1	4.4	4.2	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	4.7	5.0	4.2	3.9	3.4	-0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	11.5	13.0	13.3	11.6	10.8	-0.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	5.5	5.8	5.1	4.3	4.0	-0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.9	3.6	3.2	3.3	3.0	-0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	4.9	5.0	4.5	3.9	3.6	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	11.4	12.1	10.9	10.0	9.1	-0.9 pps
Male	6.1	6.5	5.9	5.0	4.6	-0.4 pps
Female	5.3	5.6	5.0	4.7	4.4	-0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	29.2	32.2	33.3	28.9	25.1	-3.8 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.9	41.0	40.7	40.8	40.7	-0.2 %
Male	41.5	41.7	41.4	41.4	41.4	0.0 %
Female	39.5	39.5	39.4	39.4	39.4	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-6.3	-2.7	-2.4	-6.3	-4.7	1.6 pps
Building and construction	-0.3	1.3	2.4	2.6	2.9	0.3 pps
Services	0.6	1.4	1.9	2.2	1.2	-1.0 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.5	0.5	1.3	2.6	1.3	-1.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.9	2.4	1.6	2.9	2.8	-0.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.3	0.5	0.8	1.2	1.1	-0.1 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	3.2	1.0	3.5	3.3	2.7	-0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.3	1.1	2.7	2.9	2.7	-0.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.3	-0.6 pps

Poland	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	38455	38427	38422	38413	38390	-0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	25128	24649	24317	23941	23596	-1.4 %
(% of total population)	65.3	64.1	63.3	62.3	61.5	-0.9 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	17112	16961	16919	16790	16650	-0.8 %
Male	9389	9315	9304	9213	9167	-0.5 %
Female	7723	7646	7616	7577	7483	-1.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.1	68.8	69.6	70.1	70.6	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	32.8	34.5	34.8	35.1	35.2	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.1	84.9	84.9	85.2	85.3	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	46.9	48.3	50.1	50.3	50.7	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	68.1	68.8	69.5	70.1	70.5	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.8	67.9	77.6	78.3	80.5	2.1 pps
Male	74.8	75.7	76.6	77.0	77.7	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	38.4	39.8	39.7	39.2	39.2	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.6	90.8	91.1	91.0	91.5	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	57.5	58.6	60.8	61.9	62.6	0.8 pps
Female	61.4	62.0	62.6	63.3	63.4	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	26.9	28.9	29.7	30.7	31.0	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.6	79.0	78.7	79.3	79.0	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	37.3	39.0	40.5	39.9	40.0	0.0 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	62.9	64.5	66.1	67.4	68.2	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	26.0	28.4	29.6	31.0	31.7	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.5	80.3	81.4	82.4	82.9	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	44.3	46.2	48.3	48.9	49.5	0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	23.3	23.0	23.3	23.6	24.7	1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	64.0	65.6	67.0	68.1	68.6	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	85.0	85.8	86.8	87.6	87.9	0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	62.9	64.5	66.1	67.4	68.2	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	62.4	60.5	71.2	74.1	75.6	1.5 pps
Male	69.2	71.0	72.8	74.0	75.3	1.3 pps
Young (15-24)	30.5	32.9	33.9	34.7	35.4	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	84.9	86.1	87.3	88.1	89.2	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	54.2	55.7	58.3	59.8	61.0	1.2 pps
Female	56.6	58.1	59.5	60.8	61.1	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	21.3	23.7	25.2	27.0	27.8	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	73.9	74.5	75.3	76.5	76.4	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	35.5	37.6	39.3	39.1	39.2	0.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	15811.6	15901.8	16078.8	16133.4	16094.1	-0.2 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.5	0.8	1.3	0.5	-0.2	-0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.4	0.6	1.1	0.3	-0.2	-0.6 pps
Male	1.0	0.5	1.2	0.1	0.4	0.2 pps
Female	2.0	0.6	1.0	0.6	-1.0	-1.6 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	17.9	17.7	17.4	17.4	17.4	0.0 pps
Male	21.8	21.7	21.8	21.6	21.6	0.0 pps
Female	13.1	12.7	12.0	12.3	12.3	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	28.0	27.5	26.1	24.3	21.7	-2.6 pps
Male	28.0	27.3	25.6	23.5	20.6	-2.9 pps
Female	27.9	27.6	26.6	25.1	22.9	-2.2 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.8	6.4	6.6	6.4	6.1	-0.3 pps
Male	4.2	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.5	-0.3 pps
Female	9.9	9.7	10.0	9.7	9.3	-0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	2.1	1.6	1.4	1.0	0.9	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.5	6.2	4.9	3.9	3.3	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	20.8	17.7	14.8	11.7	9.9	-1.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.6	5.4	4.2	3.4	2.9	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	5.4	4.4	3.7	2.8	2.4	-0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	17.3	14.9	12.6	10.3	8.6	-1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.4	7.0	5.7	4.5	3.7	-0.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.0	3.3	2.5	2.0	2.0	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.6	6.2	5.0	3.9	3.3	-0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	11.0	8.2	5.4	6.0	0.6 pps
Male	7.3	6.1	4.9	3.9	3.0	-0.9 pps
Female	7.7	6.2	4.9	3.9	3.6	-0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	39.3	34.9	31.0	26.9	21.5	-5.4 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.1	41.2	40.8	40.2	40.1	-0.2 %
Male	42.3	42.3	41.9	41.2	41.1	-0.2 %
Female	39.4	39.6	39.3	38.8	38.7	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	2.1	-7.6	-2.4	-5.6	-3.8	1.8 pps
Building and construction	1.9	1.3	-0.2	2.5	4.0	1.5 pps
Services	1.9	1.7	1.6	0.9	-0.6	-1.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	3.0	5.4	4.4	1.5	-3.2	-4.7 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.1	4.8	5.8	8.1	8.5	0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	1.1	4.4	3.9	6.8	5.2	-1.6 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	3.8	4.4	6.6	7.0	6.1	-0.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.8	4.4	6.6	7.0	6.1	-0.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	2.7	2.3	3.4	4.8	4.8	0.0 pps

Portugal	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	10358	10326	10300	10284	10286	0.0 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6743	6700	6659	6623	6603	-0.3 %
(% of total population)	65.1	64.9	64.6	64.4	64.2	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4949	4940	4972	4976	4987	0.2 %
Male	2501	2498	2506	2499	2495	-0.2 %
Female	2448	2441	2466	2477	2493	0.6 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	73.4	73.7	74.7	75.1	75.5	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	33.5	33.2	34.0	34.2	34.3	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.8	89.1	89.6	89.8	90.3	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	57.0	58.5	61.5	63.4	64.4	1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	73.3	73.6	74.6	75.1	75.4	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	76.7	78.7	79.3	77.1	80.0	2.9 pps
Male	76.7	77.2	77.9	78.1	78.3	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	34.2	35.0	35.6	36.6	36.0	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.7	91.9	92.3	92.6	92.7	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	65.0	66.9	69.2	69.0	70.9	1.9 pps
Female	70.3	70.5	71.6	72.4	72.9	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	32.8	31.3	32.3	31.7	32.4	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.0	86.6	87.0	87.3	88.0	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	49.9	51.0	54.6	58.4	58.8	0.4 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	63.9	65.2	67.8	69.7	70.5	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	22.8	23.9	25.9	27.2	28.0	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.8	80.2	82.5	84.3	85.2	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	49.9	52.1	56.2	59.2	60.4	1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	56.3	57.0	59.8	61.3	61.2	0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	66.9	68.3	70.5	72.0	73.3	1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	80.4	81.8	83.5	85.5	85.5	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	64.0	65.3	67.8	69.7	70.5	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	61.4	65.1	68.3	68.3	70.7	2.4 pps
Male	66.9	68.3	71.1	72.7	73.6	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	24.1	25.5	27.6	29.3	30.4	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	81.8	83.0	85.6	87.5	88.1	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	56.0	58.5	63.0	64.5	66.5	2.0 pps
Female	61.1	62.4	64.8	66.9	67.6	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	21.5	22.2	24.1	25.1	25.5	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.1	77.6	79.7	81.4	82.5	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	44.5	46.3	50.2	54.6	55.1	0.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4309.0	4371.2	4515.4	4615.0	4652.9	0.8 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.4	1.6	3.3	2.3	0.8	-1.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.3	1.4	3.3	2.2	0.8	-1.4 pps
Male	0.8	1.3	3.4	1.8	0.7	-1.1 pps
Female	1.7	1.6	3.2	2.6	1.0	-1.7 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.5	13.9	13.4	13.1	13.6	0.5 pps
Male	17.8	17.1	16.6	16.2	16.6	0.4 pps
Female	11.1	10.7	10.1	9.8	10.5	0.7 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	22.0	22.3	22.0	22.0	20.8	-1.2 pps
Male	22.4	22.5	22.3	22.0	20.6	-1.4 pps
Female	21.5	22.1	21.7	22.0	21.1	-0.9 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	9.8	9.5	8.9	8.1	8.1	0.0 pps
Male	7.1	6.8	6.1	5.7	5.4	-0.3 pps
Female	12.5	12.1	11.7	10.5	10.9	0.4 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.9	4.6	4.2	3.7	3.5	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	12.6	11.2	9.0	7.1	6.5	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	32.0	28.0	23.9	20.3	18.3	-2.0 pps
Prime age (25-49)	11.2	10.0	7.9	6.1	5.7	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	12.5	11.0	8.5	6.5	6.2	-0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	14.2	12.7	10.2	7.7	7.2	-0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	14.0	12.3	10.0	8.3	7.3	-1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	9.3	8.4	6.6	5.4	5.4	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	12.7	11.4	9.1	7.1	6.5	-0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	20.0	17.3	13.8	11.4	11.7	0.3 pps
Male	12.4	11.1	8.5	6.7	5.9	-0.8 pps
Female	12.8	11.3	9.4	7.5	7.2	-0.3 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	57.2	55.2	49.6	43.4	42.2	-1.2 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.4	40.7	40.6	40.4	40.2	-0.5 %
Male	42.4	41.7	41.6	41.5	41.3	-0.5 %
Female	40.3	39.6	39.4	39.3	39.0	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-5.7	-4.3	-1.5	-2.6	-7.5	-4.9 pps
Building and construction	1.3	1.2	4.6	4.6	0.9	-3.7 pps
Services	3.3	3.5	5.2	3.8	1.8	-2.0 pps
Manufacturing industry	3.1	1.7	3.6	3.4	0.1	-3.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.3	1.2	2.3	3.9	3.5	-0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.7	-0.5	0.8	2.0	1.8	-0.3 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.9	1.1	-0.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.3	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.0	-0.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.5	1.4	0.9 pps

Romania	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	19822	19706	19593	19477	19370	-0.5 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	13404	13263	13095	12930	12774	-1.2 %
(% of total population)	67.6	67.3	66.8	66.4	65.9	-0.4 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8858	8696	8812	8761	8761	0.0 %
Male	5099	5006	5034	5036	5049	0.3 %
Female	3759	3690	3778	3725	3712	-0.4 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	66.1	65.6	67.3	67.8	68.6	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	31.3	28.0	29.9	29.5	29.6	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.5	81.9	83.4	83.6	84.1	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	42.7	44.2	46.0	47.5	48.9	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.1	65.6	67.3	67.8	68.6	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	74.5	72.1	0.0	-72.1 pps
Male	75.3	74.8	76.2	76.9	78.0	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	37.0	33.9	34.6	34.6	35.7	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.6	91.0	92.2	92.5	93.1	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	53.8	55.1	57.4	59.7	61.6	2.0 pps
Female	56.7	56.2	58.2	58.3	58.9	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	25.2	21.8	25.0	24.2	23.3	-0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.9	72.4	74.2	74.2	74.6	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	32.8	34.4	35.7	36.4	37.3	0.9 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	61.4	61.6	63.9	64.8	65.8	1.0 pps
Young (15-24)	24.5	22.3	24.5	24.7	24.7	0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.4	77.6	79.9	80.6	81.4	0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	41.1	42.8	44.5	46.3	47.8	1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	42.6	41.0	42.5	42.6	44.4	1.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	64.9	65.2	67.5	68.6	68.6	0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	85.3	86.2	87.9	88.4	89.2	0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	61.4	61.6	63.9	64.8	65.8	1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	68.2	68.6	0.0	-68.6 pps
Male	69.5	69.7	71.8	73.2	74.6	1.4 pps
Young (15-24)	29.4	27.2	28.4	29.0	29.8	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.2	85.5	87.6	88.7	89.7	1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	51.2	53.0	55.3	57.9	60.1	2.2 pps
Female	53.2	53.3	55.8	56.2	56.8	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	19.3	17.1	20.4	20.3	19.3	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	69.2	69.2	71.8	72.1	72.7	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	32.1	33.6	34.9	35.7	36.5	0.8 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	8234.8	8166.1	8363.2	8381.8	8407.9	0.3 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-1.3	-1.1	2.4	0.1	0.0	-0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.2	-0.8	2.4	0.2	0.3	0.1 pps
Male	0.6	-0.8	1.6	1.0	0.7	-0.3 pps
Female	-1.3	-0.9	3.5	-0.8	-0.2	0.6 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	17.6	16.5	16.4	15.5	15.2	-0.3 pps
Male	22.5	21.2	21.1	19.9	19.6	-0.3 pps
Female	11.1	10.2	10.1	9.8	9.4	-0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.4	0.3 pps
Male	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.7	0.5 pps
Female	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	0.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.8	7.4	6.8	6.5	6.1	-0.4 pps
Male	8.5	7.3	6.7	6.2	6.0	-0.2 pps
Female	9.2	7.7	6.9	6.9	6.2	-0.7 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.2	4.3	3.8	3.5	3.4	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	6.8	5.9	4.9	4.2	3.9	-0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	21.7	20.6	18.3	16.2	16.8	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-49)	6.2	5.3	4.2	3.6	3.2	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	3.7	3.2	3.2	2.5	2.4	-0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	9.1	8.6	7.6	6.6	7.0	0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	7.3	6.3	5.2	4.4	4.0	-0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.1	3.1	2.4	2.1	1.6	-0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	7.0	6.1	5.1	4.3	4.0	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	7.5	6.6	5.6	4.7	4.3	-0.4 pps
Female	5.8	5.0	4.0	3.5	3.4	-0.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	43.9	50.0	41.5	44.1	42.5	-1.6 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.1	40.2	40.1	40.0	40.1	0.2 %
Male	40.5	40.6	40.5	40.4	40.5	0.2 %
Female	39.5	39.6	39.6	39.5	39.6	0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-11.0	-10.7	0.3	-0.1	-4.6	-4.5 pps
Building and construction	-0.3	6.6	3.2	-2.7	5.5	8.2 pps
Services	4.5	2.4	3.2	2.6	1.8	-0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.8	2.9	3.5	-0.5	-2.1	-1.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.8	15.5	14.8	12.9	9.5	-3.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-1.4	12.7	9.7	6.4	2.4	-4.0 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	5.0	10.4	14.3	12.4	12.2	-0.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	7.6	10.5	14.2	33.1	12.3	-20.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	4.3	5.9	4.8	4.4	4.2	-0.2 pps

Slovenia	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	2063	2065	2066	2072	2089	0.8 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	1382	1371	1362	1352	1350	-0.2 %
(% of total population)	67.0	66.4	65.9	65.3	64.6	-0.6 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	992	982	1011	1015	1015	0.1 %
Male	536	524	538	544	546	0.3 %
Female	456	458	473	470	469	-0.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	71.8	71.6	74.2	75.0	75.2	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	35.3	33.7	39.1	38.5	36.2	-2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.8	90.5	91.9	92.0	92.4	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	39.7	41.2	45.6	49.5	50.9	1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	71.5	71.4	74.1	75.1	75.2	0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	77.6	76.7	76.1	74.4	75.6	1.2 pps
Male	75.4	74.5	77.1	78.2	78.0	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	38.9	36.9	42.9	42.4	39.1	-3.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	92.9	92.0	93.4	94.0	94.4	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	46.3	47.1	51.7	55.1	55.8	0.7 pps
Female	67.9	68.6	71.2	71.7	72.2	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	31.7	30.5	34.9	34.4	32.9	-1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.6	88.9	90.2	89.9	90.3	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	32.9	35.2	39.5	43.9	46.0	2.1 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.2	65.8	69.3	71.1	71.8	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	29.6	28.6	34.7	35.1	33.3	-1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.9	83.5	86.1	87.5	88.6	1.1 pps
Older (55-64)	36.6	38.5	42.7	47.0	48.6	1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	35.7	32.3	35.4	36.3	34.4	-1.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	65.9	67.4	70.7	72.8	73.2	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	83.1	84.0	86.2	88.0	89.5	1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.2	65.8	69.3	71.3	71.9	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	66.3	66.4	69.1	68.8	70.3	1.5 pps
Male	69.2	68.9	72.5	74.5	74.8	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	32.0	31.1	38.6	38.8	36.2	-2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.1	85.6	88.5	90.1	90.9	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	42.6	43.6	48.0	52.2	53.2	1.0 pps
Female	61.0	62.6	65.8	67.5	68.6	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	27.0	26.0	30.4	31.0	29.9	-1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.5	81.2	83.5	84.8	86.0	1.3 pps
Older (55-64)	30.5	33.4	37.4	41.9	44.0	2.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	901.6	902.5	943.5	961.9	969.7	0.8 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.3	1.8	3.0	3.2	2.5	-0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.0	0.1	4.5	2.0	0.8	-1.1 pps
Male	1.2	-1.6	4.6	2.5	1.0	-1.5 pps
Female	0.8	2.1	4.5	1.3	0.6	-0.7 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.1	11.5	11.4	12.1	11.8	-0.3 pps
Male	15.7	15.1	14.3	15.4	15.2	-0.2 pps
Female	7.8	7.4	8.1	8.3	7.8	-0.5 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	17.8	16.9	17.6	15.7	13.2	-2.5 pps
Male	17.0	15.9	16.4	14.4	11.7	-2.7 pps
Female	18.7	18.0	18.9	17.1	14.9	-2.2 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.1	9.3	10.3	9.7	8.4	-1.3 pps
Male	7.0	6.0	6.7	5.9	4.8	-1.1 pps
Female	13.7	13.1	14.5	14.3	12.7	-1.6 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.6	0.4	-0.2 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.0	8.0	6.6	5.1	4.5	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	16.3	15.2	11.2	8.8	8.1	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-49)	8.7	7.7	6.3	4.9	4.2	-0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	7.8	6.5	6.4	4.9	4.5	-0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	14.6	15.1	11.5	9.1	9.9	0.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	10.0	8.1	6.8	5.6	4.7	-0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.8	6.2	5.3	3.7	3.0	-0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64)	8.9	7.9	6.5	5.1	4.4	-0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	14.6	13.4	9.2	7.6	7.1	-0.5 pps
Male	8.1	7.5	5.8	4.6	4.0	-0.6 pps
Female	10.1	8.6	7.5	5.7	5.0	-0.7 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	52.3	53.3	47.5	42.9	43.0	0.1 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.0	40.5	39.9	40.1	40.1	0.0 %
Male	41.6	41.2	40.5	40.7	40.6	-0.2 %
Female	40.2	39.6	39.2	39.3	39.3	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.9	-1.3	-1.0	-0.4	-0.6	-0.2 pps
Building and construction	0.6	-0.8	2.3	6.5	9.1	2.6 pps
Services	1.8	2.3	3.9	3.2	2.1	-1.1 pps
Manufacturing industry	1.7	3.1	3.7	4.6	2.7	-1.9 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.5	3.1	3.0	3.9	4.9	1.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.5	2.3	1.5	1.7	2.6	0.9 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.4	1.8	5.6	3.3	4.8	1.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.0	1.4	5.1	3.6	4.9	1.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.9	1.3	1.8	1.1	0.7	-0.4 pps

Slovak Republic	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5422	5431	5438	5446	5453	0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3834	3810	3781	3749	3718	-0.8 %
(% of total population)	70.7	70.2	69.5	68.8	68.2	-0.7 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2719	2738	2726	2713	2702	-0.4 %
Male	1493	1499	1489	1487	1478	-0.6 %
Female	1226	1239	1237	1225	1223	-0.2 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	70.9	71.9	72.1	72.4	72.7	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	31.7	32.4	33.2	32.3	29.7	-2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.3	87.6	86.6	86.5	86.5	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	51.8	53.9	56.4	57.2	59.8	2.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	70.9	71.8	72.1	72.3	72.6	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	81.8	75.8	79.6	78.6	80.6	2.1 pps
Male	77.5	78.3	78.2	78.7	78.8	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	38.3	39.7	39.6	39.7	36.8	-2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.6	93.5	93.1	93.2	93.2	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	58.4	60.1	60.0	61.1	62.9	1.7 pps
Female	64.3	65.4	65.9	65.9	66.4	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	24.9	24.7	26.5	24.5	22.2	-2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.8	81.5	79.8	79.7	79.6	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	45.8	48.2	53.0	53.7	57.0	3.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	62.7	64.9	66.2	67.6	68.4	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	23.3	25.2	26.9	27.5	24.9	-2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.2	80.0	80.0	81.2	82.0	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	47.0	49.0	53.0	54.2	57.0	2.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	18.4	19.8	21.4	21.1	20.7	-0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.6	70.9	72.5	74.1	75.0	1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	76.5	77.3	78.5	79.3	80.6	1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	62.7	64.9	66.2	67.6	68.4	0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	77.3	69.7	75.0	70.4	76.3	5.9 pps
Male	69.5	71.4	72.0	73.9	74.4	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	28.4	31.9	32.4	34.0	31.6	-2.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.1	86.3	86.3	87.9	88.3	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	53.6	55.1	56.6	58.4	60.4	2.0 pps
Female	55.9	58.3	60.3	61.2	62.4	1.1 pps
Young (15-24)	18.0	18.2	21.1	20.6	17.8	-2.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	71.0	73.5	73.4	74.4	75.3	1.0 pps
Older (55-64)	41.0	43.5	49.6	50.4	53.9	3.5 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2405.1	2471.7	2502.1	2533.3	2543.8	0.4 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	2.0	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.0	-1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	2.4	2.8	1.2	1.2	0.4	-0.8 pps
Male	2.3	2.2	0.2	1.8	0.0	-1.9 pps
Female	2.5	3.5	2.5	0.6	1.0	0.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.9	15.2	15.0	14.6	14.8	0.2 pps
Male	18.8	19.1	19.0	18.7	19.1	0.4 pps
Female	10.0	10.4	10.2	9.6	9.7	0.1 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	10.5	9.9	9.4	8.1	7.8	-0.3 pps
Male	9.8	9.7	9.1	7.5	7.1	-0.4 pps
Female	11.3	10.2	9.8	8.7	8.6	-0.1 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.8	5.8	5.8	4.9	4.5	-0.4 pps
Male	4.0	4.1	4.0	3.2	2.9	-0.3 pps
Female	8.0	7.9	8.0	7.0	6.5	-0.5 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	1.7	2.0	1.8	1.3	1.2	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	11.5	9.7	8.1	6.5	5.8	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	26.5	22.2	18.9	14.9	16.1	1.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	10.5	8.7	7.6	6.1	5.3	-0.8 pps
Older (55-64)	9.3	9.0	6.0	5.3	4.7	-0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	37.7	31.7	29.9	30.0	31.3	1.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	11.0	9.2	7.6	5.8	4.9	-0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	6.1	5.7	4.2	3.1	2.5	-0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64)	11.6	9.7	8.2	6.6	5.8	-0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0 pps
Male	10.3	8.8	7.9	6.1	5.6	-0.5 pps
Female	12.9	10.8	8.4	7.0	6.0	-1.0 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	65.8	60.2	62.4	61.7	58.2	-3.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.2	40.1	39.7	39.8	39.8	0.0 %
Male	40.9	40.8	40.5	40.5	40.6	0.2 %
Female	39.2	39.1	38.7	38.9	38.9	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	1.3	-1.1	-0.3	-0.2	0.1	0.3 pps
Building and construction	-0.6	1.6	2.3	2.3	5.2	2.9 pps
Services	2.8	2.5	1.8	2.9	0.6	-2.3 pps
Manufacturing industry	2.4	3.7	3.9	1.7	0.2	-1.5 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.7	2.2	5.4	5.8	6.6	0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	4.0	2.8	4.1	3.7	4.0	0.3 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	3.4	2.9	6.7	6.6	7.3	0.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.7	2.8	6.1	6.5	7.1	0.6 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	2.8	-0.2	0.8	1.7	1.3	-0.4 pps

Finland	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	5481	5495	5508	5516	5522	0.1 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	3455	3445	3434	3421	3410	-0.3 %
(% of total population)	63.0	62.7	62.3	62.0	61.7	-0.3 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2619	2615	2635	2665	2669	0.2 %
Male	1343	1350	1362	1375	1379	0.3 %
Female	1277	1265	1273	1290	1290	0.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.8	75.9	76.7	77.9	78.3	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	52.2	52.2	53.2	53.1	53.9	0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	86.6	86.3	86.8	87.8	87.7	-0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	65.2	66.4	67.8	70.3	71.5	1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	76.1	76.3	77.1	78.3	78.7	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	67.9	67.3	68.7	68.9	68.3	-0.6 pps
Male	77.2	77.7	78.5	79.5	79.9	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	51.1	51.2	52.3	51.5	54.3	2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54)	89.6	89.7	89.8	90.8	90.3	-0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	63.2	65.2	67.5	69.7	70.5	0.8 pps
Female	74.4	74.1	74.9	76.3	76.6	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	53.3	53.2	54.2	54.7	53.5	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.6	82.8	83.6	84.6	84.9	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	67.2	67.6	68.2	70.8	72.4	1.6 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	68.5	69.1	70.0	72.1	72.9	0.9 pps
Young (15-24)	40.5	41.7	42.5	44.0	44.6	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	80.0	79.9	80.6	82.5	83.2	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	60.0	61.4	62.5	65.4	66.8	1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	37.9	38.6	38.5	39.5	39.0	-0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	70.2	70.6	71.1	73.2	74.4	1.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.9	82.9	84.4	86.2	86.2	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	69.0	69.7	70.5	72.7	73.5	0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	55.9	55.5	58.2	57.7	59.7	2.0 pps
Male	69.3	70.5	71.4	73.5	74.1	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	38.2	40.1	41.3	42.6	44.1	1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.5	83.0	83.3	85.3	85.6	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	57.4	59.8	61.6	64.3	64.8	0.5 pps
Female	67.7	67.6	68.5	70.6	71.8	1.2 pps
Young (15-24)	42.8	43.3	43.7	45.5	45.1	-0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	77.3	76.7	77.9	79.5	80.7	1.2 pps
Older (55-64)	62.5	63.0	63.4	66.5	68.7	2.1 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	2367.9	2379.5	2402.6	2464.8	2487.0	0.9 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	-0.1	0.5	1.0	2.5	1.7	-0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	-0.8	0.5	1.0	2.6	0.9	-1.7 pps
Male	-0.7	1.6	1.0	2.6	0.6	-2.0 pps
Female	-0.8	-0.6	0.9	2.6	1.2	-1.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	12.7	12.4	11.6	11.6	11.8	0.2 pps
Male	16.7	16.4	15.0	14.8	14.9	0.1 pps
Female	8.5	8.2	8.1	8.2	8.6	0.4 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.1	15.6	15.8	16.2	15.5	-0.7 pps
Male	12.3	12.9	12.9	13.1	12.7	-0.4 pps
Female	17.8	18.2	18.6	19.2	18.2	-1.0 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.1	14.9	15.1	15.1	15.5	0.4 pps
Male	9.7	10.0	9.9	10.0	10.1	0.1 pps
Female	18.7	20.2	20.5	20.6	21.3	0.7 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.4	5.1	4.8	4.8	4.8	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.4	8.8	8.6	7.4	6.7	-0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	22.4	20.1	20.1	17.0	17.2	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	7.7	7.4	7.1	6.0	5.1	-0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	8.0	7.5	7.8	6.9	6.6	-0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	18.7	17.6	18.9	16.7	17.1	0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	10.4	9.7	9.6	8.4	7.3	-1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	6.1	5.9	5.3	4.3	4.0	-0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.3	8.7	8.6	7.2	6.6	-0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	17.6	17.6	15.2	16.2	12.6	-3.6 pps
Male	9.9	9.0	8.9	7.4	7.2	-0.2 pps
Female	8.8	8.6	8.4	7.3	6.2	-1.1 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	24.6	25.9	24.4	21.9	17.6	-4.3 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	38.5	38.8	38.7	38.5	38.5	0.0 %
Male	40.0	40.2	40.0	39.8	39.8	0.0 %
Female	36.7	37.1	37.0	37.0	36.9	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-3.5	-6.8	-3.2	-3.4	0.5	3.9 pps
Building and construction	1.8	4.8	3.6	4.5	-1.7	-6.2 pps
Services	-0.1	1.0	1.4	3.2	1.9	-1.3 pps
Manufacturing industry	-1.5	-1.0	0.0	1.7	-0.1	-1.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.4	0.9	-1.1	1.3	1.4	0.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	-0.2	0.8	-1.7	-0.6	-0.4	0.2 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.5	0.6	-0.7	1.4	0.8	-0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.3	0.1	0.4	2.1	1.5	-0.6 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.6	2.3	2.2	-1.0	-0.5	0.5 pps

Sweden	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	9799	9923	10058	10175	10279	1.0 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	6170	6214	6290	6347	6404	0.9 %
(% of total population)	63.0	62.6	62.5	62.4	62.3	-0.1 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	5044	5100	5190	5251	5310	1.1 %
Male	2624	2658	2709	2739	2773	1.2 %
Female	2420	2442	2481	2513	2538	1.0 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	81.7	82.1	82.5	82.7	82.9	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	55.1	54.8	54.7	54.1	55.0	0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54)	90.9	90.9	91.2	91.3	91.3	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	78.7	79.7	80.5	81.7	81.5	-0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	82.5	82.9	83.2	83.6	83.9	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	73.1	73.7	75.9	74.5	74.6	0.1 pps
Male	83.5	83.9	84.3	84.4	84.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	53.8	54.2	54.1	52.8	53.9	1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	93.3	93.3	93.6	93.6	93.7	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	81.8	82.5	83.2	84.7	84.1	-0.6 pps
Female	79.9	80.2	80.7	81.0	81.2	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	56.5	55.5	55.4	55.5	56.2	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.4	88.5	88.8	88.9	88.7	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	75.5	76.9	77.8	78.6	78.9	0.3 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	75.5	76.2	76.9	77.4	77.1	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	43.9	44.5	44.9	44.7	43.9	-0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.6	85.9	86.3	86.6	86.4	-0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	74.5	75.5	76.4	78.0	77.7	-0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	46.0	45.8	46.5	46.8	46.0	-0.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	80.9	81.6	82.6	83.0	82.5	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	87.7	88.1	88.1	88.6	88.8	0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.0	78.0	78.6	79.4	79.2	-0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	57.7	57.6	59.8	58.8	59.5	0.8 pps
Male	77.0	77.5	78.3	78.8	78.8	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	42.4	43.1	43.9	43.0	42.9	-0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	87.9	88.1	88.5	88.8	89.0	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	76.8	77.5	78.4	80.4	79.8	-0.6 pps
Female	74.0	74.8	75.4	75.9	75.4	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	45.5	45.9	46.0	46.4	45.1	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.3	83.7	84.1	84.2	83.7	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	72.1	73.5	74.4	75.7	75.6	0.0 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	4659.9	4735.6	4833.9	4910.2	4938.5	0.6 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.5	1.9	2.5	1.6	0.6	-1.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.4	1.6	2.1	1.6	0.6	-1.0 pps
Male	1.2	1.6	2.3	1.7	1.0	-0.7 pps
Female	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.5	0.1	-1.4 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	8.9	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.7	0.2 pps
Male	12.1	11.8	11.8	11.9	12.2	0.3 pps
Female	5.4	5.3	5.1	5.0	5.0	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	16.6	16.1	16.1	15.9	15.7	-0.2 pps
Male	14.9	14.5	14.5	14.3	14.0	-0.3 pps
Female	18.3	17.7	17.7	17.6	17.3	-0.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	24.3	23.9	23.3	22.6	22.5	-0.1 pps
Male	13.2	13.0	13.1	12.9	13.4	0.5 pps
Female	36.3	35.6	34.4	33.3	32.5	-0.8 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	7.1	6.8	6.3	5.5	5.2	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	7.4	7.0	6.7	6.4	6.8	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	20.4	18.9	17.9	17.4	20.1	2.7 pps
Prime age (25-49)	5.8	5.5	5.4	5.2	5.3	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	5.3	5.3	5.1	4.4	4.7	0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	19.7	19.7	19.4	19.5	21.6	2.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.4	5.8	5.2	4.7	5.1	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	4.3	4.1	4.1	3.7	3.8	0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	6.6	5.9	5.5	5.1	5.5	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	21.1	21.8	21.3	21.1	20.2	-0.9 pps
Male	7.6	7.4	7.0	6.5	6.7	0.2 pps
Female	7.3	6.6	6.4	6.2	7.0	0.8 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	20.8	19.4	19.6	18.3	14.3	-4.0 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	39.1	39.4	39.1	39.0	38.8	-0.5 %
Male	39.8	40.1	39.8	39.7	39.5	-0.5 %
Female	37.9	38.3	38.0	38.0	37.7	-0.8 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-1.6	-2.9	0.3	-2.9	-0.9	2.0 pps
Building and construction	2.9	1.8	7.3	3.5	0.5	-3.0 pps
Services	1.7	1.8	2.9	1.9	1.3	-0.7 pps
Manufacturing industry	-2.1	-1.8	2.4	2.6	-0.7	-3.3 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	2.6	2.6	2.1	3.8	3.2	-0.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.5	1.1	-0.1	1.4	0.5	-0.9 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.8	3.8	2.8	2.0	2.6	0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.5	2.6	2.3	1.6	2.8	1.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	3.0	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.4 pps

United Kingdom	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	65110	65648	66040	66436	66833	0.6 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	41287	41430	41539	41656	41757	0.2 %
(% of total population)	63.4	63.1	62.9	62.7	62.5	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	31746	32025	32215	32442	32631	0.6 %
Male	16843	16982	17003	17102	17162	0.4 %
Female	14903	15043	15212	15340	15469	0.8 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	76.9	77.3	77.6	77.9	78.1	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	58.5	58.3	57.5	57.1	56.6	-0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.8	86.1	86.5	86.9	87.2	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	64.4	65.8	66.4	67.5	68.3	0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64)	77.0	77.5	77.7	77.9	78.1	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	75.9	75.9	76.5	77.5	78.3	0.8 pps
Male	82.2	82.4	82.3	82.6	82.5	0.0 pps
Young (15-24)	60.0	59.2	58.2	58.5	57.6	-1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.9	92.2	92.4	92.5	92.6	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	71.4	72.6	72.1	72.7	73.3	0.5 pps
Female	71.7	72.2	72.9	73.2	73.8	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	57.0	57.5	56.8	55.6	55.7	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.8	80.1	80.8	81.3	81.9	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	57.7	59.2	60.9	62.5	63.5	1.0 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.7	73.5	74.1	74.7	75.2	0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	50.0	50.7	50.5	50.6	50.3	-0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.4	82.9	83.8	84.3	84.8	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	62.2	63.4	64.1	65.3	66.3	1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	55.9	58.3	59.6	61.1	60.3	-0.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	73.3	73.8	74.2	74.4	75.0	0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	84.7	84.9	85.0	85.3	85.9	0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.9	73.7	74.3	74.8	75.2	0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.0	71.5	72.4	74.0	74.8	0.8 pps
Male	77.6	78.2	78.6	79.1	79.2	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	50.3	50.4	50.3	51.4	50.1	-1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54)	88.3	89.0	89.6	89.8	90.2	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	68.6	69.5	69.2	70.3	70.9	0.6 pps
Female	67.9	68.8	69.7	70.3	71.1	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	49.7	51.1	50.8	49.9	50.6	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.6	77.0	78.1	78.8	79.6	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	56.0	57.4	59.1	60.6	61.8	1.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	30019.6	30443.6	30785.5	31112.0	31382.2	0.9 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.7	1.5	1.0	1.2	1.1	-0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.6	1.4	1.1	1.1	0.9	-0.2 pps
Male	1.5	1.4	0.7	1.0	0.5	-0.5 pps
Female	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.3	0.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	13.6	14.1	14.0	13.8	14.3	0.5 pps
Male	17.4	17.9	17.7	17.4	18.0	0.7 pps
Female	9.4	9.9	10.0	9.8	10.1	0.3 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.1	5.9	5.6	5.5	5.1	-0.4 pps
Male	5.6	5.4	5.2	5.1	4.6	-0.5 pps
Female	6.5	6.5	6.1	5.8	5.5	-0.3 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	25.2	25.2	24.9	24.6	24.4	-0.2 pps
Male	11.2	11.3	11.1	11.1	10.8	-0.3 pps
Female	41.0	40.9	40.4	39.7	39.4	-0.3 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	4.5	4.0	3.6	3.4	3.2	-0.1 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	5.3	4.8	4.3	4.0	3.8	-0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	14.6	13.0	12.1	11.3	11.2	-0.1 pps
Prime age (25-49)	4.0	3.6	3.2	3.0	2.7	-0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	3.4	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.0	-0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	10.0	8.6	7.6	6.6	6.8	0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	6.1	5.5	4.9	4.8	4.1	-0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.5	0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	5.3	4.8	4.3	4.0	3.7	-0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	6.5	5.8	5.3	4.6	4.5	-0.1 pps
Male	5.5	5.0	4.5	4.1	3.9	-0.2 pps
Female	5.1	4.7	4.2	4.0	3.5	-0.5 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	30.6	27.1	25.9	26.3	24.8	-1.5 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	41.3	41.4	41.2	40.9	40.9	0.0 %
Male	42.6	42.7	42.5	42.2	42.1	-0.2 %
Female	39.0	39.2	38.9	38.8	39.0	0.5 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-8.6	-0.6	5.0	-3.0	-1.8	1.2 pps
Building and construction	2.5	3.8	4.1	0.0	0.3	0.3 pps
Services	2.6	2.1	0.7	1.3	1.4	0.1 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.9	-0.3	1.5	1.5	-1.1	-2.6 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	0.8	3.0	3.0	2.6	4.0	1.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.2	0.9	1.1	0.3	1.9	1.5 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	4.2	1.5	3.1	3.1	3.0	-0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	3.8	1.8	2.7	3.0	3.2	0.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	0.6	0.2	0.7	0.1	0.2	0.1 pps

European Union (28 countries)	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	509792	511348	512432	513591	514914	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	329038	328902	328099	327190	326755	-0.1 %
(% of total population)	64.5	64.3	64.0	63.7	63.5	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	238592	239755	240585	241070	241806	0.3 %
Male	128438	128939	129247	129397	129594	0.2 %
Female	110153	110816	111338	111673	112213	0.5 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.5	72.9	73.3	73.7	74.0	0.3 pps
Young (15-24)	41.5	41.5	41.6	41.6	41.7	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.4	85.5	85.7	85.9	86.1	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	57.3	59.1	60.6	61.9	63.0	1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.6	73.1	73.5	73.8	74.1	0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	71.6	71.2	71.4	72.3	72.8	0.5 pps
Male	78.3	78.5	78.8	79.2	79.4	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	44.2	44.0	44.0	44.2	44.3	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.4	91.4	91.6	91.7	91.8	0.1 pps
Older (55-64)	65.0	66.6	67.8	69.1	70.0	0.9 pps
Female	66.8	67.3	67.8	68.2	68.6	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	38.8	38.9	39.1	38.9	39.0	0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.4	79.5	79.8	80.0	80.4	0.3 pps
Older (55-64)	50.0	52.0	53.8	55.2	56.4	1.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	65.6	66.6	67.6	68.6	69.2	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	33.1	33.7	34.6	35.3	35.7	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	78.0	78.7	79.6	80.4	81.1	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	53.3	55.2	57.1	58.7	60.0	1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	43.7	44.5	45.4	46.2	46.6	0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	69.0	69.9	70.9	71.6	72.1	0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	82.7	83.4	84.0	84.5	84.9	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	66.0	67.0	68.1	69.0	69.7	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	60.7	61.4	62.5	64.0	65.0	1.0 pps
Male	70.8	71.8	72.9	73.8	74.4	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	34.8	35.4	36.3	37.2	37.7	0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54)	83.8	84.6	85.5	86.2	86.8	0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	60.1	62.0	63.7	65.4	66.6	1.2 pps
Female	60.4	61.3	62.4	63.3	64.1	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	31.2	32.0	32.8	33.2	33.7	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	72.2	72.9	73.7	74.6	75.4	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	46.8	48.9	50.8	52.4	53.7	1.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	215783.2	218923.5	221910.9	224296.7	226271.0	0.9 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.0	-0.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.1	1.5	1.4	1.1	0.9	-0.2 pps
Male	1.1	1.4	1.3	1.0	0.7	-0.3 pps
Female	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.1	-0.1 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.1	14.0	13.7	13.5	13.5	0.0 pps
Male	17.8	17.5	17.2	16.9	16.9	0.0 pps
Female	9.9	9.9	9.7	9.5	9.6	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.1	14.2	14.3	14.1	13.6	-0.5 pps
Male	13.8	13.8	13.8	13.6	13.2	-0.4 pps
Female	14.5	14.7	14.8	14.7	14.1	-0.6 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	19.6	19.5	19.4	19.2	19.1	-0.1 pps
Male	8.9	8.8	8.8	8.7	8.7	0.0 pps
Female	32.1	31.9	31.7	31.3	31.3	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	5.7	5.4	5.1	4.8	4.5	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	9.4	8.5	7.6	6.8	6.3	-0.5 pps
Young (15-24)	20.4	18.7	16.9	15.2	14.4	-0.8 pps
Prime age (25-49)	8.7	7.9	7.0	6.3	5.8	-0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	7.0	6.5	5.8	5.2	4.8	-0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	17.9	16.6	15.2	13.7	12.8	-0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	8.8	7.9	7.0	6.3	5.8	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	5.7	5.1	4.6	4.2	4.0	-0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64)	9.1	8.2	7.3	6.5	6.0	-0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	15.2	13.7	12.5	11.5	10.8	-0.7 pps
Male	9.3	8.3	7.4	6.6	6.1	-0.5 pps
Female	9.5	8.7	7.8	7.0	6.5	-0.5 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	48.5	46.8	45.1	43.4	40.5	-2.9 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.5	40.6	40.3	40.2	40.1	-0.2 %
Male	41.5	41.5	41.3	41.1	41.0	-0.2 %
Female	38.9	39.0	38.8	38.7	38.7	0.0 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-3.1	-4.1	0.0	-1.8	-2.8	-1.0 pps
Building and construction	0.7	1.3	1.9	2.3	2.1	-0.2 pps
Services	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.3	-0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.3	1.5	1.6	1.4	0.0	-1.4 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	3.2	-0.5	1.2	2.4	2.6	0.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.0	0.5	0.9	1.1	0.7	-0.3 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	2.0	1.5	2.7	2.8	2.7	-0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	2.3	1.6	2.6	2.9	3.0	0.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.3	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.5	-0.1 pps

Euro Area	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2018-2019
1 - **Population** (LFS, total, 1000 pers.)	339151	340235	340971	341778	342741	0.3 %
2 - **Population** (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.)	218337	218818	218528	218152	218205	0.0 %
(% of total population)	64.4	64.3	64.1	63.8	63.7	-0.2 pps
3 - **Labour force** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	158204	159356	159681	160063	160626	0.4 %
Male	84941	85443	85575	85690	85768	0.1 %
Female	73263	73913	74106	74373	74859	0.7 %
4 - **Activity rate** (% of population 15-64)	72.5	72.8	73.1	73.4	73.6	0.2 pps
Young (15-24)	39.7	39.7	39.8	40.0	40.2	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	85.3	85.5	85.5	85.6	85.8	0.2 pps
Older (55-64)	58.0	59.8	61.3	62.6	63.6	1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64)	72.7	73.1	73.4	73.6	73.9	0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	70.6	70.1	70.1	71.1	71.5	0.4 pps
Male	78.1	78.3	78.5	78.7	78.8	0.1 pps
Young (15-24)	42.2	42.0	42.1	42.6	42.8	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.4	91.4	0.0 pps
Older (55-64)	65.2	66.9	68.1	69.3	70.1	0.8 pps
Female	66.9	67.4	67.7	68.0	68.5	0.4 pps
Young (15-24)	37.2	37.3	37.4	37.3	37.4	0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54)	79.3	79.6	79.6	79.8	80.2	0.4 pps
Older (55-64)	51.2	53.1	54.9	56.3	57.5	1.2 pps
5 - **Employment rate** (% of population 15-64)	64.5	65.4	66.4	67.3	68.0	0.7 pps
Young (15-24)	30.9	31.4	32.3	33.2	33.8	0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54)	76.6	77.4	78.1	79.0	79.7	0.7 pps
Older (55-64)	53.3	55.3	57.1	58.8	60.0	1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	44.1	44.7	45.6	46.3	46.7	0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	68.8	69.7	70.3	71.1	71.5	0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	81.5	82.4	83.0	83.6	84.0	0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64)	65.1	66.1	67.1	67.9	68.6	0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	58.5	59.2	60.2	61.9	62.9	1.0 pps
Male	69.6	70.5	71.5	72.4	73.0	0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	32.5	33.0	33.9	35.2	35.9	0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54)	82.4	83.2	84.1	84.8	85.3	0.5 pps
Older (55-64)	59.5	61.5	63.3	65.0	66.1	1.1 pps
Female	59.4	60.3	61.2	62.1	62.9	0.8 pps
Young (15-24)	29.2	29.7	30.6	31.2	31.7	0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54)	70.8	71.6	72.2	73.1	74.0	0.9 pps
Older (55-64)	47.4	49.4	51.3	52.9	54.2	1.3 pps
6 - **Employed persons** (15-64, 1000 pers.)	140792.2	143162.7	145007.7	146763.4	148296.4	1.0 %
7 - **Employment growth** (%, National accounts)	0.9	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.2	-0.4 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS)	1.0	1.7	1.3	1.2	1.0	-0.2 pps
Male	0.9	1.7	1.3	1.1	0.8	-0.3 pps
Female	1.0	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.4	0.0 pps
8 - **Self employed** (15-64, % of total employment)	14.0	13.8	13.5	13.3	13.3	-0.1 pps
Male	17.6	17.3	16.9	16.6	16.5	-0.1 pps
Female	9.9	9.8	9.7	9.5	9.5	0.0 pps
9 - **Temporary employment** (15-64, % of total employment)	15.4	15.6	16.1	16.2	15.8	-0.4 pps
Male	15.1	15.2	15.6	15.7	15.4	-0.3 pps
Female	15.8	16.0	16.5	16.7	16.1	-0.6 pps
10 - **Part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	21.6	21.6	21.5	21.3	21.4	0.1 pps
Male	9.3	9.4	9.4	9.3	9.3	0.0 pps
Female	36.0	35.8	35.7	35.3	35.3	0.0 pps
11 **Involuntary part-time** (15-64, % of total employment)	6.8	6.5	6.3	5.9	5.6	-0.3 pps
12 - **Unemployment rate** (harmonised:15-74)	10.8	10.0	9.0	8.1	7.5	-0.6 pps
Young (15-24)	22.4	20.9	18.8	16.9	15.7	-1.2 pps
Prime age (25-49)	10.3	9.5	8.6	7.8	7.2	-0.6 pps
Older (55-64)	8.1	7.6	6.8	6.2	5.7	-0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64)	19.4	18.2	16.8	15.2	14.1	-1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64)	9.7	9.0	8.2	7.4	6.9	-0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64)	6.9	6.2	5.5	5.1	4.8	-0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64)	10.4	9.6	8.7	7.8	7.2	-0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64)	17.2	15.5	14.1	12.9	12.0	-0.9 pps
Male	10.7	9.7	8.7	7.8	7.2	-0.6 pps
Female	11.0	10.3	9.4	8.5	7.9	-0.6 pps
13 - **Long-term unemployment** (% of total unemployment)	51.5	50.1	48.9	46.9	44.1	-2.8 pps
14 - **Worked hours** (full-time, average actual weekly hours)	40.4	40.4	40.2	40.2	40.1	-0.2 %
Male	41.3	41.4	41.2	41.1	41.0	-0.2 %
Female	38.7	38.8	38.6	38.6	38.5	-0.3 %
15 - **Sectoral employment growth** (% change)						
Agriculture	-0.9	-0.3	-0.5	-0.4	-1.9	-1.5 pps
Building and construction	0.2	0.3	1.2	2.7	2.0	-0.7 pps
Services	1.5	2.0	2.2	1.9	1.3	-0.6 pps
Manufacturing industry	0.0	0.9	1.0	1.5	0.7	-0.8 pps
16 - **Indicator board on wage developments** (% change)						
Compensation per employee	1.4	1.2	1.7	2.2	1.9	-0.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP	0.0	0.2	0.7	0.8	0.3	-0.5 pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.)	1.3	1.2	2.1	2.4	2.3	-0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total)	1.7	1.3	2.2	2.3	2.5	0.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed)	1.1	0.4	1.0	0.3	0.1	-0.2 pps

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